Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment

We study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons: those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. Voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences, while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage. We consider the employment policies of a well-informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies. The model is simple, yet rich enough to reflect real-world policies, including transfers to the disabled, welfare for non-working employables, unemployment insurance, employment subsidies, and taxes on workers and firms.     

A New Specification of Labour Supply in the MONASH Model with an Illustrative Application

MONASH is a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Australian economy. This article describes a new labour-market specification for MONASH in which people are allocated in year t to categories according to their labourmarket activities in year t – 1. People in each category plan their labour supplies by solving an optimisation problem. Via these problems, we introduce the assumption that people in employment categories supply labour more strongly to employment activities than do people in unemployment categories. Thus we find that employment-stimulating policies in t – 1 increase labour supply in t by shifting the composition of the labour force in t in favour of employment categories and away from unemployment categories. We illustrate this idea by using MONASH to simulate the Dawkins proposal to combine a freeze on award wage rates with tax credits for low-wage workers in low-income families. We find that the Dawkins policy would generate a significant short-run increase in employment. With the increase in employment generating an increase in labour supply, the employment benefits of the policy would persist over many years. However, in the long run, we would expect the effect of the policy on aggregate employment to be small and to depend on how the policy affected the ratio of real after-tax wage rates to unemployment benefits.     

Editorial announcement

In this paper we develop a general equilibrium model of the Mexican economy in which unemployment and government deficits play important roles. The unemployment rate depends on a downwardly rigid real wage in the urban sector. The government runs a deficit simply by selling bonds that consumers consider perfect substitutes for physical capital as savings instruments. The model is used to analyze the impact of the 1980 fiscal reform. The presence of the rigid real wage and alternative specifications of government policies regarding the size of the deficit are found to have significant effects on the comparative statics results. Whether or not the reform improves the welfare of rural households compared to urban households, for example, depends on whether government policy is to keep the deficit constant or keep expenditures constant in response to changes in tax revenues.     

Labour Market Policy Developments in Japan: Following an Australian Lead?

In recent times, Japan has experienced a rapid expansion in its service sector, increases in casual and part‐time employment and record unemployment. In addition, there has been an associated rise of freeters and NEETs—predominantly young workers with tenuous labour market attachment. While somewhat slow in initiating policy responses, the Japanese government responded to these structural changes by reforming its existing employment policies. In this article we argue that recent changes in the nature of Japan's labour market policies appear to have been driven by some of the same factors which led to the radical overhaul of Australia's own labour market policies.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker–firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

Why has unemployment risen in the New South Africa?1

We document the rise in unemployment in South Africa since the transition in 1994. We describe how changes in labour supply interacted with stagnant labour demand to produce unemployment rates that peaked between 2001 and 2003. Meanwhile, compositional changes in employment at the sectoral level widened the gap between the skill‐level of the employed and the unemployed. Using nationally representative panel data, we show that stable unemployment rates mask high individual‐level transition rates in labour market status. Our analysis highlights several key constraints to addressing unemployment in South Africa. We conclude that unemployment is near equilibrium levels and is unlikely to self‐correct without policy intervention.     

Federal tax arrears in Russia Liquidity problems,federal redistribution or regional resistance?*

Three hypotheses about the nature of federal tax arrears in Russia in the second half of the 1990s are tested empirically. Tax arrears can be a result of: 1) liquidity problems in firms, 2) redistributive subsidies of the federal government, or 3) regional political resistance to federal tax collectors. Liquidity problems in firms explain a large part of the variation in tax arrears. Regional political resistance to federal tax collectors was also an important factor: For a given level of liquidity, federal arrears accumulated faster in regions where governors had a larger popular base, in regions with a better bargaining position vis‐à‐vis the centre, and in regions with governors in political opposition to the centre. We find that patterns of federal arrears are inconsistent with the redistributive politics premise that redistribution favours jurisdictions with ‘closer races’ for the incumbent in the national elections. Variation in authorized tax deferrals can be explained in part by federal redistributive politics.     

Tax Base and Crowding‐in Effects of Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy

A dynamic general equilibrium business cycle model is constructed with staggered price adjustment, monopolistic wage setting and distortionary taxation. The government purchases goods, runs an unemployment benefit system and balances its budget through a proportional tax on labour income. A temporary tax‐financed increase in government expenditures can lower the tax rate through a demand‐induced widening of the tax base. It is shown analytically that this allows private consumption to rise, under realistic conditions, despite the negative wealth effect of increased fiscal spending.     

Environmental Goods and Measures for Their Promotion: An Analysis Using a Fair Wage Model

In this paper, we model a two‐sector small open economy with emissions and unemployment associated with the fair wage effort hypothesis, and investigate the environmental and employment impact of an emission tax, a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods in the downstream polluting industry, and a subsidy to the upstream eco‐industry. We then show that if the eco‐industry is skilled labor intensive relative to the polluting final goods industry, while a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled labor, it may increase total emissions. In contrast, the emission tax and the subsidy to eco‐industry firms worsen the unemployment rate, though both policies decrease total emissions. Hence, if the emission tax is set equal to the marginal environmental damage, and either a downstream or upstream subsidy is used to mitigate unskilled unemployment, the optimal subsidy to purchase the goods is positive whereas the optimal subsidy to the eco‐industry is negative, i.e., a tax on the eco‐industry.     

Can regional policy in a federation improve economic efficiency?

In the European Union and in many federal and non-federal countries, the central government pays subsidies to poor regions. These subsidies are often seen as a redistributive measure which comes at the cost of an efficiency loss. This paper develops an economic rationale for regional policy based on economic efficiency. We consider a model of a federation consisting of a rich and a poor region. The economy is characterized by imperfect competition in goods markets and unemployment. Firms initially produce in the rich region but may relocate their production to the poor region. We show that a subsidy on investment in the poor region unambiguously increases welfare if labour markets are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the case for regional subsidies is weaker.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Shocks and rigidities as determinants of CEE labour markets’ performance

In this article, the impact of real wage, productivity, labour demand and supply shocks on eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies from 1996–2007 is analysed with a panel structural vector error correction model. A set of long‐run restrictions derived from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to identify structural shocks, and fluctuations in foreign demand are controlled for. We find that the propagation of shocks on CEE labour markets resembles that found for OECD countries. Labour demand shocks emerge as the main determinant of employment and unemployment variability in the short‐to‐medium run, but wage rigidities were equally important for observed labour market performance, especially in Poland, Czech Republic and Lithuania. We associate these rigidities with collective bargaining, minimum wage, active labour market policies and employment protection legislation.     

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self‐selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance – or subsidy to unemployment – reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device.     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

Employment Subsidy with Capital Mobility

Most models of tax competition assume full employment. Yet, actually one often observes that fiscal competition, particularly when it is aimed at attracting investment, is motivated by the concern of fighting unemployment and enhancing job creation. The present paper considers a multicountry model with capital mobility and unemployment. Fiscal policy has two opposing objectives: financing unemployment insurance and increasing employment. In each country there is a majority vote on this policy.
The purpose of the paper is to analyse how opening borders to capital flows modifies the median voter's choice of the employment subsidy. Assuming that capital and labour are complements, economic integration is shown to raise the employment subsidy with fixed wages. This agrees with intuition as a larger employment subsidy attracts more capital. However, when wages are set by labour unions economic integration can change the median voter's choice in either direction.     

Are small employers more cyclically sensitive? Evidence from Brazil

An important issue facing policymakers is the degree to which fluctuations in economic activity affect employment in large and small businesses across sectors and regions. This issue is particularly relevant for developing countries as it matters for the understanding of the labour market dynamics, and for devising national, sectoral, and regional labour policies that aim at dampening employment fluctuations, particularly during recessions. Using a unique monthly dataset of 27 states and eight industries from 2000:1 to 2009:7, this paper evaluates the sensitivity of businesses of different sizes to business cycle conditions in Brazil. The behaviour of the difference in employment growth rates between large and small firms is counter-cyclical and suggests that small firms are more sensitive to business cycle conditions. In addition, the SVAR impulse response analysis suggests the existence of the effect of small firms hiring cheaply from unemployment proportionally more than large ones. On the other hand, credit constraints seem to hit small firms harder and help to explain the empirical regularity that small firms are more cyclically sensitive than large ones for the Brazilian case.     

Endogenous job specialization

According to some authors, technical change contributes to the explanation of the increase in equilibrium unemployment by making jobs more and more specialized. Here, we assume that firms optimally adapt the specialization of jobs to overall labour market conditions. Using a matching labour market framework, we show that the increase in unemployment can explain the higher specialization of jobs.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.