防范民间借贷风险的对策选择

当前民间借贷风险爆发已经引起全社会的高度关注,且业内外判断本轮民间借贷必有部分资金来自银行贷款。本文结合理论研究、银行信贷管理经验并经过深入调研,认为本轮民间借贷潮中,银行资金流入民间市场更多的是个人贷款资金直接流入或通过借款人投资的小贷公司、担保公司曲线流入形成的,而缺乏严格的个人贷款额度测算管理造成过度授信是问题的根源,进而本文提出解决的途径须从两方面入手:一是监管部门加强个人贷款额度的测算监管;二是商业银行完善个人贷款额度测算管理。     

市场规模结构、竞争程度与小微 企业关系型贷款*

本文研究了银行业竞争度与小微企业关系型贷款之间的关系，以及市场规模结构对该关系的影响。信息假说认为，由于信息不对称和代理问题，垄断增加了银行内部化关系型贷款的收益，关系型贷款与竞争度之间呈负相关。然而，越来越多的研究对信息假说提出了质疑。本文在数理推导的基础上，采用江苏省县域地区352家小微企业2011-2015年非平衡面板数据，运用Fractional Logit模型进行实证分析。研究结果表明：市场规模结构是决定竞争度与关系型贷款之间关系的重要因素，当信贷市场中大银行的市场份额占比较大时，银行竞争的加剧对关系型贷款是不利的；当市场中小银行的市场份额占比较大时，竞争的加剧有利于关系型贷款的发放。以往研究对于市场规模结构的忽视可能是导致不同研究结论存在巨大差异的重要原因。本文在此基础上，提出了完善金融基础设施等相关政策建议。     

The Number of Bank Relationships of SMEs: A Disaggregated Analysis of Changes in the Swiss Loan Market

This paper investigates changes in the number of bank relationships of small and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland from 1996 to 2002. It differentiates between overall bank relationships and lending relationships and disaggregates the loan market with respect to firm sizes, industries and banking groups. On average, bank lending declined, and the concentration of lending relationships increased. The changes seem to have been driven by demand and supply for medium-sized firms, but only by supply for micro and small firms. Supply-side reductions resulted from a merger and changes in credit risk management by major banks. We find evidence of increasing specialization of larger banks on transaction lending and of smaller and regional banks on relationship lending.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of corruption in bank lending. Corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely related to legal enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’ willingness to lend. Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only judiciary corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can alleviate firm’s financing obstacles.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

The interbank market during a crisis

The autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis. This period witnessed Russia's effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets, the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with Federal Reserve intentions. Further, risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased, suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period.     

Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?

Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models.     

A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area

This article is the first that applies a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the banking industry. This approach is able to measure competition of bank market segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of competition can consider the entire banking market only. Like most other model-based measures, this approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We measure competition on the lending markets in the five major EU countries as well as, for comparison, the UK, the US and Japan. Our findings indicate that over the period 1994–2004 the US had the most competitive loan market, whereas overall loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in the EU. The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position, whereas in Italy competition declined significantly over time. The French, Japanese and UK loan markets were generally less competitive.     

Is the Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Dominant in Australia?

The transmission process of monetary policy is a longstanding macroeconomic issue. The lending view is that a monetary tightening affects aggregate demand by shifting the supply schedule of bank loans left. The contraction of bank loans does not necessarily mean a shift of the supply schedule. Therefore, testing the lending view requires the identification of the shifts of the demand and supply schedules in the bank loan market. This paper employs an original approach, finding that the lending channel is not dominant in Australia. The paper also examines features of Australian banks' behaviour which make the lending channel less dominant.     

Commercial banks and real estate lending: The Texas experience

This paper examines the performance of Texas commercial banks specializing in mortgage lending during the difficult times of the late 1980s and early 1990s to investigate how representative their experience as compared with that of banks concentrating in real estate lending across the country. The results show that Texas REBs performed very poorly during the 1980s and early 1990s, but this was because the Texas REBs were clearly different from the majority of the banks classified as REBs in the rest of the country. In contract to non-Texas real estate specializing banks, those in Texas banks put substantial assets into much riskier construction and development loans, and in loans on commercial property, such as office buildings, hotels and shopping centers. In a poor real estate market, these loans performed very poorly. The analysis indicates that the Texas experience is not a basis for rejecting the view that the commercial bank industry can safely replace the declining thrift industry as a major source of residential mortgage financing.     

Bank liquidity risk and monetary policy. Empirical evidence on the impact of Basel III liquidity standards

We extend the literature on the bank lending channel in two aspects. First, rather than following the literature by analyzing the impact of banks’ liquidity (measured via their asset portfolio) on monetary policy transmission, we study the role of banks’ actual liquidity risk, as measured by the Basel III liquidity regulations. Second, we investigate the effect of complying with the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy transmission. We use highly detailed bank-level data from Luxembourg for the period 2003q1--2010q4. Our findings are that monetary policy transmission works its way through small banks that also have a large maturity mismatch, as measured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In contrast, large banks with a small maturity mismatch increase their lending following a monetary policy shock, which confirms existing results that Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the European market. Based upon in-sample predictions and upon simulated data from an optimization model that takes the banks’ business models into account, we conclude that the bank lending channel will no longer be effective once banks adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulations.     

Inside the bank lending channel

This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The results, derived from a comprehensive sample of Italian banks, suggest that heterogeneity in the monetary policy pass-through exists. After a monetary tightening the decrease in lending is lower for well-capitalized banks that are perceived as less risky by the market and are better able to raise uninsured deposits. Liquid banks can protect their loan portfolio against monetary tightening simply by drawing down cash and securities. The presence of internal capital markets in bank holding companies also contributes to insulate monetary shocks. Bank size is never relevant.     

Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper empirically examines the interest rate pass‐through at the euro area level. The focus is on the pass‐through of official interest rates, approximated by the overnight interest rate, to longer‐term market interest rates, which, in turn, are a proxy for the marginal costs for banks to attract deposits or grant loans, and therefore passed through to retail bank interest rates. Empirical results, on the basis of a (vector) error‐correction and vector autoregressive model, suggest that the pass‐through of official interest to market interest rates is complete for money market interest rates up to three months, but not for market interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass‐through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates is found to be at most 50%, whereas the final pass‐through is typically found to be close to 100%, in particular for lending rates. Empirical results for a sub‐sample starting in January 1999 show qualitatively similar findings and are supportive of a quicker interest rate pass‐through since the introduction of the euro. It is shown that the difference between the adjustment speed of bank deposit and lending rates (typically around one versus three months since the common monetary policy) can to a large extent significantly be explained by credit risk considerations.     

Asymmetric interest rate pass-through in the U.S., the U.K. and Australia: New evidence from selected individual banks

This paper provides new evidence on asymmetric interest rate pass-through in the U.S., the U.K. and the Australian economies by using the Nonlinear Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag model, central bank interest rates, lending and deposit interest rates from selected banks, spanning the period 2000–2013. The results provide evidence that corroborates the asymmetric pass-through market predictions. Robustness tests are also performed by splitting the sample period into that prior to and after the recent financial crisis. The new findings document that the asymmetric character of pass-through remains active only in the case of Australia.     

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: Diminishing effectiveness?

This paper analyses the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending in a low interest rate environment. Based on a sample of 108 large international banks, our empirical analysis suggests that monetary policy is less effective in stimulating bank lending growth when interest rates reach a very low level. This result holds after controlling for business and financial cycle conditions and different bank-specific characteristics such as liquidity, capitalisation, funding costs, bank risk and income diversification. We find that the impact of low rates on the profitability of banks’ traditional intermediation activity helps explain the subdued evolution of lending in the period 2010–14.     

How to measure the market power of banks in the lending business accurately: a segment-based adjustment of the Lerner Index

Numerous empirical studies use the price-cost-margin-based Lerner Index (LI) to assess the general market power of banks. A common procedure within those LI applications is to approximate the market price required for the LI measurement as the ratio of a bank’s total revenues to total assets. We discuss the major flaws of this aggregated procedure and propose an adjusted (i.e. business segment-orientated) LI approach, which is then applied to assess the market power of banks in the specific lending business at the country level. Our empirical study is based on an original data set containing all interest-related categories (weighted by the respective loan as well as deposit volumes) in the countries of the European Monetary Union zone (EMU) from 2003 to 2013. Our results reveal that the country-specific market power of banks in the lending business has been substantially underestimated in previous studies based on aggregated outputs. For example, averaged across the five most important economies in the EMU, we detect a calibration factor of four. Our findings corroborate the economic notion that the interest-bearing lending business is a more locally separated, and thus profitable, segment in which competition is attenuated.     

THE NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR

This paper studies the bank's lending decision, based on three observed phenomena: banks earn substantial profits from off‐balance sheet activities and services, which they take into account in their lending decisions. Secondly, the critical point in the customer relation is the loan decision: the probability of the customer staying with the bank is a function of the loan extended each time one is applied for. Third, what is at stake in the loan decision is the expected value of the entire customer relation, which is the probability times the present value of expected future profits. The bank is a maximizer of this expected present value, while making decisions on individual loan applications. It is shown that the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its good customers, and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore, corner solutions may be the rule rather than the exception in the bank's customer relations, and there is no mechanism making the bank indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers. It can be optimal to extend loans to (present and expected future) good customers at an interest rate loss. A rationed customer with a concave enough probability function can receive a larger loan by asking for less. Loyalty increases the customer's value to the bank but improves its loan terms only if the customer makes it conditional on the loan extended.     

The determinants of China's lending rates and interest rates pass-through: A cointegration analysis

Based on quarterly data between Q4, 2008–Q4, 2017, this study examines the interest rates pass-through from policy rate to lending rates, and more broadly, the determinants of lending rates in China. The results show that while there is a certain level of pass-through from money market rates to lending rates, and the interest rates pass-through has improved after the interest rate liberalization completion on October 2015, this pass-through is also negatively affected by the asset quality of commercial banks and shadow banking activities as well. This study also finds that the macroeconomic condition also affects the lending rates.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.