共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
ALEJANDRO SAPORITI 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2008,10(5):827-857
This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two‐party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, referred to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi‐continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi‐concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne ) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism, and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. 相似文献
2.
Ken Koyama 《Asian Economic Policy Review》2013,8(2):274-293
The Great East Japan Earthquake and the successive accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station are stark reminders of the importance of energy, which is the basis of economic activity and national governance. Urgent responses have been conducted since March 11, 2011, including controlling the consequences of the nuclear accident, dealing with the short‐term power shortages, and a comprehensive review of Japan's long‐term national energy policy. Nationwide discussions and reviews of these issues are still continuing. Even today, more than 2 years after March 11, many problems remain unsolved and Japanese society has to face uncertainty and challenges about its energy future. In the current difficult situation, Japan needs to achieve “3Es (e nergy security, environmental protection, and economic efficiency)” plus “S” (safety) and “M” (macro economy protection) simultaneously, taking account of the new realities following the Fukushima accident. This paper tries to identify the energy‐related challenges that Japan has to face and tries to recommend the concept of the “energy best mix policy” for Japan, by describing the present status of energy issues in Japan and the national debate on energy policy. 相似文献
3.
We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third‐party recommendations drawn from publicly announced distributions. We find that when recommendations are given, behavior differs from both a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium and behavior without recommendations. In particular, subjects typically follow recommendations if and only if (1) those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium and (2) that correlated equilibrium is payoff‐enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria. 相似文献
4.
We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials. 相似文献
5.
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality. 相似文献
6.
Mario Amendola Jean-Luc Gaffard Francesco Saraceno 《Scottish journal of political economy》2004,51(5):654-674
Keynes' main concern in the General Theory is about the capacity of an economy to return to full employment equilibrium when subject to a (negative) demand shock. He maintains that money wages cuts may not help reabsorb unemployment, as they do not necessarily imply a fall in real wages. On the contrary, wage rigidity may be necessary for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the economy far away the full employment equilibrium. Co‐ordination failures in the investment‐saving market are behind this conclusion. However, the analysis is carried out within a static equilibrium framework. This paper is an attempt to focus on the problems of intertemporal co‐ordination arising within the context of a sequential economy. Our analysis of the out‐of‐equilibrium process of adjustment stirred by a shock allows to generalize the original Keynesian intuition. Unemployment emerges as the result of a lack of co‐ordination due to irreversibly constrained choices, and not only nominal but also real wage flexibility does not necessarily help to restore equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it may even be harmful, by triggering processes that make the economy diverge from equilibrium. Our analysis has important analytical implications as regards the role of market imperfections and the interpretation of the effects of monetary policy. 相似文献
7.
Frederick Van Der Ploeg 《International Economic Review》2010,51(2):365-381
I analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights. I obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium to the dynamic common‐pool problem and obtain political variants of the Hotelling depletion rule and the Hartwick saving rule. Resource prices and depletion occur too fast, so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high. The power struggle boosts output, but depresses sustainable consumption. Genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society. World Bank estimates may be too optimistic. 相似文献
8.
Jason Allen James Chapman Federico Echenique Matthew Shum 《International Economic Review》2016,57(2):691-716
Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers. 相似文献
9.
The aggregation formula in the Human Development Index (HDI) was changed to a geometric mean in 2010. In this paper, we search for a theoretical justification for employing this new HDI formula. First, we find a maximal class of index functions, what we call quasi‐geometric means, that satisfy symmetry for the characteristics, normalization, and separability. Second, we show that power means are the only quasi‐geometric means satisfying homogeneity. Finally, the new HDI is the only power mean satisfying minimal lower boundedness, which is a local complementability axiom proposed by Herrero et al. (2010). 相似文献
10.
Paul Simshauser Elizabeth Molyneux Michelle Shepherd 《The Australian economic review》2010,43(2):114-135
Australia has long been the beneficiary of low, stable power prices. A decade‐long state of oversupply underpinned this result and while plant capital costs had been rising, the cost of capital had been declining. These offsetting effects locked the wholesale market into an average cost of $35–$40/MWh. However, from 2007, a simultaneous and sharp rise in new entrant plant capital costs and the cost of capital occurred. The combined effects crept up on the industry while it was in a state of oversupply. This ‘entry cost shock’ disrupted a 7 year long equilibrium price, with average power system cost rising to $60/MWh. 相似文献
11.
One common, simplifying assumption in open economy macroliterature is that the rest of the world can be thought of as a representative economy. This article formally investigates conditions under which this assumption can be justified using a multicountry general equilibrium model as a laboratory. We derive the conditions that ensure the existence of the equilibrium and study the properties of the equilibrium using large N asymptotics. Thereby, we show that the two‐country framework is a valid approximation only for economies that have diversified trade linkages and only when there is no globally dominant economy among the foreign economies. 相似文献
12.
We expand the scope of the two‐aggregate method by applying it to a situation in which many heterogeneous players are free to contribute to both aggregates. Such situations naturally arise in various resource allocation problems. Hence, our method is useful in many applications. A production–appropriation model is employed to illustrate how the problem of establishing the Nash equilibrium can be reduced from solving n>2 best‐response functions in n unknowns to solving two consistency conditions in two unknowns. We then conduct a comparative static exercise that the conventional approach could not handle easily, if at all, to demonstrate the power of our method. 相似文献
13.
We characterize Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving policy reforms in a second‐best (Diamond/Mirrlees) world with a consumption externality. A counterintuitive finding is that, starting from an initial equilibrium with no direct quantity control on the externality, it is possible that all Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving directions of change require an increase in a negative externality. We provide intuition for these results by establishing a nexus between Guesnerie's approach to designing (tax) policy reforms and the standard Kuhn–Tucker technique for identifying the manifold of feasible Pareto‐optimal states, given the instruments available to the policy maker. 相似文献
14.
Osborne shows that for almost all distributions of voters’ preferences, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in the classical Hotelling–Downs model of electoral competition with free entry. We show that equilibrium is generically possible if in addition one allows voters an option to announce their candidacy to compete side‐by‐side with office‐seeking players. The model studied in this paper renders Osborne and the celebrated citizen‐candidate model à la Osborne and Slivinski as two extreme cases. We characterize the equilibrium set with two central questions: (i) can there be equilibria where only voters contest? and (ii) are equilibria with contesting office‐seeking players possible? We also show that in our general setting, extremists are typically voter‐candidates so that in every two‐party contest, office‐seeking politicians stay out of competition. 相似文献
15.
by Jan Erik Askildsen Norman J. Ireland 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2003,74(4):515-528
Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo. : A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low‐risk investment policy for firms which offer within‐house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. 相似文献
16.
Stphane Gonzalez Alain Marciano Philippe Solal 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2019,21(2):347-365
We revisit the “Coase theorem” through the lens of a cooperative game model which takes into account the assignment of rights among agents involved in a problem of social cost. We consider the case where one polluter interacts with many potential victims. Given an assignment or a mapping of rights, we represent a social cost problem by a cooperative game. A solution consists in a payoff vector. We introduce three properties for a mapping of rights. First, core compatibility indicates that the core of the associated cooperative games is nonempty. Second, Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility indicates that there is a payoff vector in the core where victims are fully compensated for the damage once the negotiations are completed. Third, no veto power for a victim says that no victim has the power to veto an agreement signed by the rest of the society. We then demonstrate two main results. First, core compatibility is satisfied if and only if the rights are assigned either to the polluter or to the entire set of victims. Second, there is no mapping of rights satisfying Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim. 相似文献
17.
This paper builds on earlier work that used a general‐equilibrium model to show that reducing employment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States through a tighter border‐security policy lowers the average income of legal residents. Here we exploit further the detail available in the general‐equilibrium model to look at distributional effects, recognizing that the policy increases wage rates for low‐paid legal workers. We assess the social welfare effect on legal workers using a constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function. We contrast our general‐equilibrium approach to immigration analysis with the more commonly used partial‐equilibrium, econometric approach. (JEL D63, J61, C68) 相似文献
18.
We present a general equilibrium model that encompasses the endogenous selection and shadow‐pricing of a set of tradeable commodities, with home‐based and social production activities. In the model, a market system is a set of costly social institutions which embody the trade and production technologies available in the economy. Our equilibrium concept describes the pricing of market institutions, thus pricing the tradeability of a commodity. We obtain the existence and the decentralization of Pareto‐efficient allocations. We discuss an example regarding the transition of a guild‐based economy into a market‐based economy. 相似文献
19.
Two career‐concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker (D). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D. Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist. 相似文献
20.
Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Maria Montero 《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,54(2):380-397
This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a “divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium. 相似文献