PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub‐optimal brand mix.     

Resale and bundling in auctions

The possibility of resale increases bidders' incentives to jointly reduce demand in multi-object auctions, because resale increases low-value bidders' willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders' willingness to pay. Therefore, resale may reduce the seller's revenue. In a simple model with complete information, however, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are “complement strategies” for the seller (under reasonable conditions)—by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by selling the objects separately and/or forbidding resale. We also show why allowing resale may reduce efficiency.     

An empirical analysis of multiple services and choices of consumer in the Swedish telecommunications market

Received analyses state that firms can use a multiple services offering strategy to retain customers and capture new customers. Factors that determine the multiple services strategy include product discount, service provider and customer characteristics. Consequently, this study addresses the fundamental question: what are the key determining factors that explain the probability that a consumer buys multiple services? A generalized Poisson regression model is employed to examine whether the product discount, service provider, socio-economic variables and geographical location impact consumer decisions. Data from a national survey in 2009 commissioned by Post-och Telestyrelsen, the Swedish telecommunications regulator, are analyzed. The results clearly show that the discount, service provider and income of the consumer affect the consumer׳s buying decision. A consumer who receives a discount or has a high income is more likely to buy multiple services or select more services from the current service provider into his basket than a consumer who does not receive discount or has lower income. Service providers, cable TV operators and telecommunications carriers can also lock-in their consumer and expand their market position from one particular service to another using bundling service. Thus, this may be the time for the telecommunications regulator to consider the market definition.     

Multiproduct retailing and consumer shopping behavior: The role of shopping costs

We empirically examine the role of shopping costs in consumer shopping behavior in a context of competing differentiated supermarkets that supply similar product lines. We develop and estimate a model of demand in which consumers can purchase multiple products from multiple stores in the same week, and incur transaction costs of dealing with supermarkets. We show that a similar model without shopping costs predicts a larger proportion of multistop shoppers and overestimates own-price elasticities and product markups. Further, we use our model along with a model of competition between supermarkets to study two practices that are commonly used by supermarkets: product delisting and loss-leader pricing. We show that the presence of shopping costs makes product delisting less profitable whereas it makes loss-leader pricing more profitable compared to a context in which consumers do not incur shopping costs.     

A distribution-free newsvendor model with balking and lost sales penalty

In this paper, we extend the classical single period newsvendor model in an environment of customer balking, which occurs when customers are reluctant to buy a product if its available inventory falls below a threshold level. Since failure to make a sale usually results in a cost penalty, in addition to the opportunity cost of lost sales, we incorporate such costs in our model. Furthermore, we extend our model to include fixed ordering costs. Our analysis is based on the assumption that only the mean and the variance of the distribution of demand are known, without assuming any specific distributional form. We illustrate the concepts developed here through simple numerical examples and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by solving a set of 1000 randomly generated test problems.     

PRODUCT VARIETY AND DEMAND UNCERTAINTY: WHY MARKUPS VARY WITH QUALITY*

We demonstrate that demand uncertainty can explain equilibrium product variety in the presence of sunk costs. Product variety is an efficient response to uncertainty because it reduces the expected costs associated with excess capacity. We find that within the firm's product line, the highest quality product has the highest profit margin but the lowest percentage margin, while the lowest quality product has the highest percentage margin but the lowest absolute margin. Both of these relationships are consistent with evidence available from marketing studies.     

Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts

We study diversificsation within the real estate industry because of its relative transparency: portfolio management of assets with well-defined market prices. Diversification is over property types and geographical regions. The major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue nonfocusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, are predominantly privately controlled and use dual-class shares extensively. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs.     

Using Product Bundling to Facilitate the Adoption Process of Radical Innovations*

Generally, radical innovations are not easily adopted in the market. Potential adopters experience difficulties to comprehend and evaluate radical innovations due to their newness in terms of technology and benefits offered. Consequently, adoption intentions may remain low. This paper proposes bundling as an instrument to address these problems. More specifically, this paper examines how consumer comprehension, evaluation, and adoption intention of radical innovations may be enhanced by bundling such products with existing products. In addition, it is argued that the proposed effects are contingent upon the level of fit perceived to exist between the radical innovation and the product that accompanies it in the bundle. Furthermore, consumers' prior knowledge may affect the influence of bundling on the innovation adoption process as the interpretation of the meaning of new products may be strongly related to prior knowledge. This study therefore investigates whether consumer prior knowledge has such a moderating effect. Hypotheses are tested by means of an experimental study with three different radical innovations and distinguishing among offering the radical innovation separately, offering the radical innovation in a bundle with moderate perceived fit between the products, and offering the radical innovation in a bundle with high perceived fit between the products. Results show that product bundling enhances the new product's evaluation and adoption intention, although it does not increase comprehension of the radical innovation. Moreover, the results show that comprehension, evaluation and adoption intention of the innovation significantly decrease when consumers perceive a moderate fit between the products in a bundle. Taken together, these findings contribute to the bundling literature by showing not only that product bundling may indeed be an effective instrument to introduce a radical innovation but also that product bundling may be counterproductive when ignoring the critical role of perceived product fit as core characteristic of a product bundle. In addition, the notion that product bundling helps to enhance the evaluation and purchase intention of new and relatively complex products suggests a suitable strategy for new product managers to enhance benefits and reduce learning costs for radical innovations. Moreover, the effects of bundling on consumer appraisals of radical innovations are also shown to depend on the level of knowledge respondents possess regarding the product category of the radical innovation. More specifically, if bundled with a familiar product, novices tend to evaluate the innovative product more positively, but for experts no such effect can be detected. As such, these results provide additional specific implications for managers when introducing radical innovations in the market. Offering a radical innovation in a product bundle could be a fruitful strategy for companies that target customers with little or no prior knowledge in the product domain.     

On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts*

We investigate job design problems in relational contracting environments with multitasking and an aggregated and distorted performance measurement. Compared to assigning all the tasks to a single agent, assigning the tasks to multiple agents mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but tightens the self-enforcing constraint. Consequently, task separation is optimal if and only if the discount factor is high. Some tasks may not be assigned to the agents at all under the optimal job design. When the principal provides explicit incentives as well, it may be the case that task bundling is suboptimal for any discount factor.     

Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs

We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk‐averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits. With sufficient risk aversion and non‐trivial fixed operating costs, it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued, and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high: output relative to monopoly levels becomes a U‐shaped function of demand. Greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions, but easier to support in booms.     

Ain't it “suite”? Bundling in the PC office software market

Research Summary: We examine the importance of office suites for the evolution of the personal computer (PC) office software market in the 1990s. An estimated discrete‐choice model reveals a positive correlation of consumer values for spreadsheets and wordprocessors, a bonus value for suites, and advantages for Microsoft products. We employ the estimates to simulate various hypothetical market structures to evaluate the profitability, welfare, and competitive effects of suites under alternative correlation assumptions. We find that firms benefit greatly from bundling components (i.e., a spreadsheet and a word processor) when the correlation of consumer preferences over the components in the bundle is positive. Our work adds another aspect to the recent work in the strategy literature that examines benefits from bundling when there are complementary relationships across the products in the bundle. Managerial Summary: Our research helps managers understand the conditions under which product bundling is likely to be most profitable. We show that one key to enhanced profitability is the correlation in consumer preferences over the individual products. We consider the performance implications of bundling under a variety of alternative market structures and competitive environments. Our analysis reveals that firms benefit greatly from bundling when the correlation of consumer valuations over the products is positive. Consumers benefit as well. Hence, bundling is a win‐win for firms and their customers. Since profits increase by more than consumer surplus, bundling leads to increased value capture by the firms. Consequently, it may be profitable for firms to invest in actively increasing the correlation in consumer preferences over products in the bundle.     

Discount pricing for a family of items: The supplier's optimal decisions

Consider a family of SKUs for which the supplier will offer a quantity discount, according to the aggregate purchases of the product group. Management of those items is based on the modified periodic policy. From the supplier's point of view, what are the optimal parameters (breakpoint and discount percentage)? For deterministic demand, we discuss the cases in which demand is both constant and price-sensitive. First as a noncooperative Stackelberg game, and then when the two parties make the discount and replenishment decisions jointly, we illustrate the impact of price-sensitivity and joint decision making on the supplier's discount policy.     

Fixed-to-mobile substitution in the European Union

This paper analyzes substitution between access to fixed-line and mobile telephony in the European Union using cross-section panel data on households’ choices of telecommunications technologies in years 2005–2010. We estimate a structural model of household?s demand for access to: (i) fixed-line only; (ii) mobile only; and (iii) both fixed-line and mobile. We find that growing Internet usage increases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households, which suggests that households keep their fixed-line connection to access Internet. However, the spread of 3G and cable broadband access decreases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households and increases the share of ‘mobile only’ households. Hence, fixed-to-mobile substitution was slowed down by the spread of Internet but it may continue with the spread of mobile broadband. Furthermore, bundling of telecommunications services increases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households and decreases the shares of ‘mobile only’ and ‘fixed only’ households. Therefore, operators which can bundle fixed-line connection with Internet or mobile services may slow down fixed-to-mobile substitution.     

Bundling can signal high quality

When consumers have noisy information, bundling experience goods can signal high quality in a simple static model. When consumers are partially informed, bundling has a bigger negative impact on the sales of a low-quality firm than on the sales of a firm with two high-quality products. Bundling can also signal high quality by restricting total sales even when consumers are uninformed. However, I argue this is not a likely explanation for bundling because raising prices is always a more profitable way to restrict total sales than bundling.     

Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests

We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of the discount-attribution test to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. (The discount-attribution test is a variant of the price-cost test, where the discount is attributed only to the share of total demand that is regarded as effectively contestable.) In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses market-share discounts to boost the demand for its own products. In this framework, we show that the attribution test is misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-cost tests to loyalty discount cases.     

Risk and Return to Housing, Tenure Choice and the Value of Housing in an Asset Pricing Context

Homeowners do not diversify their risky home equity because of fixed costs of issuing securities and information costs. An asset pricing model is developed for homeowners with the undiversifiable home equity asset. Homeowner value and house value to diversified landlords are compared, and a tenure choice equation is developed. We demonstrate the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium under appropriate conditions.     

Optimal inventory and pricing policies for remanufacturable leased products

In this paper we consider a company which leases new products and also sells remanufactured versions of the new product that become available at the end of their lease periods. When the amount of end-of-lease items in stock is not sufficient to meet the demand for remanufactured products, the firm may purchase additional cores from a third-party supplier. We develop a dynamic programming formulation for determining the optimal price of remanufactured products, and optimal payment structure for the leased products. Our objective is to maximize the discounted system-wide profit over a finite horizon. The profit function consists of revenues that are obtained from remanufactured product sales and leasing, remanufacturing and manufacturing costs, inventory holding and shortage costs. We consider a consumer choice based demand model for mapping a potential customer into one of the product segments (a remanufactured product customer or a customer for a leased product with a particular lease period) for a given price/lease payment vector. We explore several properties of the discounted profit function and provide insight on the behavior of pricing and inventory policies. We also investigate the effect of key product characteristics such as deterioration in age, cost of shortage in remanufacturable product inventory, and key market characteristics such as relative willingness-to-pay for buying a remanufactured product and relative willingness-to-pay for leasing a new product on optimal pricing policies through a computational study.     

Inventory service-level optimization within distribution network design problem

We propose a sequential heuristic approach to optimize inventory service levels in a two-stage supply chain. The proposed approach deals with service level and inventory decisions, simultaneously with network design decisions, and incorporating unfulfilled demand costs in a previous inventory-location model. A two-step formulation is considered, where the first step optimizes service level and the second step addresses location and inventory decisions. Each algorithm iteration solves an inventory-location model for a fixed service level, and then the service level is updated in order to reach an equilibrium condition between operating system and unfulfilled demand costs. The algorithm converged in three iterations for a set of sample instances, obtaining the same outcome in comparison with a more intuitive, exact, but more time-consuming search procedure.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.