On the democratic legacy of colonialism

The article features a temporal approach to analyzing the impact of Western colonialism on contemporary levels of democracy. We present a new data set with dates of colonization, independence, and a colonizing event for all former colonies and dependencies that are regarded as countries today (143 observations). Our data, as well as the existing literature, suggest that the very heterogeneous era of colonization should be divided into an early ‘mercantilist’ wave and a much later ‘imperialist’ wave with quite different characteristics. We show that there is a strong positive effect of colonial duration on democracy, an effect which turns out to be driven primarily by former British colonies and by countries colonized during the imperialist era.     

经济民主与社会主义市场经济的政治经济学含义:基于生产方式视角的分析

长期以来,作为社会主义市场经济的政治经济学含义的主要载体,经济民主的作用并不明显。出现这一现象的原因有二:在理论上,学界关于经济民主的论述强调生产关系视角而忽视生产方式视角。这样的把握方式导致经济民主体系处于悬置的状态;在现实中,将美国型市场经济视为唯一的参照系导致具有后福特主义色彩的经济民主无法进入政策议程。本文认为,以生产方式视角下的经济民主为中心,有选择、有秩序地推进经济民主是当下的现实选择。     

法学与政治：内生民主化

作者指出，经济发展增加了一国发生民主化转变的可能性。他们的这一结论与Przeworski及其合作者的观点相抵触，后者认为，发展只能起到维持既存民主的作用，而无法促成民主化转变的发生。通过全面地处理样本选择及模型规范方面的问题，作者发现，经济增长的确导致了非民主国家向民主化方向转变的发生。他们指出，在十九世纪中叶到二战前这百余年时间里，经济增长对于民主化转变发生可能性的影响十分明显，甚至比它在维持民主稳定方面的作用更加显著。同时，他们指出，在未来的几十年里，一些取得了一定程度的经济发展但仍由独裁政权统治的国家，发生民主化的几率会随着它们的经济发展水平的提高而提高。例如，当一国人均收入达12000美元时，该国有望最快在三年之内实现民主化。     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies

The paper develops a theoretical rationale for a non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and government spending. A model is presented showing why and how political participation influences the spending behavior of opportunistic governments that can choose an optimal combination of rents and public goods to attract political support. If the level of democracy remains low, governments rationally prefer rents as an instrument to assure political support. With increasing democratic participation, however, rents become an increasingly expensive (per unit of political support) instrument while the provision of public goods becomes more and more efficient in ensuring the incumbent government's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy, which drives a country from a pure autocracy to a semi-participatory system, tends to reduce government spending, while an increase in political participation from a semi-participatory country to a full democracy tends to raise the size of the public sector.     

Toward Subnational Democracies of Scale: Tensions between Democratic Legitimacy,Legality, and Effective Governance

Although democracy is often discussed as a universally applicable ideology, the liberal democratic state tends to assess democracy on the basis of government institutions. This paper argues that democratic institutionalism favours national governments and makes it difficult for subnational governments to expand their governance capacity and exercise additional powers. Greenland, Shetland, and Tresco (Isles of Scilly) serve as case studies of different subnational strategies for exercising greater governance capacity: 1) Actual adherence to democratic form (Greenland), 2) Symbolic adherence to democratic form (Shetland), and 3) Operating external to democratic form (Tresco). Despite the efforts of local governance actors, governance in these three island communities has proved problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy, legality, and/or effectiveness. It is argued that pressure toward the development of liberal democratic government institutions can in fact decrease the quality of subnational democracy. This requires a reassessment of definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. It is necessary to pursue place-specific and community-sensitive democracies of scale if we wish to democratically empower local communities.     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?

This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for.     

Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections

Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections? Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights? These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.     

当前中国发展基层民主的途径探索

发展基层民主、保障人民享有更多更切实的民主权利是发展社会主义民主政治的基础性工程。改革开放以来,学者们就如何推进和发展基层民主的方法、途径和措施等方面进行了深入地研究,取得了一系列成果。在把握当前中国基层民主发展现状的基础上,进一步探索有效发展基层民主的途径,对于加强社会主义民主政治建设具有重要理论和实践意义。     

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Political scientists and policy‐makers agree that democratic states were less likely to engage each other in militarized disputes than were other states during the Cold War. Most among them attribute this to their domestic political structures. Some, however, believe that the common and conflicting interests that the East–West conflict induced explain the relatively low democratic‐dispute rate. Evidence from the post‐Cold War world can help to arbitrate between these very different claims, as the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the bipolar system, precipitated a sharp rise in the number of democracies, and shifted dispute‐rate patterns. The analyses in this paper show that dyadic dispute rates converge after the Cold War, casting doubt on the existence of a democratic peace.     

参与机制对党内民主建设的价值考量

党内民主作为一种民主形式,与广大党员积极参与是不可分割的。党的代表大会制度是党内民主的根本制度,其本质就是一种党内参与机制;完善党内选举制度的方式就是让广大党员行使参与权利;保障党员民主权利是党内民主的最终归宿,其实现途径就是党内参与机制;扩大党务公开透明是党内民主的表现形式,其目的就是通畅党内参与渠道;党内监督制度是党内民主的重要功能,其制约作用需要通过参与机制来发挥。     

Export Growth and Economic Development in Colonial British America

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between tobacco and the rest of the economy in the colonial Chesapeake to test the staple theory version of the export-led growth hypothesis. The paper adopts a multivariate time-series approach which accommodates the presence of cointegration and contemporaneous correlations among innovations. The empirical evidence strongly supports the staple theory. British demand for tobacco is statistically exogenous and found to induce cyclical fluctuations in the colonial price of tobacco as well as temporary over- or underproduction, as measured by a long-term cointegration relationship between the British demand for tobacco and the colonial price of land.     

Do unfair perceived own pay and top managers’ pay erode satisfaction with democracy?

Many people are relatively unsatisfied with the democratic system as it currently exists. In this empirical research note, the authors present evidence that German workers, who perceive their own pay or top managers’ pay as unfair, are on average significantly less happy with the democracy in Germany. Thus, fairness perceptions in the labour market and of income inequality seem to have spillover effects on the overall satisfaction with the democratic system.     

Political origins of financial structure

There is growing policy interest in the role of financial structure in promoting development. However, very little is known about how different financial structures emerge and evolve. In this paper we empirically assess the political origins of financial structure. Using difference–in difference estimation and annual data, we study the effects of democratization on financial structure in a sample of 96 countries covering the period 1970–2005. Democratization here corresponds to the event of becoming a democracy. We find that democratization leads to a more market-based financial system. Democratic change could also be incremental rather than a one off. To identify the effect of incremental democratic change on financial structure we estimate a separate model and find that democracy matters. We also find that countries with substantial democratic capital are more likely to have a market-based financial structure. Our main results are robust to a variety of controls, Arellano–Bond GMM estimation, alternative measures of democracy and financial structure, and across different samples.     

Democracy and Economic Growth: Optimal Level and Transmission Channels

After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of –1.113 percent, fully democratic countries have a conditioned growth rate of 1.146 while countries with the optimal level of democracy/autocracy have a conditioned growth rate of 2.665. In the case of a fully dictatorial country, moving one unit towards democracy can raise the GDP growth rate by about 1.725 points; while for a fully democratic country, moving towards autocracy by one unit can raise the growth rate by about 0.885 points. This study provides useful information for many developing countries which are experiencing substantial pressures to restructure their political system.     

The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default

Many have argued that democracies are able to make credible commitments to repay their debts and consequently enjoy higher sovereign credit ratings. In contrast to this expectation, I argue that the advantage of democracies in credit ratings is conditional on the countries' level of financial vulnerability and adjustment needs. Because democracies have more diffuse decision-making and are more accountable to the public, they encounter greater difficulty than autocracies in passing unpopular economic adjustment measures. Thus, I argue that democracies with high debt levels and low foreign reserve assets experience worse credit outcomes, whereas democracies with low vulnerability experience more positive outcomes. In a sample of up to 96 developing countries, I show that democracies have worse credit ratings and CDS Spreads and are more likely to default than their autocratic counterparts when foreign reserves are low relative to external debt. Notably, I also show that large debt burdens increase credit risk mainly in more democratic countries. I further test the causal pathway of the democratic advantage by constructing democracy scores of “market-friendly” and “adjustment-difficulty” democracy, finding that democracy worsens debt outcomes due to adjustment difficulty. These findings help to revise and clarify the causal logic surrounding the democratic advantage hypothesis.     

Short and long run democracy diffusion

Does democracy diffuse across borders? If so, how long does it take? Can diffusion cause path dependence, such that if a region is initially democratic (or autocratic), it becomes increasingly so? In this paper I estimate short and long run regional democratic diffusion and account for feedback to and from other countries within the region. Although it is difficult to establish causality, I estimate that when regional democracy in year (t-1) increases, domestic democracy receives or “catches” 40–42% of the increase in the next 5 years, 55–61% in 10 years, and 68–85% in the long run prior to accounting for feedback. When I account for feedback, the average region converges to a unique long-run democracy level regardless of how democratic it is initially. I also provide region-specific and contiguous neighbor estimates, use the model to explain democratization waves, and estimate the alternative V-DEM dataset. In the V-DEM data, democracy diffuses much faster, although the long-run diffusion effects are comparable.     

Trade uncertainty,income, and democracy

Existing studies establish a strong correlation between income and democracy. Little, however, is known about whether income shocks driven by non-economic fundamentals matter for political transitions. This study employs trade uncertainty as a non-economic fundamental and examines the effect that trade uncertainty driven income variations have on democratic transitions over the period 1960–2013. We find that higher income fosters democratic transitions, but this effect works mainly for developing than developed countries. Specifically, using trade uncertainty as an instrument, we find that the Polity2 score, a measure of democracy, increases by at least 2.3 points following a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth. This positive association is robust to exploiting conditional heteroskedasticity for identification, using different time periods, including lagged Polity2 as a regressor, and using alternative measures of GDP and democracy.