Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

Characteristics of failed U.S. commercial banks: an exploratory study

This study uses survival analysis to determine how early the indications of bank failure can be observed. We find that banks with high loan to asset and high personal loan to assets ratios are more likely to survive. Older banks and banks with high real estate and agricultural loans, loan loss allowance, loan charges off and non‐performing loans to assets ratio are more likely to fail. It is possible to predict survival functions of <50% for failed banks, 3 years or less before failure. Moreover, we find that most of the variables present a behaviour that departs from Benford’s Law.     

The Effect of Forward‐looking Criteria and IFRS on the Informativeness of Banks’ Loan Loss Allowances: Evidence from Korea

This study analyses how forward‐looking criteria (FLC) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as well as changes in accounting principles, affect the informativeness of banks’ loan loss allowances. The results indicate that although the relationship between non‐performing loans and loan loss allowances strengthened after the application of FLC, the relationship between non‐performing loans and loan loss allowances weakened and that between net charge‐offs and loan loss allowances strengthened after the application of IFRS, presumably because banks delayed the reflection of insolvent loans on loan loss allowances in the latter case. Moreover, the introduction of IFRS did not improve the ability to predict the future charge‐off scale using loan loss allowances, referred to as the ‘informativeness of loan loss allowances’. This result occurred because IFRS's incurred loss model does not incorporate the impact of macroeconomic situations into loan loss allowances in the early stage, although it does enhance the accuracy of loan loss allowances. By exploring the effect of accounting principles on the determinants of loan loss allowances, this study has implications for the assessment of loan loss allowances, capital adequacy and asset quality for stakeholders such as depositors, creditors, capital markets and financial supervisory authorities.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

Loan growth and riskiness of banks

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

Do Loan Loss Provisions Affect the Credit Fluctuations in China’s Banking System?

ABSTRACT

The global financial crisis of 2008 sparked new ideas on pro-cyclical transmission in the financial system. The accounting treatment method of loan loss provisions differs between the accounting standards that banks use and the supervisory rules of banks. This fundamental difference has attracted wide attention from academics and regulators. This article studies whether bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s banking system. We divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. We find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions result in greater credit fluctuation, whereas discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation. Further evidence shows that the relation between non-discretionary loan loss provisions and credit fluctuations does not vary among different types of banks. Overall, our study shows that non-discretionary loan loss provisions can increase credit fluctuation and therefore strengthen banks’ pro-cyclical behavior.     

Corporate Taxes and Securitization

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.     

我国个人住房贷款利率合理水平探讨

本文从个人住房贷款利率水平影响因素角度入手，运用中美两国住房贷款利率水平比较的方法对我国当前的个人住房贷款的合理利率水平进行分析。得出了我国目前的个人住房贷款利率水平偏高的基本结论，认为我国商业银行拥有高于国外同行的超额利润，房贷存在“暴利”，我国浮动利率住房贷款利率水平合理的范围应当在4-5％左右。     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

Does Securitization of Corporate Loans Lead to Riskier Lending?

This paper finds that loans sold to collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) underperform matched unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. We find that banks put less weight on the hard information on borrower risk available to them when they set interest rates on the loans they sell to CLOs, and that they retain less skin in the game on these loans, suggesting that lax underwriting standards contributed to the worse performance of securitized loans. We also find that the median non‐CLO syndicate participant retains a lower stake in securitized loans when compared to loans that are not securitized, suggesting that these investors, like lead banks, expected securitized loans to perform worse.     

Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial Banks

Noninterest income now accounts for over 40% of operating income in the U.S. commercial banking industry. This paper demonstrates a number of empirical links between bank noninterest income, business strategies, market conditions, technological change, and financial performance between 1989 and 2001. The results indicate that well‐managed banks expand more slowly into noninterest activities, and that marginal increases in noninterest income are associated with poorer risk‐return tradeoffs on average. These findings suggest that noninterest income is coexisting with, rather than replacing, interest income from the intermediation activities that remain banks' core financial services function.     

贷款损失准备计提与商业银行经营风险相关性研究 ——基于经理自主权视角

贷款损失准备的计提作为商业银行调节会计利润的手段,是否对商业银行经营风险有影响,是一个值得探讨的问题。基于我国上市商业银行2007-2017年的数据为研究样本进行实证分析,研究结果表明：贷款损失准备对商业银行经营风险有正向信号传递作用。其中,基于经理自主权计提的自由裁量部分能缓释经营风险,非自由裁量部分对经营风险产生加速放大效应,从而证明了自由裁量贷款损失准备能增强银行风险承担能力,为商业银行经理人员和监管者合理规范计提准备金提供新思路。     

The expansion of services in European banking: Implications for loan pricing and interest margins

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.     

Real Activity Forecasts Using Loan Portfolio Information

To extend and monitor loans, banks collect detailed and proprietary information about the financial prospects of their customers, many of whom are local businesses and households. Therefore, banks’ loan portfolios contain potentially useful information about local economic conditions. We investigate the association between information in loan portfolios and local economic conditions. Using a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1990:Q1 to 2013:Q4, we document that information in loan portfolios aggregated to the state level is associated with current and future changes in statewide economic conditions. Furthermore, the provision for loan and lease losses contains information incremental to leading indicators of state‐level economic activity and recessions. Loan portfolio information also helps to improve predictions of economic conditions at more granular levels, such as at the commuting zone level. We discuss the relevance of these findings for economic analysis and forecasting, and the relation of our study to prior work on the informativeness of accounting information about the macroeconomy.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Loan loss accounting and procyclical bank lending: The role of direct regulatory actions

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns.     

Discretion in bank loan loss allowance,risk taking and earnings management

We study whether banks use the allowance for loan losses (ALL) for efficiency or for opportunistic reasons. We find that banks that had higher abnormal ALL during the period prior to the 2007–2009 crisis engaged in less risk taking during the pre‐crisis period and had a lower probability of failure during the crisis period. In testing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, we find that abnormal ALL is unrelated to next period's loss avoidance and just meeting or beating the prior year's earnings. Our results suggest that banks use ALL for efficiency and not for opportunistic purposes.     

Income smoothing among European systemic and non-systemic banks

There is scant research on the financial reporting behaviour of global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs) and non-global systemically-important banks (non-G-SIBs). We examine the link between financial reporting and financial system stability given the understanding that income smoothing is a stability mechanism for banks. We empirically examine whether the way G-SIBs use loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth income differ compared to non-G-SIBs and the incentive to do so. We examine 231 European banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among G-SIBs in the post-crisis period and pronounced among non-G-SIBs in the pre-crisis period. Also, G-SIBs exhibit greater income smoothing when they: (i) have substantial non-performing loans, (ii) are more profitable and meet/exceed minimum regulatory capital ratios (iii) engage in forward-looking loan-loss provisioning and during recessionary periods. The implication of our findings is that capital regulation and abnormal economic fluctuations create incentives for systemic banks to use accounting numbers (loan loss provisions) to smooth income, which also align with the financial system stability objective of bank regulators. Our findings are useful to accounting standard setters in their evaluation of the role of reported accounting numbers for financial system stability, given the current regulatory environment in Europe which focuses on systemic banks.