Public trust and corruption perception: disaster relief

Public trust in government and nongovernment organizations is essential to the public’s willingness to donate and to support those organizations. We measure public trust in disaster aid using people’s perception of these organizations’ effectiveness in delivering aid relief to the victims of two recent major earthquakes in China. Based on the survey data collected in 2013 from about 2100 residents in Hong Kong, we document the vulnerability of these residents’ trust perceptions in aid delivery. We find that the sharp decline in trust perception is highly negatively correlated with their perception of corruption of local governments in China.     

Bootstrapping for standard errors of instrumental variable estimates

Theil and Finke (1983) used the distance from the equator as an instrumental variable (IV) in the estimation of a cross-country demand system. Here we obtain standard errors of the IV estimates using Efron's (1979) bootstrap technique.     

Gravity models,PPML estimation and the bias of the robust standard errors

In gravity models with exporter and importer dummies, the robust standard errors of the slope parameters tend to be severely downward biased when estimated by PPML. The coverage rate of confidence intervals of the estimated slope parameters may thus be much too small in cross-sections of the size typically used in empirical research.     

The power of negative thinking: corruption,perception and willingness to bribe in Ukraine

This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and the willingness to offer bribes, as well as of the influence of different sources of information on corruption perception in the Ukraine. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting corruption. Since corruption scandals in Ukraine seldom result in legal action, information about corruption in the mass media might actually encourage people to give bribes. This study found that corruption perception is one of the key factors in giving a bribe and that its positive/negative effects strongly depend on institutions and government policies.     

A Monte Carlo approach to compute the asymptotic standard errors of dynamic multipliers

A Monte Carlo method to compute asymptotic standard errors of dynamic multipliers is proposed. It is applied to Hein's Model I to find standard error of interim multipliers of taxes on nominal income.     

Asymptotic standard errors of point elasticities calculated from simultaneous equation systems

An expression for the asymptotic covariance matrix of point elasticities, computed from a simultaneous linear equation system with estimated coefficients, is derived in this paper. Numerical examples are provided using the Klein-I model estimated by 2SLS.     

On the persistence of corruption

This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.     

The economics of corruption

This paper considers the relationship between market structure and the incidence of corrupt dealings in the government contracting process. Three cases are analyzed. We first deal with a situation in which government preferences are well-defined and many firms compete for the contract; we then contrast this case with one in which government preferences are ‘vague’ and finally eliminate the competitive assumption to consider the case of bilateral monopoly. It is then possible to consider the extent to which various criminal sanctions will deter corruption and the degree to which criminal incentives can be reduced by revising contracting procedures and reorganizing market structures.     

Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232, 1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.     

Explaining the Concentration-Profitability Paradox

This paper explains an empirical paradox which is often found, but generally ignored: a significant negative econometric relationship between profitability and market share concentration. The phenomenon can appear when there is a negative correlation between market share and costs—for example due to economies of scale. I show that concentration becomes an indicator for the cost competitiveness of direct rivals within an industry. Profitability of a given firm is undermined if price correlates positively with average industry costs (Classical natural prices) and frictions like sunk costs make an industry exit expensive for firms. This idea also explains the frequent findings of highly persistent profit rate differentials.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.     

The welfare costs of corruption

Corruption has been shown to affect a variety of economic indicators, especially GDP per capita. However, as GDP is not a genuine indicator of welfare, it may reflect the welfare costs of corruption only in an incomplete way. This article uses self-rated subjective well-being as an empirical approximation to general welfare and shows that cross-national welfare?–?operationalized in this way?–?is affected by corruption not only indirectly through GDP, but also directly through nonmaterial factors. This article estimates the size of these effects as well as their monetary equivalent. The direct effect?–?not previously investigated in the corruption literature?–?is found to be substantially larger than the indirect effect.     

Inequality, corruption and the informal sector

The marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is shown to be a linear function of the size of the informal sector. This implies that anti-corruption policies alone are unlikely to reduce inequality in countries with a large informal sector.     

也说腐败发展的库兹涅茨曲线

在经济发展的过程中,腐败现象存在一种倒U型的发展轨迹。制度建设的滞后,一方面导致了有害于社会发展的腐败的盛行,另一方面也使得腐败成为了改革和发展的润滑剂。而到了经济增长成熟的阶段,随着制度建设的完善,腐败会逐渐下降。     

腐败的预警预控体系分析

分析了在我国建立腐败预警预控体系的紧迫性和必要性,界定了腐败预警预控体系的定义和内涵,建立了腐败预警预控体系的结构,并详细阐释了腐败预警预控体系的运用流程,为我国腐败的预警预控工作提供参考和借鉴。     

公务员腐败成本—收益的经济学分析

腐败的根本原因是目前的制度安排缺陷，导致腐败成为“高收益低风险”行为，而廉洁成为“低收益”行为，同时公务员缺乏对国家的“信赖感”、对退休之后生活的“安全感”和长期收益的“信任感”。防止国家公务员腐败的根本措施是通过制度创新，使腐败成为被查出概率极高，政治风险极大，经济成本极高，逃避受到法律制裁惩治的程度极小，个人及利益相关者的精神或名誉受到严重损害的行为，同时，使公务员廉洁能够获得较高的收益。     

Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China

Fiscal recentralization in China in the 1990s introduced incentives that changed the form of corruption at the local government level from the helping-hand to the grabbing-hand type. Against the background of the experience of China, this paper describes how the central–local government revenue-sharing rule introduces strategic considerations that affect the form of corruption and thereby economic growth. Information regarding the possibilities for substitution in the form of corruption is shown to be relevant for decisions regarding fiscal centralization. However, the consequences of the decisions made in China suggest that such information was either not available or was not taken into account.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

论国家权限与政府腐败

马克思主义者认为,国家是超出其他一切以维持和维护阶级统治和剥削为职能的一种机构。国家征税是权力当做资本的结果。国家通过征税参与剩余价值的分配,但国家权力资本分配财富不是无限的。在市场经济中,政府对于维护国家经济安全负有重要的责任。制度的腐败导致官员生活的腐化,对官员权力寻租的批判不应当脱离人的本性。