The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

Horizontal integration in the Dutch financial sector

In this paper, the consequences of cross-shareholding in an n-firm industry are analyzed. Our attention focuses on the case where firms have silent interests in each other. These interests can be direct or indirect. We analyze the effects of cross-shareholding on the price–cost margins in a Cournot and a Bertrand setting. In all cases, competition is reduced due to shareholding interlocks. As an empirical example the Dutch financial sector is used. Comparing the case of shareholding with the case of no-shareholding, the price–cost margins are found to be up to 2% higher in a Bertrand market, and at least 8% higher in a Cournot market.     

On Storage Behavior Under Imperfect Competition,with Application to the American Cheese Market

This paper investigates the economic implications of storage behavior under imperfect competition. It evaluates the economic dynamics implied by a storage firm under alternative market structures. This includes perfect competition as well as imperfect competition under Cournot behavior. The conceptual analysis is used to specify and estimate a model of storage behavior, with an econometric application to the U.S. American cheese market. The empirical results provide statistical evidence of non-competitive storage behavior. They show how the exercise of market power can contribute to reduced stock fluctuations and increased price instability in the U.S. cheese market.      

Timing of technology adoption and product market competition

This paper examines how product market competition affects firms' timing of adopting a new technology, as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives. It demonstrates that adoption dates differ, not only among symmetric firms, but also among markets with different market features. More specifically, technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with Cournot competition than in a market with Bertrand competition. It can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes. Therefore, this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives. When goods are sufficiently differentiated, adoption occurs later than is socially optimal.     

Measuring Conduct and Cost Parameters in the Spanish Airline Market

This paper examines airline competition through an empirical specification of a demand and pricing equation system. The system is estimated for the Spanish airline market using a simultaneous procedure. The suitability of the Cournot assumption is tested in a competitive scenario characterized by an asymmetric oligopoly with capacity constraints. In addition, the degree of density economies is analyzed. Results show that Spanish airlines behave in a less competitive way than is implied by the Cournot solution. Finally, some evidence on the fact that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies is found.     

Rationalizability and efficiency in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies rationalizability in a linear asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with a unique Nash equilibrium. It shows that mergers favor uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome. When one requires uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome maximization of consumers' surplus may involve a symmetric oligopoly with few firms. We interpret uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome as favoring a dampening of strategic ‘coordination’ uncertainty. An illustration to the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest shows that a reallocation of 1% of market share from a small carrier to a larger one has implied a lower production volatility over time, yielding a 1.5% decrease in the coefficient of variation of number of passengers.     

On equivalence between Cournot competition and the Kreps-Scheinkman game

The existing literature dealing with the equivalence between the Kreps-Scheinkman (KS) game and Cournot competition has focused on the case of a concave demand function. This paper analyzes the equivalence possibilities under the much extended circumstances of strictly decreasing marginal (industrial) revenue, a twice differentiable demand function, and convex costs. It proves that in the extended context, the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the KS game are those of Cournot equilibrium (CE) and that a CE is on the path of the SPNE of the KS game if the marginal cost of each firm in some special (borderline) cases is not too high. It further proves that for decreasing continuous demand and strictly increasing costs, the outcome in the SPNE of the KS game (if the SPNE exists) is that of CE. Based on these results, we argue that the KS game can serve as the basic form for studying “quantity competition” and for developing a T-stage game-theoretical framework to make competition form and timing endogenous.     

Investment under Demand Uncertainty,Ex-Ante Pricing,and Oligopoly

This paper considers the capacity choice of duopolists who set price ex-ante under demand uncertainty with risk-neutrality. The duopolists compete for market shares on the basis of availability of supply, rather than by price competition. Collusive pricing coexists with Cournot–Nash capacity choice. A formal model is presented, where the market share of each firm may deviate from the certainty share due to rationing. With shares reflecting different costs, capacity utilisation for the lower cost firm is expected to be substantially lower. The implications for the price-cost margin and capacity formation are also explored.     

Credit Unions: Fringe Suppliers or Cournot Competitors?

Recent work has demonstrated the competitive relationship between credit unions and banks in consumer financial services. One issue underlying the nature of competition between the two, however, concerns the most appropriate way to model their interactions.Two possible approaches are the dominant-firm price-leadership model and the generalized Cournot model. In the former model, credit unions act as fringe suppliers who are price-takers in a homogeneous product market. In the latter, they possess (limited) market power. Oneway to distinguish the two is by examining the impact of credit union market shares on their pricing, as the two models imply differing effects. Our results are more consistent with the ``credit unions as fringe suppliers' view. Using a pooled cross-section time seriesof 77 small local consumer lending markets throughout the U.S., each with 10 observations over 5 years, the focus is on a loan product ex ante thought to be sold in local markets, unsecured (non-credit card) loans. For this product, increasing credit union market sharesreduces credit union loan rates, consistent with a fringe supplier hypothesis.     

Competition,Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*

This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. Using a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. We find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers. Moreover, the transport distance also varies in the ratio of capacity relative to demand, but only if firms compete and not when they coordinate their sales. We provide a theoretical model of spatial competition with capacity constraints that rationalizes the empirical results.     

Endogenous capacities and price competition: The role of demand uncertainty

We analyze the role of demand uncertainty in markets of fixed size, in which firms take long-run capacity decisions prior to competing in prices. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria under various assumptions regarding the nature and timing of demand uncertainty. In order to prove equilibrium existence, we identify a sufficient condition for the capacity choice game to be submodular. This condition resembles the standard downward-sloping marginal revenue condition used in Cournot games. A robust conclusion of the analysis is that equilibrium capacity choices are asymmetric, even when firms are ex-ante identical. Concerning the equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, we find that with inelastic demands, the equilibria of the former belong to the equilibrium set of the latter. However, as compared to the Cournot game, the capacity-price game leads to lower prices and generates price dispersion.     

The Strategic Effect of Bundling: A New Perspective

This paper investigates the strategic effect of the bundling strategy that is adopted by a multi-product firm that produces two complementary goods and faces one single-product rival in each market. I consider both the Cournot and Bertrand cases. When firms compete in quantities, bundling is completely ineffective. Under price competition, selling as a package is profitable when market competition is particularly tough. In such circumstances, the multi-product firm resorts to bundling to dampen the negative impact of low brand differentiation and/or scarce product complementarity. However, overall prices increase as a result of bundling, and not only consumer surplus, but also total social welfare, shrink.     

The role of obsolescence and inventory costs in providing commitment

This paper modifies the Cournot and Stackelberg models to allow the firms to sell less than they have produced and to store the unsold portion of their output as inventory. Even if one of the firms can choose its output before the other, if it is costless to carry unsold goods forward then the Cournot outcome emerges. We show, however, that costs of carrying the inventory forward endow the firms with a limited degree of commitment to sell what they have produced. This partially restores the first-mover advantage. If the firms choose their outputs simultaneously, the Cournot outcome emerges and has locally consistent conjectures.     

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the US digital camera market

This paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996–1999. These manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market—the film camera market. This paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms' decisions to launch a new model of digital camera: the effects of competition with “within-brand” models; the effects of competition with “cross-brand” models; the level of experience in the film camera market; and market conditions. The empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products, which has a positive effect on product launches. On the other hand, existing cross-brand models have a negative effect on product launches, while within-brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches.     

Common ownership,market power,and innovation

I examine the effects of overlapping ownership on market power when there are external effects across firms. This is done in an oligopoly model with cost-reducing innovation with technological spillovers where firms have an overlapping ownership structure based largely on López and Vives (2019). The model allows for Cournot competition with homogeneous product and for Bertrand with differentiated products as well as for strategic effects of R&D investment. It derives positive testable implications and normative results to inform policy.     

Raising Rivals' Costs Strategies via Emission Permits Markets

In the present paper we examine the effect of emissions permit price manipulation within an oligopolistic model. We examine the effect that positioning strategies in permits markets have on the degree of competition in the product market as well as on social welfare. The analysis is based on the concept of raising rivals' cost strategies. We find that competition in the product market can be lessened substantially. The welfare effect is ambiguous. If the leader expands its market share at the expense of a less efficient rival, or if it excludes a less efficient entrant, overall efficiency may increase despite the decrease in the industry's output. When efficiency decreases, or when consumers' protection is a policy priority, the initial distribution of permits can be used to control power in the permits market. Such interventions though, improve efficiency only when policy makers have substantial information on the technological structure of the industry, and thus, should be used with caution. Given the importance of information, sharing of information and coordination of actions between policy makers is very important.     

Cournot competition in wholesale electricity markets: The Nordic power exchange,Nord Pool

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the price-cost margins of all producers then depend on the same inverse residual demand curve instead of one for each firm. We apply the model to the day-ahead market of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool, for the years 2011-13. We reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition in all specifications. Results suggest that the average price-cost margin across the sample period was around four percent.     

Anote on second degree price discrimination and its implications

This paper develops the analytical solution to the standard problem of second degree discrimination and shows that, as the number of discrete prices increases, the market output approaches that of pure competition or perfect price discrimination in the same manner as Cournot oligopolies converge to competitive outcomes. This solution is subsequently compared with that of Third degree discrimination in light of recent contributions of Coase and Varian. This comparison reveals that-1-neither type of discrimination, in its pure form, is empirically likely;-2- actual price discrimination will involve elements of both types;-3- therefore, the analytical solution to second degree discrimination is, contrary to Pigouvian tradition, no less important than that of third degree discrimination.     

The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry

This paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability. When goods are imperfect substitutes, both Cournot and Bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit-maximizing firm. Overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes. Similarly, Cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low, and a weaker incentive if this degree is high.     

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to bid high in order to signal an aggressive output strategy in a downstream Cournot market game, and conversely bid low to signal acquiescent pricing in a Bertrand market game. The present paper examines the information revealed by publishing the winning or the losing or no bid, assuming an oligopoly with differentiated goods. We rank disclosure rules and find that it is not optimal for the innovator to disclose the winning bid, regardless of the mode of competition.