The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel

We study the collapse of collusion in Québec's retail gasoline market following a Competition Bureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station‐level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre‐collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.     

ASYMMETRIC DYNAMIC PRICING IN A LOCAL GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET*

Asymmetric‐price adjustment is a common phenomenon in many markets around the world, particularly in retail gasoline markets. This paper studies the existence of this phenomenon in the retail gasoline market in the city of Santiago, Chile, using a data set of weekly gas station prices that covers a period of almost four years. We found that prices adjust asymmetrically, and the asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and unbranded stations. In addition, we found that the asymmetry for high‐margin stations is statistically equivalent to that for low‐margin stations. This evidence is suggestive of collusion as a rationale for the asymmetric pricing policy observed.     

Endogenous price commitment,sticky and leadership pricing: Evidence from the Italian petrol market

This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) collusion.     

An empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing

This article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline stations, I find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices, which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.     

Shock Value: Bill Smoothing and Energy Price Pass‐Through

Energy prices are volatile, affect every consumer and industry in the economy, and are impacted by regulations including gas taxes and carbon pricing. Like the pass‐through literature in general, the growing energy pass‐through literature focuses on marginal prices. However, multi‐part pricing is common in energy retail pricing. I examine the retail natural gas market, showing that while marginal prices exhibit full or nearly full pass‐through, fixed fees exhibit negative pass‐through. This is consistent with the stated desire by utilities and regulators to prevent ‘bill shock.’ I discuss implications for pass‐through estimation and for proposed alternative pricing structures for regulated utilities.     

The impact of corporate size and strategy on competitive pricing

Larger firms are often hypothesized to have higher prices than smaller competitors because of their market power or implicit collusion on prices. Advertising is often suggested as another cause of price elevation due to its ability to differentiate products of equivalent or inferior quality. This study examines the effect of these and other factors on prices in the major home appliance industry. The most interesting result is the strong corporate effect on prices, which permeates pricing strategies across categories, models and time. Contrary to the hypotheses listed above, larger corporations have lower prices, and advertised products are not higher priced. Strategic and policy implications are discussed.     

Barriers to Entry and Competitive Behavior: Evidence from Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulations

Between 2005 and 2008, nineteen of the fifty states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for ‘Basic’ service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 per cent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular ‘Expanded Basic’ service. We also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non‐reformed states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for ‘Basic’ service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state‐level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample‐split test that finds larger declines in prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent second entrant). Our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefited consumers in reformed states.     

Pricing process as a capability: a resource‐based perspective

Strategists following the resource‐based view argue that firms can generate rents through value creation. To create value, firms develop and use resources and capabilities that other firms cannot imitate, trade for, or substitute other assets for. Even a firm that has created value, however, may not capture the potential rents associated with that value. To capture rents, a firm must set the right prices for what it sells. Most views of pricing assume that a firm can readily set appropriate prices. In contrast, we argue that pricing is a capability. To develop the ability to set the right prices, a firm must invest in resources and routines. We base our argument on a study of the pricing process of a large Midwestern manufacturing firm. We show that pricing resources, routines, and skills may help or inhibit a firm in setting the right price—and hence in appropriating value created. Our view of pricing as a capability contributes to the resource‐based view because it suggests that strategists should consider the portfolio of value creation and value appropriation capabilities a firm uses to create competitive advantage. Our view also contributes to economics because it suggests that strategic decisions about pricing capabilities have important implications for a fundamental economic action, determining prices. Managers in firms without effective pricing processes may be unable to set prices that reflect the wishes of its customers, so the customers may misuse their resources. As a result, resources may be used ineffectively. Our view of pricing as a capability therefore takes the resource‐based‐view straight to the heart of what is perhaps the central economic question: the best use of resources. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modelling Price Dispersion as an Outcome of Competition in the Irish Grocery Market

The paper empirically models price dispersion between related brands within product categories of the Irish Independent Grocery market. Retail brand prices are averaged over the independent shops stocking the brand. Since individual brands are retailed through different groups of shops, brands are priced over heterogeneous consumer segments. Brand price dispersion is estimated to increase with competition when conditioned on brand distribution structures, while controlling for other observed and unobserved deterministic factors. The data suggest that brand pricing across consumer groups induce varying degrees of localised price competition rather than pricing across segments to extract consumer willingness to pay.     

The Ex‐Day Price Behavior of REITs: Taxes or Ticks?

Taxes and microstructure constraints are often cited as possible explanations for why stock prices drop by less than the dividend on their ex‐dates. Using a sample of real estate investment trusts, which have no significant correlation between dividend size and yield, we find that close‐to‐open ex‐dividend price drops are related to dividend size as suggested by the microstructure models, but close‐to‐close price drops are related to dividend yield as predicted by the tax theory. These results imply that overnight price drops are primarily determined by microstructure, but that trading during the ex‐day causes prices to adjust to reflect individual tax preferences.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

The Value of Collusion with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty

Collusion has often been alleged in industries where long‐lived capacity investments are important. This article develops a computational duopoly model with capacity investments, demand shocks and either competitive or collusive pricing. It shows that allowing for endogenous capacity investments can sometimes make collusion less valuable than competition and that it can change the normal relationships between the profitability of collusion and both the discount rate and industry‐wide demand shocks.     

Progress and Challenges in Product Line Pricing

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in research on product line pricing. Modelers in multiple disciplines have offered methods for the optimal design/selection and pricing of the products in new or modified product lines. Behavioral scientists have contributed insights on how consumers' perceptions of product line prices, attributes, and quality levels influence their evaluation of the alternative choices. Significantly, the work of both modelers and behavioral scientists is distributed across three types of product line contexts: price‐quality product lines, multi‐attribute product lines, and product lines that include a core product plus options. This paper reviews this literature, and assesses its usefulness for managers. One observation is that, while scholars have developed approaches to optimization that offer increased scope and tractability, the applicability of these models is constrained by the narrow specification of profit functions, and the limited consideration of competitive and other dynamic forces. A second conclusion is that the managerial usefulness of the behavioral science research on perceptions and product‐line choice has been limited by a dependence on attribute‐based estimation of utilities, uncertainty about possible interaction effects, and an excessive focus on the cannibalization aspects of product line pricing. Based on the review, a research agenda is identified for enhancing the applicability of research on consumer perceptions and choice to product line pricing decisions, and for building more complete product line price optimization models.     

Long‐Term Growth in Housing Prices and Stock Returns

A firm's long‐term stock returns are negatively related to past growth in housing prices in the state where the firm is located. The housing price effect is persistent and robust to controlling for the long‐term stock return reversal effect, changes in mortgage interest rates across the states, cyclicality in housing prices and overall local economic conditions. There is no evidence that extant asset pricing models can adequately explain the effect. The study discusses potential explanations for, and the implications of, the cross‐regional housing price effect.     

Joint oligopsony-oligopoly in the U.S. leaf tobacco market, 1924–39

The leaf tobacco marketplace is highly organized. Prior to 1940, the few large tobacco companies controlled that organization explicitly. The question is whether this organization set oligopsonistic leaf prices or minimized production and transaction costs. A model of joint oligopsonyoligopoly shows that pricing of cigarettes and leaf tobacco was unified: oligopolistic cigarette pricing was sufficient to curtail both cigarette production and leaf purchases. The companies could just bid in the market for the leaf necessary for that cigarette production rate.Prima facie, the organization was not for oligopsony coordination. The implied econometric model of pricing fits observed behavior well.Malcolm Boyd, Dennis Carlton, John Garen, Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, An-loh Lin, Robert Miller, Stephen Spurr and the referee have given me thoughtful, perceptive and useful comments. I am pleased to acknowledge their involvement without implicating them in whatever errors remain.     

Collaboration,Co‐operation or Collusion? Contrasting Employee Responses to Managerial Control in Three Call Centres

This article draws on ethnographic studies of three call centres in a single, medium‐sized insurance company to explore how employees responded differently to similar techniques of managerial control. Considering recent discussions of compromise in the workplace, we identify a response to control that sits between implacable resistance and supine acquiescence. We style this collusion and distinguish it from other states of compromise, such as collaboration and co‐operation. Drawing on the work of Edwards et al., we argue that a dynamic and politically sophisticated collusive compromise can exist between parties whose control and developmental concerns are in conflict. From this position, we extend existing theories of compromise: (a) to accommodate different permutations of control and developmental concerns; and (b) to predict when collaboration, co‐operation and collusion are likely to occur under ostensibly similar conditions of managerial control.     

Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds).