Domestic trade protection in vertically-related markets

We consider trade policy in a setting where home country firms are fully dependent on vertically-integrated foreign firms for supplies of a key input. We find that vertically-integrated firms' strategic considerations play an important role and that, in particular, a tariff on final goods may either increase or decrease the domestic price of final goods. The import of final goods is always taxed to extract and shift rents from foreign firms, while the import of intermediate goods can be either taxed or subsidized. The market structure is shown to be an important consideration when making trade policy.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Intrafirm trade and the developing countries: an assessment of the data

The state of general empirical knowledge of the extent of and trends in intrafirm international trade are surveyed with attention concentrated on United States and Canadian data sources. Focus is on conceptual and definitional distinctions, U.S. trade with U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates, U.S. related-party imports, international subcontracting and value added tariffs, aggregative data from individual developing countries, and customs documents as micro-level data soruces. In this effort to outline the reasons for the growing concern with the phenomenon of intrafirm trade and to summarize the most readily available data on its nature and growth, the following were among the important points made: 1) it is essential to arrive at clear and uniform definitions as to what is meant by "intrafirm trade"; 2) the share of U.S. non-petroleum imports from developing countries which originates in majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. firms is declining; 3) very high proportions of some U.S. imports from developing countries originate with "related parties," and there are frequently large differences between import unit values in related-party trade and those in non-related-party trade; 4) international subcontracting, as indicated by the usage of value added tariff provisions, continues to be a rapidly growing element in manufactured goods trade between the U.S. and developing countries; and 5) further data should be collected and empirical research conducted.     

The Moral Hazard Play: A Review of The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF

We estimate the influence of trade preferences granted by Argentina on the origin of its imports. We try to identify if changes in Argentina's trade policy toward a set of countries had a differential effect, depending on whether goods were already traded, or on the contrary, if tariff changes affected mostly imports of new goods. We distinguish between the effects of changing tariffs and changing trade preferences. The econometric evidence shows that the effect of changes in tariff preferences on the probability of Argentina importing from other Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) members has been rather small, with most of the effect being explained by changes in tariff rates levied on imports from these countries. This result is stronger in the case of imports from Brazil.     

Optimal policy for environmental goods trade in asymmetric oligopolistic eco-industries

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.     

Trade diversion effects of the US–China trade war on Vietnam

This paper empirically examines the US–China trade war that began in mid-2018, focusing on the impact on a third country, Vietnam. Using regression analysis, we found that while the trade war had a negative impact on US imports from China for all targeted products, there was a partial offset from increased imports from other countries. Notably, US imports from Vietnam experienced a sharp increase, particularly after the third round of US import tariffs on Chinese goods. Additionally, our research reveals that the four rounds of tariff escalation affected US imports from China differently depending on their end-use and technology intensity.     

Vertically related markets, tariffs, and technology adoption

This study considers the effect of trade policy on the time of technology adoption. Home firm is dependent on a foreign vertically integrate firm for supplies of a key input before the technology adoption and can produce the intermediate input after the technology adoption. Both firms compete by Cournot in the home final product market. I show that the decrease in the tariff on final product imports and the increase in the tariff on input imports create incentives for earlier technology adoption by home firm. While maximizing the discounted sum of welfare, the domestic government should protect home firm initially. Further, provided the cost of technology adoption declined sufficiently over time, the domestic government should stimulate the earlier technology adoption by decreasing the tariff on final product imports and increasing the tariff on intermediate product imports.     

The influence of international trade on labour productivity in services: The case of Brazil in the 1990s

In the developing world, services account for a rising share of domestic employment and international trade. Thus, it is important to know whether trade liberalization contributes to labour productivity in services. We explore this question, examining the 1990–2000 Brazilian trade liberalization. We find that growth of imports and exports strengthened labour productivity in services, but the contribution was smaller in subsectors with more college graduates, and this negative offset was larger in subsectors that received large foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Improved access to imported manufactured intermediate inputs raised downstream services' labour productivity and downstream manufacturing firms benefitting from tariff cuts enacted by trade partners generated spillovers that improved the labour productivity of upstream service subsectors. However, FDI inflows and investments in human and physical capital modified these downstream factors. We conclude that the Brazilian trade liberalization strengthened productivity in services, but unequally across subsectors.     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

全球价值链影响下的中国关税水平*——来自中国制造业的证据

本文基于中国政治经济背景,构建了一个关税影响因素理论模型,且利用2005—2011年中国制造业134个部门的数据,通过OLS和Tobit方法进行了经验验证。结果表明：（1）外国最终产品中的中国增加值越高,或者中国最终产品中的外国增加值越高,则中国对于该产品的关税水平越低;（2）贸易协定的签署不仅会直接降低中国的关税,还会扩大中国增加值上升对关税的负影响,削弱外国增加值上升对关税的负影响。     

Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Industries

This paper examines the impact of tariff reduction following China's World Trade Organization (WTO) entry on the productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms using a firm‐level panel database that comprises all of China's manufacturing firms with an annual turnover above 5 million yuan and that spans the period of 2000–2006. An instrumental variable estimator is used to account for the endogeneity of the tariff reduction. The results indicate that China's trade liberalization in the five years following its WTO entry has led to a 0.94% annual increase in total factor productivity for Chinese manufacturing firms. However, the overall productivity gain from the tariff reduction is a net result of a productivity depressing effect of output tariff reduction and a productivity enhancing effect of input tariff reduction. Both effects have diminished in magnitude over the years after China joined the WTO. Firm heterogeneity and turnover plays an important role in generating gains from trade liberalization. The surviving firms have managed to cope with and take advantage of lower tariffs. The extent to which the tariff reduction affects Chinese firms' productivity is also dependent on the ownership structure of the firms with foreign‐invested firms being the clear winner.     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

MARKET ACCESS,INVESTMENT, AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS*

This article presents a model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms can expand through capital acquisitions. I show that demand elasticities are a crucial element in predicting which firms invest, in what location, and for what reason. High‐productivity firms, who tend to sell goods at a low elasticity, invest for market access (tariff jumping). Middle productivity firms, who tend to sell at a higher elasticity, invest for productivity improvement. The relative value of trade costs dictates which incentive is larger. In equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce aggregate productivity by reducing an important source of investment demand: foreign firms.     

新贸易壁垒对策研究(英文)

中国进入世界贸易组织以后,国外将逐步降低对中国设置的贸易壁垒的门槛,进口许可及进口配额等传统的非贸易壁垒也会有所减少,但这并不是说中国的商品就能在国际市场上顺利流通。实际上以技术为中心的新型贸易壁垒正在增加,并将会成为阻碍中国未来国际贸易的最大障碍。而中国缺乏对这一新型贸易壁垒体系的理解,因此当前了解新贸易壁垒的内容意义重大,它有助于中国采取及时、恰当的措施解决新贸易壁垒带来的问题,以适应中国国际贸易的可持续发展。     

Trade liberalization and trade performance of environmental goods: evidence from Asia-Pacific economic cooperation members

In this article, we study the impact of trade liberalization, including reductions in both tariff and nontariff trade barriers, on environmental goods (EGs) exports. Using bilateral trade data from 20 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members, we find that tariff reduction in an exporting country has a larger positive impact on its exports of EGs than tariff reduction in an importing country. Our results also show that a lower nontariff barrier in an importing country increases its imports of EGs. A considerable amount of heterogeneity also exists in subsample results based on countries’ income levels.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

Choosing between multiple regional trade agreements: Evidence from Japan’s imports

Mega‐regional trade agreements (RTAs) are likely to overlap with other RTAs. When such overlaps occur, firms must choose the tariff rates from multiple RTAs. By employing data on Japan’s imports by tariff schemes, we investigate how RTA tariff rates affect firms’ decisions on tariff schemes when multiple RTAs exist. Our finding is that RTA utilization rates are higher when tariff rates for that RTA are lower (own effect) and tariff rates for alternative RTAs are higher (cross effect). We also found that the absolute magnitudes of own and cross effects are larger in bilateral and multilateral RTAs, respectively.     

Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Trade liberalization and Firms’ export performance in China: Theory and evidence

The focus of the literature surrounding trade liberalization has recently shifted from trade liberalization in imported final goods to studying the effects of trade liberalization in imported intermediate inputs. This emphasis fits very well the trade liberalization experience of China following its accession to the WTO in 2001. In this paper, we build a multi-sector heterogenous-firm model with trade in both intermediate goods and final goods, and we ask: How do final-goods producers respond to trade liberalization in imported inputs? Do they respond differently across sectors? How do firms respond differently to trade liberalization in imported-outputs instead? We separate the total effect of trade liberalization into those caused by inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) and by within-sector selection of firms according to productivity (which we call Melitz selection effect). It is the IRA effect that gives rise to differential impacts of trade liberalization in different sectors. These impacts include changes in the probability of entry into the export market, the fraction of firms that export and the share of export revenue. To test our hypotheses, we carry out both quantitative analysis and empirical analysis by using Chinese firm-level data. The results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.