DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

PRODUCT VARIETY AND COMPETITION IN THE RETAIL MARKET FOR EYEGLASSES*

I use original data on eyewear retailers in a cross‐section of U.S. markets to study how firms' product range choices vary with the degree of local competition. Market level regressions show average per firm variety declining in the number of rivals. In regressions at the firm level, taking account of spatial differentiation within each market, a non‐monotonic relationship between product ranges and competition is apparent. As the number of nearby rivals increases, per firm variety may first rise before eventually declining. Explanations for this pattern are offered, in terms of a tradeoff between business stealing and clustering effects.     

Pay-for-delay patent settlement,generic entry and welfare

“Pay-for-delay” settlement (P4D), in which the brand patentee reversely pays the generic infringer to delay market entry, is typically criticized for blocking competition but is often excused for its potential to maintain innovation. We present a game-theoretic model to show that when the generic firm’s entry decision is endogenized, P4D can actually increase ex post competition under certain conditions. We further explore the impact of P4D on ex ante innovation and find that the brand’s innovation incentive may increase or decrease, depending on the generic firm’s entry cost and other factors. Our findings contribute to the ongoing P4D debate by identifying conditions under which (1) P4D can improve consumer surplus and (2) the trade-off between competition and innovation can be reconciled.     

Competitive Pressure and Innovation at the Firm Level

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between market competitive pressure and firms' innovation using panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2006. We depart from standard measures of competition, and construct variables capturing the fundamentals of competitive pressure (product substitutability, market size and entry costs) to test the theoretical predictions of Vives [2008, The Journal of Industrial Economics] for free entry. Our results line up favourably with these predictions. We obtain that greater product substitutability and higher costs of entry lead to more process innovation but less product innovation, whereas market enlargement spurs both product and process innovation.     

ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN LOCAL HOSPITAL MARKETS*

We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. The Bresnahan and Reiss model infers changes in the toughness of competition from entry threshold ratios. Entry threshold ratios, however, identify the product of changes in the toughness of competition and changes in fixed costs. By using quantity data, we are able to identify separately changes in the toughness of competition from changes in fixed costs. This model is generally applicable to industries where there are good data on market structure and quantity, but not on prices, as for example in the quinquennial U.S. Economic Census. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market.     

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND SHARED FACILITIES IN UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES

In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed-cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed.     

Diversification of cable television firms into broadband products

This research provides a new perspective to investigate the broadband diffusion in eight states of the U.S. by studying the two-stage entry decisions, namely, upgrading and subsequent product decisions, by the cable television system operators, one of the early dominant players in the broadband market, and examines the role of competition, market characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the cable company's decisions in a dynamic setting. Comparing the empirical results of the decision models of both stages can give new insights into the dynamics of broadband diffusion. The empirical results show that the subsequent product decision is affected more by the demand determinants, while the upgrading decision is affected more by the cost determinants. The results also indicate that policies which aim to reduce the entry cost such as a low city fee can largely encourage firms to upgrade the network, while subsequent policies that help boost the demand can help firms diversify into new digital services early. The effectiveness of competition policy in the broadband diffusion is confirmed in both stages. Strategic responses by cable firms to the presence of RBOCs are more noticeable in the second-staged product decision than in the first-staged upgrading decision.     

The fit between product market strategy and business model: implications for firm performance

We examine the fit between a firm's product market strategy and its business model. We develop a formal model in order to analyze the contingent effects of product market strategy and business model choices on firm performance. We investigate a unique, manually collected dataset, and find that novelty‐centered business models—coupled with product market strategies that emphasize differentiation, cost leadership, or early market entry—can enhance firm performance. Our data suggest that business model and product market strategy are complements, not substitutes. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring Mediating and Moderating Influences on the Links among Cycle Time,Proficiency in Entry Timing,and New Product Profitability*

Development cycle time is the elapsed time from the beginning of idea generation to the moment that the new product is ready for market introduction. Market‐entry timing is contingent upon the new product's cycle time. Only when the product is completed can a firm decide whether and when to enter the market to exploit the new product's window of opportunity. To determine the right moment of entry a firm needs to correctly balance the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry. Proficient market‐entry timing is therefore defined as the firm's ability to get the market‐entry timing right (i.e., neither too early nor too late). The literature has produced divergent evidence with regard to the effects of development cycle time and proficiency in market‐entry timing on new product profitability. To explain these disparities this study (1) explores the mediating roles of development costs and sales volume in the relationships among development cycle time, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product profitability, respectively; and it (2) explores the moderating influence of product newness on the relationship between development cycle time and development costs and that of new product advantage on the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results from a survey‐based study of 72 manufacturers of industrial products in the Netherlands suggest that development costs mediate the relationship between development cycle time and new product profitability and that sales volume mediates the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and new product profitability. In addition, the findings indicate that new product advantage strengthens the positive relationship between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results provide no evidence for a moderating effect of product newness. These results have important implications because to maximize new product profitability managers need to distinguish between costs and demand side effects of development cycle time and market‐entry timing on new product profitability. Keeping this distinction in mind should help them to better determine the relative profit impact of investments in cycle time reduction or improved entry timing. Moreover, the findings suggest that highly advantaged products that enter the market at the right time may have a highly attenuated sales volume. It also implies that new products with lower advantage may have very little leeway in hitting the “sweet spot” in market. The message is that “doing the right thing” (i.e., to develop a highly advantaged new product) may be at least as important as correctly balancing the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry.     

The ambidextrous patterns for managing technological and marketing innovation

Built upon organizational ambidexterity theory, this study provides a new perspective in managing technological and marketing innovation. It distinguishes between simultaneous and sequential patterns of innovation within a firm and takes a longitudinal approach in examining the differential effects of these two ambidextrous patterns of innovation on firm performance. Further, this study investigates the contingent roles of internal product scope and external market dynamism on the above relationships. Using panel data from 158 U.S. firms over 26 years, we find that both simultaneous and sequential patterns are positively associated with firm performance. Further, our findings indicate that a broader product scope strengthens the effect of the simultaneous pattern on firm performance, while weakening that of the sequential pattern on firm performance. When market dynamism increases, the effect of the simultaneous pattern on firm performance is strengthened, while that of the sequential pattern is weakened. Our findings offer managers guidance on the choice of innovation patterns under certain contingencies and how to better manage technological and marketing innovation over time.     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

Regulated prices and real options

This paper shows how the cash flows received by an unregulated firm operating in a workably competitive market can be replicated for a regulated firm. The only change to standard regulatory practice is that each time the regulated firm invests, the amount added to its rate base is the product of its capital expenditure and a multiplier, greater than one, that captures the reduction in value of the unregulated firm's growth options that occurs whenever the firm invests. The regulated firm is allowed to earn a rate of return equal to its weighted-average cost of capital, applied to this rate base. Four possible approaches to estimating the size of the multiplier are presented, each based on an established real-options investment model.     

MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit‐Stiglitz when firms sell multiple products. Both products and firms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case). We use it to determine the market's biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over‐entry.     

Entry deregulation,firm organization,and wage inequality

This paper identifies a causal link between changes in product market competition, firm reorganization and within-firm wage inequality. We exploit a unique episode of comprehensive firm entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment and use exceptionally detailed linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector firms and workers in Portugal. Following deregulation affected firms flatten their hierarchies: the number of layers is reduced and managers’ span of control increased. Dropping a hierarchy layer is accompanied by a significant reduction in wage inequality within the firm, by 8% for the average pay ratio between the top and the bottom layer and 4.4% for the 90-50 percentile wage ratio, showing that there are real changes arising from firm reorganization. Overall wage dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of hourly pay, is also reduced. We discuss mechanisms and interpretations for these changes.     

Efficient versus Responsive Supply Chain Choice: An Empirical Examination of Influential Factors

Contemporary strategies in operations management suggest that successful firms align supply chain assets with product demand characteristics in order to exploit the profit potential of product lines fully. However, observation suggests that supply chain assets often are longer lived than product line decisions. This suggests that alignment between supply chain assets and demand characteristics is most likely to occur at the time of initial market entry. This article examines the association between product demand characteristics and the initial investment in a supply chain at the time of market entry. We characterize supply chains as responsive or efficient. A responsive supply chain is distinguished by short production lead‐times, low set‐up costs, and small batch sizes that allow the responsive firm to adapt quickly to market demand, but often at a higher unit cost. An efficient supply chain is distinguished by longer production lead‐times, high set‐up costs, and larger batch sizes that allow the efficient firm to produce at a low unit cost, but often at the expense of market responsiveness. We hypothesize that a firm's choice of responsive supply chain will be associated with lower industry growth rates, higher contribution margins, higher product variety, and higher demand or technological uncertainty. We further hypothesize that interactions among these variables either can reinforce or can temper the main effects. We report that lower industry growth rates are associated with responsive market entry, but this effect is offset if growth occurs during periods of high variety and high demand uncertainty. We report that higher contribution margins are associated with responsive market entry and that this effect is more pronounced when occurring with periods of high variety. Finally, we report that responsive market entry also is correlated positively with higher technological demand uncertainty. These results are found using data from the North American mountain bike industry.     

Innovation and competition: The role of the product market

We study how competition impacts innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run. We provide conditions for when competition increases or decreases industry innovation and welfare. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

A Longitudinal Study of the Impact of R&D,Patents, and Product Innovation on Firm Performance

Because of increasing levels of competition and decreasing product life cycles, a firm's ability to generate a continuous stream of innovations may be more important than ever in allowing a firm to improve profitability and maintain competitive advantage This paper investigates several issues that are central to an examination of the innovation productivity in a firm. First, the relationship between a firm's commitment to research and development and its innovative outcomes is examined. Two innovative outcomes are analyzed: (1) invention, which focuses on the development of new ideas; and (2) innovation, the development of commercially viable products or services from creative ideas. Invention is measured by the number of patents granted, and innovation is assessed by the number of new product announcements. Second, because many inventions ultimately result in marketable innovations and because patents may provide protection for new products, the relationship between patents and product announcements is also investigated. Finally, the ability of a firm to benefit from its inventions and innovations is studied by examining their separate effects on firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA) and sales growth. Drawing from a sample of 272 firms in 35 industries over 19 years, the results from a model of simultaneous equations provided support for some of the hypotheses, but several other surprising findings were found. As expected, R&D spending was positively related to patents. This finding is consistent with others who argue that internal research capabilities, particularly those with a strong basic research component, is key to enabling a firm to generate creative outputs. More surprising was the finding of increasing returns to scale to R&D spending. While this contradicts much of the existing research, it is consistent with economic arguments for the advantages of scale in innovation. Also interesting is the finding that, while a significant curvilinear relationship exists between R&D spending and product announcements, it is not the predicted inverse‐U but instead a U‐shaped relationship. Consistent with previous work, product announcements were found to be positively related to both performance measures. A negative relationship was found between patents and both ROA and sales growth. While these findings were unexpected, they are intriguing and call into question the value of patents as protection mechanisms. In addition, these results may be resulting from the rise of strategic patenting, where an increasing number of firms are using patents as strategic weapons. As expected, a positive relationship was found between patents and new product announcements.     

系统市场中企业策略性排他行为分析

本文将系统竞争和组件竞争结合起来，分析系统市场中的企业策略性行为及其对市场竞争和创新的影响。在系统市场上．开放的系统竞争结构是较优的，但是企业并不一定会选择与社会福利目标相一致的组织形式．而是更多地基于策略性需要来进行选择。在系统市场中．创新主导企业有激励通过策略性地选择许可比例来操纵市场竞争。在邻近市场结构中．在位创新垄断企业有激励通过排他性行为将关键技术市场的垄断势力延伸到邻近竞争市场．这些市场封锁行为通常会严重地伤害市场竞争，并阻碍技术创新。     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

Quantity competition with access fees

We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal marginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus. As the number of firms increases, access fees fall below net consumer surplus and toward zero. Existence is guaranteed if Marshallian consumer surplus is not too concave. With open entry, quantity competition with access fees may be less efficient than without access fees.