Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating

We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdating (BD) scandal of 2006–2007. We find that, at firms involved in BD, significant penalties accrued to compensation committee members (particularly those who served during the BD period) both in terms of votes withheld when up for election and in terms of turnover, especially in more severe cases of BD. However, directors of BD firms did not suffer similar penalties at non-BD firms, raising the question of whether reputation penalties for poor oversight of executive pay are large enough to affect the ex ante incentives of directors.     

Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

CEO optimism and incentive compensation

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.     

Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers’ decisions

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, banks should ensure that their incentive compensation policies appropriately balance long-term risk with short-term rewards. Using daily output data from mortgage officers in a US commercial bank, we test the notion that nonlinear contracts create time-varying incentives for the employees and impose costs on the firm. We provide empirical evidence that mortgage officers greatly increase their output toward the end of each month, when the minimum monthly quota is assessed. This occurs through a combination of reducing the processing time and approving some marginal applications. We also find that mortgages originated on the last working day of the month have a higher likelihood of delinquency.     

Comparing the performance of market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models

Recently developed corporate bankruptcy prediction models adopt a contingent claims valuation approach. However, despite their theoretical appeal, tests of their performance compared with traditional simple accounting-ratio-based approaches are limited in the literature. We find the two approaches capture different aspects of bankruptcy risk, and while there is little difference in their predictive ability in the UK, the z-score approach leads to significantly greater bank profitability in conditions of differential decision error costs and competitive pricing regime.     

Bankers' compensation and fair value accounting

This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost—the clawback problem—if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA may be a good measure of current managerial effort and so be cash compensated. We find evidence consistent with a positive link between CEO cash bonus and fair value (FV) valuation of trading assets, managed for short-term profit, as well as (amongst banks with limited trading exposure) a positive link between CEO pay and FV valuations of available for sale (AFS) assets. We find no evidence that trading income is incrementally compensation relevant, indicating that compensation committees avoided the clawback problem for unrealized trading gains. The paper also provides evidence on the link between FVA outcomes and equity-based pay.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

The power of the pen and executive compensation

We examine the press’ role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. However, negative coverage is also greater for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of “sensationalism.” We find little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.     

Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations

I investigate the determinants and consequences of granting equity to the target's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during deal negotiations. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. I find that CEOs are more likely to receive equity during negotiations when they negotiate for the target, particularly when the target has more bargaining power. This suggests that boards use equity to enhance bargaining incentives for CEOs with the most influence over deal price. I find limited evidence that negotiation grants are used as compensation and no evidence that they have a material adverse effect on shareholders.     

Mandatory Environmental Disclosures by Companies Complying with IASs/IFRSs: The Cases of France,Germany, and the UK

This study investigates whether the adoption of a single set of accounting standards, such as IASs/IFRSs, guarantees the harmonization of accounting practices within a country and across countries, or whether differences in reporting practices persist because of dissimilarities in reporting habits and institutional settings. To this end, we investigate whether the level of environmental disclosure under IFRSs is related to the size of the reporting firm, and the strength of legal and regulatory constraints on environmental disclosures in the country where the firm is domiciled. Results indicate (1) that environmental disclosures imposed by IFRSs increase with firm size, and (2) that firms domiciled in countries with constraining environmental disclosure regulations (i.e., France and the UK) report more on environmental issues than firms domiciled in countries with weakly constraining regulations (i.e., Germany). This suggests a strong impact of national regulations on IFRS reporting. Taken as a whole, our results support the view that IFRSs are not applied consistently across firms and across countries, notably because of persistence of reporting traditions and discrepancies in national legal requirements.     

Labor unions, bargaining power and corporate bond yield spreads: Structural credit model perspectives

This study investigates labor union effects on bond yield spreads from perspectives of structural credit models by employing American bond observations from 2001 to 2007. This research finds that union strength significantly and positively relates to bond yield spreads (this effect is roughly equal to that of issuer rating for one standard deviation change when controlling for well-known variables). The empirical results also show that the positive effects become weaker when management has higher bargaining power. Additionally, union strength volatility significantly and negatively relates to bond yield spreads and capital structure (leverage). The above results are robust when controlling for credit ratings, collinearity concerns, industry effect and tax effect.     

Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans

We find that fixed effects related to the location of firms’ headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and social interaction with neighboring firms. Broad based option grants are higher: (i) when a firm's stock prices co-move more with stock prices of other firms located in that Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); (ii) in states that are less likely to enforce non-compete agreements; and (iii) in MSAs where employees prefer options because stocks there experience abnormally high returns.