World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World GDP now seen falling 2.8% in 2020

• ▀ With much of the global economy now in some form of lockdown due to the coronavirus pandemic, we expect world GDP to contract by about 7% in H1 2020. Activity is expected to rebound sharply in H2, but even so the severity of the shock is likely to lead to a permanent GDP loss for the global economy.
• ▀ While Chinese activity picked up in late-Q1 as lockdown restrictions were unwound, we expect Q1 GDP to have fallen 12% q/q before rebounding sharply in Q2. But this Q2 boost looks set to be swamped by the collapse in activity caused by the rest of the world going into lockdown.
• ▀ Although shutdown restrictions elsewhere are less severe than those imposed in China, business survey and labour market data still point to sharp falls in activity in most countries in Q2. Quarterly GDP declines of 8% or more in the US and eurozone seem likely. Overall, world GDP could fall by about 7% in H1, roughly double the size of the contraction during start of the global financial crisis in 2009.
• ▀ In those economies subject to some form of lockdown, we expect restrictions to begin to be lifted during Q2. As a result, growth should resume in Q3 as sectors that have been forced to shut down see some pick-up. But despite this rebound, world GDP is now seen shrinking 2.8% in 2020 overall — in 2009, the global GDP fall was 1.1%.
• ▀ The H2 pick-up, followed by a return to more normal conditions next year, will result in world GDP growth rising to almost 6% in 2021, helped also by the recent collapse in oil prices to about $30pb. But the scale of the disruption means that we expect a permanent loss of output from the shock. We expect global GDP in the medium term to be some 1.5% below the level we had anticipated before the coronavirus outbreak.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast are large and broadly balanced. But were stringent lockdowns or widespread disruption, perhaps due to renewed outbreaks of the virus, to extend into Q3, global GDP could fall by as much as 8% this year.

     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

Determinants of total factor productivity in former Soviet Union economies: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper investigates the process of GDP generation in former Soviet Union (FSU) economies to provide an understanding of the impact of technology channels on countries’ efficiency. We apply a stochastic frontier approach to 15 FSU economies over the period 1995–2008 and find that FDI and human capital improve countries’ technical efficiency. Furthermore, we show that these factors also have a positive impact on total factor productivity (TFP), which, in turn, improves real GDP growth. Hence, our results suggest that FSU countries should promote public policies that provide incentives to attract foreign investment and enhance domestic education in order to improve their economic growth. Additionally, our empirical evidence argues against the resource curse hypothesis. We also show, by computing efficiency change and technological change indices at the country level, that FSU economies benefit more from exploiting technological progress than from catching up to the best practice frontier.     

Regional trade agreement and foreign direct investment

This paper investigates the relationship between regional trade agreements, such as the NAFTA, and FDI. Using a fixed-effects gravity model to estimate OECD panel data spanning 1982–1997, we learn that trade integration encourages FDI. We find specific evidence for each of the NAFTA member countries—Mexico, Canada and the United States. In addition, we find evidence that FDI will rise with host and parent country GDP and fall with distance.     

World,country, and sector factors in international business cycles

Do sector-specific factors common to all countries play an important role in explaining business cycle co-movement? We address this question by analyzing international co-movements of value added (VA) growth in a multi-sector dynamic factor model. The model contains a world factor, country-specific factors, sector-specific factors, and idiosyncratic components. We estimate the model using Bayesian methods for 30 disaggregated sectors in the G7 economies for the 1974–2004 period. Our findings show that, although there is a substantial role for sector-specific factors, fluctuations are dominated by country-factors. The world factor appears to play a minimal role because, when using aggregate data, the world factor captures both the factor common to all countries and industries and the factor common to the same industry across countries. We then examine how these factors evolved as globalization deepened over the past two decades. Our results suggest that business cycles at a disaggregate level have not become more synchronized internationally. This is mainly driven by a substantial fall in the volatility of world shocks during the globalization period, rather than a lower sensitivity of sectoral growth to world factors. Our results also reveal that world factors appear to be more important for industries with a higher level of international vertical integration.     

Are we there yet? On the convergence of financial reforms

Since the 1970s, there have been substantial financial reforms across the world, however little research has been devoted to studying the convergence path of these reforms. While Abiad and Mody (Am Econ Rev 95:66–88, 2005) find that there is movement towards a global ‘norm’ of financial reform, their findings are based upon a cross-sectional approach that has been widely criticized in the literature. In this paper we offer new time-series evidence on the convergence of financial reforms both across and within regions, which can also act as a metric to measure the degree of globalization among countries’ financial systems. We find that some regions of the world have fully converged, but the advanced economies and Sub-Saharan Africa are not converging. In addition, while most countries have fully converged within their own region, notable exceptions are also identified. These results suggest that while financial reforms have largely become homogenized, important distinctions still remain.     

Development threshold,capital flows,and financial turbulence

We study capital flows in a panel of 130 countries, and derive the implications for the observed patterns of capital flows and capital controls before and into the crisis of 2008–11. We find that the size of capital flows is positively correlated with country's income level. In addition, capital flight has a non-linear relationship with the income level. Using the Hansen threshold estimation, we identify a three-stage threshold effect: for low-income countries (GDP per capita below US$ 3,000), capital flight increases as the income level rises; and only after the economy passes a threshold level (GDP per capita above US$ 5,000), capital flight declines with income. We conclude with a case study of Brazil and Korea, observing that the decisions to implement capital control measures tend to be pushed around by the feedbacks among economic growth, currency appreciation, and the global financial conditions.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion

• ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
• ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
• ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
• ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
• ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.

     

World economy

The recent run of soft survey data suggests that an imminent rebound in global GDP growth is unlikely and that concerns about slowing growth and trade tensions may now be taking a toll on service sector activity. We still forecast global GDP growth to slow into early next year but while recession risks have increased, we do not see this as the most likely scenario. In both 2019 and 2020 as whole we expect global GDP growth to average 2.5% each year, the weakest rate since 2009.     

Energy consumption and economic growth

The present paper discusses methods originally proposed by Adams and Miovic in 1968 (then refined and used later by many other authors) for calculating the output elasticity of useful energy consumption (?). We first show that this methodological approach is quite dubious. Better alternative methods of estimation are then proposed. We also stress that, since the marginal rate of interfuel substitution depends on the GDP functional form, the simulataneous use of several functional forms of GDP in energy studies leads obviously to misleading interpretations. Using thermal efficiency coefficients and OECD countries figures for the 1959–73 period, we finally found that ? did steadily fall from high values to values which are still higher than one.     

What Does Trade Openness Measure?

An empirical measure of trade openness is defined as the ratio of total trade to GDP, and represents a convenient variable routinely used for cross‐country studies on a variety of issues. However, the effects that the crude measure captures remain ambiguous, making it difficult to interpret the empirical results. Drawing on several strands of the literature, this study examines the informational content of the trade openness measure using intranational and international data. We find that, even for fully integrated economies within a country, trade openness is approximately half as variable as it is for segmented diverse countries around the world. The information it conveys is better characterized as the extent of the economic remoteness and idiosyncratic distribution of sectoral production. The cross‐country variation of trade openness derives more from the variability in GDP than trade.     

Global and Country‐Specific Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance

We identify global and country‐specific measures of output growth uncertainty for a large OECD country sample by means of a dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility. We find evidence for major bouts of global uncertainty in the early 1970s and late 2000s, and a number of periods with elevated levels of either global or national uncertainty, particularly in the early 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. VAR impulse responses of national macroeconomic variables to our estimated measures of uncertainty reveal that global uncertainty is the major driver of macroeconomic performance in most countries, whereas the impact of national uncertainty is small and frequently insignificant. We also find that uncertainty is transmitted primarily through investment and trade flows rather than through consumption demand.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Coronavirus to cut global growth to new lows

• ▀ The rapid spread of coronavirus will weaken China's GDP growth sharply in the short term, causing disruption for the rest of the world. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to just 1.9% y/y in Q1 this year and have lowered our forecast for 2020 as a whole from 2.5% to 2.3%, down from 2.6% in 2019.
• ▀ Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, there had been signs that the worst was over for both world trade and the manufacturing sector. However, this tentative optimism has been dashed by the current disruption.
• ▀ While the near-term impact of the virus is uncertain, the disruption to China will clearly be significant in Q1 – we expect Chinese GDP growth to plunge to just 3.8% y/y. Even though growth there will rebound in Q2 and Q3, it will take time for the loss in activity to be fully recovered and we now expect GDP growth of just 5.4% for 2020 as a whole, a downward revision of 0.6pp from last month.
• ▀ Weaker Chinese imports and tourism and disruption to global supply chains will take a toll on the rest of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. And the shock will exacerbate the ongoing slowdown in the US and may result in the eurozone barely expanding for a second quarter running in Q1.
• ▀ Weaker oil demand in the short term has prompted us to lower our Brent oil price forecast. We have cut our projection for growth in crude demand in 2020 by 0.2m b/d to 0.9 mb/d and now forecast Brent crude will average $62.4pb in 2020, down from about $65pb in our January forecast.
• ▀ Quarterly global growth is likely to strengthen a little in H2 this year as the disruption fades and firms make up for the lost output earlier in the year and the effect of China's policy response starts to feed through. But for 2020 overall, global growth is now likely to be just 2.3%, 0.2pp weaker than previously assumed as a result of the epidemic.

     

A comparison of monthly global indicators for forecasting growth

This paper evaluates the predictive content of a set of alternative monthly indicators of global economic activity for nowcasting and forecasting quarterly world real GDP growth using mixed-frequency models. It shows that a recently proposed indicator that covers multiple dimensions of the global economy consistently produces substantial improvements in forecasting accuracy, while other monthly measures have more mixed success. Specifically, the best-performing model yields impressive gains with MSPE reductions of up to 34% at short horizons and up to 13% at long horizons relative to an autoregressive benchmark. The global economic conditions indicator also contains valuable information for assessing the current and future state of the economy for a set of individual countries and groups of countries. This indicator is used to track the evolution of the nowcasts for the U.S., the OECD area, and the world economy during the COVID-19 pandemic and the main factors that drive the nowcasts are quantified.     

Forecasting macroeconomic risks

We construct risks around consensus forecasts of real GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation. We find that risks are time-varying, asymmetric, and partly predictable. Tight financial conditions forecast downside growth risk, upside unemployment risk, and increased uncertainty around the inflation forecast. Growth vulnerability arises as the conditional mean and conditional variance of GDP growth are negatively correlated: downside risks are driven by lower mean and higher variance when financial conditions tighten. Similarly, employment vulnerability arises as the conditional mean and conditional variance of unemployment are positively correlated, with tighter financial conditions corresponding to higher forecasted unemployment and higher variance around the consensus forecast.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Outlook darkens as coronavirus spreads

• ▀ What began as a supply shock in China has morphed into something much more serious. The effects of financial market weakness and the disruption to daily life around the world will trigger lower consumer spending and investment on top of the disruptions to the global supply chain. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to 2.0% this year from 2.6% in 2019, before picking up to 3.0% in 2021. But a global pandemic would lead to a far bigger slowdown this year.
• ▀ China seems to have made progress in containing the spread of the coronavirus, but the slow return to business as normal has prompted us to cut year-on-year GDP growth in Q1 from 3.8% to 2.3%, the weakest in decades. But we expect a healthy growth rebound in Q2 which will also provide Asian economies with a lift.
• ▀ It is isolation policies not infection rates that determine the economic impact. Outbreaks around the world are leading authorities to announce a growing list of measures to curb the virus spread. At a global level any Q2 rebound will thus be small at best. We expect investment in the advanced economies as a whole to contract on a year-on-year basis in Q2 for the first time since the global financial crisis, while annual household spending growth may slow to its lowest since the eurozone crisis.
• ▀ Our baseline assumes that the global economy will return to business as usual in Q3 and that some catch-up will result in robust H2 GDP growth. Combined with favourable base effects in early-2021, this is expected to result in world GDP growth averaging about 3% in 2021.
• ▀ Since January, we have cut our 2020 global GDP growth forecast by a hefty 0.5pp. But larger revisions may be required if the disruption triggered by shutdowns and other responses to coronavirus proves longer than we assume currently or if more draconian actions are needed in the event of a global pandemic. Our scenarios suggest that the latter could push the global economy into a deep recession.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global upswing delayed

• This month sees our global GDP growth forecast for 2015 revised down to 2.7%, implying no improvement from 2014. At the start of the year, we expected world growth for 2015 at 2.9%.
• A key factor behind the slippage in our global forecast has been a softening of activity in the US. The balance of economic surprises (actual data versus expected) has deteriorated sharply in recent months. As a result, we now expect US growth at 2.7% this year, compared to 3.3% at the start of 2015.
• We are wary of reading too much into the most recent data, as the US and other advanced economies also went through ‘soft patches’ at the starts of both 2013 and 2014, but recovered. Also, the balance of economic surprises for the G10 is only moderately negative – and is strongly positive for the Eurozone.
• One area of concern is sluggish US consumption recently – despite lower oil prices. But with labour market conditions favourable and disposable income growing solidly, we expect this to prove a blip. And the evidence from advanced economies as a whole suggests lower oil prices have boosted consumers.
• There are nevertheless genuine drags on global growth. The strong dollar appears to be weighing on US exports and investment, and curbing profits. It is also damaging growth in some emerging markets through its negative impact on commodity prices and capital flows and via balance sheet effects (raising the burden of dollar‐denominated debt).
• Meanwhile, this month also sees a fresh downgrade to our forecast for China – GDP is now expected to rise 6.6% this year versus 6.8% a month ago. This reflects weakness in a number of key indicators and also the likely impact of a squeeze on local government finances from the property sector slump.
• With the US and China representing a third of global GDP, slower growth there will also tend to retard world trade growth. We continue to expect world GDP growth to reach 3% in 2016, but 2015 now looks like being another year of sub‐par global growth.

     

Addressing the growth failure of the oil economies: The role of financial development

The oil exporting countries have experienced a relatively continuous fall in GDP per capita over the last 30 years. This is in spite of benefiting from a more than average of the rest of the world investment rate. The findings of this paper, report a lower level of financial development for the oil economies when compared with the rest of the world. We will show in this paper that the higher rate of investment of the oil economies can be explained mainly by the oil revenues and surprisingly, financial development has a net dampening effect on investment for these economies. The paper also shows that the weakness of financial institutions, contributes to the poor performance of economic growth of the oil economies and the weakness of financial institutions might be associated with the dominant role of government in total investment and the weakness of private sector.     

World trade recovering but still reasons for caution

• ? World trade has picked up in recent months, expanding at the fastest pace in six years in the first quarter, with the rise fairly evenly split between advanced and emerging markets. Stronger activity in China and a broader upturn in global investment have been key factors. But there are still reasons for caution. Although the ‘cyclical’ element in world trade is improving, the ‘trend’ element is not thanks to changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation.
• ? World trade growth looks set to reach about a 4% annual rate in Q1 2017, the fastest pace since 2011. Alternative freight‐based indicators confirm the upturn. This suggests some modest near‐term upside risk to our world growth forecasts.
• ? Recent growth has been evenly split between advanced countries and emerging markets (EM). In EM, the end of deep recessions in Russia and Brazil and an upturn in China have been key factors. China directly added 0.5 percentage points to annual world trade growth over recent months and firmer growth there has also pushed up commodity prices and the spending power and imports of commodity exporters.
• ? Another important positive factor is an improvement in investment, which is a trade‐intensive element of world GDP. Rising capital goods imports across a range of countries suggest the drag on world trade from weak investment is fading.
• ? The decline in the ratio of world trade growth to world GDP growth over recent years has both cyclical and structural elements. But while the cyclical component now seems to be improving, there is little evidence that the structural part – responsible for between a half and two‐thirds of the recent decline – is doing likewise.
• ? Key factors behind the structural decline in world trade growth are changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation/protectionism. Both are likely to remain a drag over the coming years. Meanwhile, a levelling‐off of growth in China and drop back in commodity prices could curb the recent cyclical uptick.

     

Patterns of business creation,survival and growth: Evidence from Africa

We study firm dynamics using a novel database of all formally registered firms in Cote d'Ivoire from 1977 to 1997, which account for about 60% of GDP. First, we examine entry and exit patterns and the role of new and exiting firms versus incumbents in job creation and destruction. We find that while the rate of job creation at new firms is quiet high – at 8% on average – the numbers of jobs added by new firms is small in absolute terms. Next, we examine survival rates and find that the probability of survival increases monotonically with firm size, but that manufacturing and foreign-owned firms face higher likelihoods of exit compared to service oriented and domestically-owned firms. We find that higher GDP growth increases the probability of firm survival, but this is a broad impact with no firm size disproportionately affected. In robustness checks we find that post-1987, size is no longer a significant determinant of firm survival for new entrants, suggesting that the operating environment for firms changed. Finally, we find that trade and fiscal reform episodes raised the probability of firm exit and attenuated the survival disadvantages faced by smaller firms, but exchange rate revaluation and pro-private sector reforms did not significantly lower the likelihood of exit.