政府干预、盈余管理与信息披露质量——来自深圳股票市场A股上市公司的经验证据

通过以深圳证券交易所2006-2010年信息披露质量评级报告结果及3185家上市公司的A股数据为研究样本,从政府干预的角度分析了盈余管理与信息披露质量之间的内在关系。实证表明,政府干预与盈余管理呈负相关关系;政府干预与信息披露质量显著负相关;盈余管理与信息披露质量呈负相关关系,且政府干预行为影响其负相关关系。这说明在政府干预的情况下,上市公司可能通过降低信息披露质量来配合其盈余管理,从而使信息使用者与上市公司信息不对称。     

Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention

An institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading ("speculation") and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance. Intervention increases the value of the institution's existing shareholdings, but intervention only increases the institution's trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution's information relative to that of uninformed traders. Thus, the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention. We examine key factors that affect the intervention decision, the usefulness of "short-swing" provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention, and implications for ownership structure across different firms.     

Technical analysis and central bank intervention

This paper extends genetic programming techniques to show that US foreign exchange intervention information improves technical trading rules' profitability for two of four exchange rates over part of the out-of-sample period. Rules trade contrary to intervention and are unusually profitable on days prior to intervention, indicating that intervention is intended to halt predictable trends. Intervention seems to be more successful in checking such trends in the out-of-sample (1981–98) period than in the in-sample (1975–80) period. Any improvement in performance results from more precise estimation of the relationship between current and past exchange rates, rather than from information about contemporaneous intervention.     

Scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts

I study whether the demand for monitoring explains the scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts. Theory suggests that renegotiation trades off the benefits of enhanced monitoring with the costs of creditor intervention. Consistent with this tradeoff, I show that monitoring demand proxies bear a positive association with renegotiation intensity. In contrast, the costs of creditor intervention are associated with less frequent renegotiations. I also find that contractual monitoring mechanisms, such as covenants and concentrated syndicate structures, are positively related to renegotiation intensity. Furthermore, renegotiations transmit new information to the market, in line with private creditors discovering information during renegotiations.     

制度环境对会计准则执行的影响研究

本文以2007～2009年沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本,实证检验了制度环境对会计准则执行的影响。选取地区市场化程度、法律保护、政府干预以及社会资本水平作为制度环境因素解释变量,以盈余管理水平和会计信息披露评级作为会计准则执行效果的替代变量。研究结果表明,地区市场化水平越高、法律保护越好、政府干预越少、社会资本水平越高,则该地区上市公司的会计信息质量越高,从而会计准则在该地区的执行效果就越好。     

Why do central banks intervene?

Intervention by central banks, in terms of buying and selling foreign currency, has been a major activity in recent years. This paper investigates the motivations for such policy and the evidence for its effectiveness. We use high quality daily data on the dollar amounts of intervention by the central banks of the US and Germany. We also use information on agreed G7 target levels for the $/DM and $/Yen nominal exchange rates. Daily, nominal dollar exchange rate returns are well described as a Martingale-GARCH process, and we find little evidence that the different types of intervention have had much effect on the conditional mean of exchange rate returns. There is some evidence that intervention is associated with slight increases in the volatility of exchange rate returns. While little evidence is found for the effectiveness of intervention, the motivations are more clear. In particular, from the application of probit analysis we find that the probability of intervention is determined by the magnitude of the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the agreed target level and, to a lesser extent, by the current volatility of exchange rates.     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

Auditor Mindsets and Audits of Complex Estimates

Auditors experience significant problems auditing complex accounting estimates, and this increasingly puts financial reporting quality at risk. Based on analyses of the specific errors that auditors commit, we propose that auditors need to be able to think more broadly and incorporate information from a variety of sources in order to improve audit quality for these important accounts. We experimentally demonstrate that a deliberative mindset intervention improves auditors’ ability to identify unreasonable estimates by improving their ability to identify and incorporate into their analyses contradictory information from diverse parts of the audit and improving their ability to think critically about the evidence. We perform additional analyses to demonstrate that our intervention improves auditor performance by causing them to think differently rather than simply to work harder. We demonstrate that critical thinking can improve the identification of unreasonable estimates and, in doing so, we provide new directions for addressing audit quality issues.     

Words Speak Louder without Actions

Information and control rights are central aspects of leadership, management, and corporate governance. This paper studies a principal-agent model that features both communication and intervention as alternative means to exert influence. The main result shows that a principal's power to intervene in an agent's decision limits the ability of the principal to effectively communicate her private information. The perverse effect of intervention on communication can harm the principal, especially when the cost of intervention is low or the underlying agency problem is severe. These novel results are applied to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and shareholder activism.     

Measurement Errors and Information Content of Segment Reporting

This paper assesses the measurement errors inherent in segment reporting. Measurement errors are gauged by comparing the correlation of segment results with their industry to the corresponding correlation for single line-of-business firms operating in the same industry. The findings show that the measurement errors in segment information, particularly earnings, are larger than those in the financial information reported by single line-of-business firms. The cross-sectional variation in the measurement errors can be traced to cost/revenue allocations, management intervention in segment reporting, and the operational structure of multi-segment firms. Market tests indicate that the information content of segment information is inversely related to the estimated measurement errors. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices

Governments intervene in firms' lives in a variety of ways. To enhance the efficiency of government intervention, many researchers and policy makers call for governments to make use of information contained in stock market prices. However, price informativeness is endogenous to government policy. We analyze government policy in light of this endogeneity. In some cases, it is optimal for a government to commit to limit its reliance on market prices to avoid harming the aggregation of information into market prices. For similar reasons, it is optimal for a government to limit transparency in some dimensions.     

HOW DO MARKET FAILURES JUSTIFY INTERVENTIONS IN RURAL CREDIT MARKETS?

Understanding of the economic causes and consequences of marketfailure in credit markets has progressed a great deal in recentyears. This article draws on these developments to appraisethe case for government intervention in rural financial marketsin developing countries and to discover whether the theoreticalfindings can be used to identify directives for policy. Before debating the when and how of intervention, the articledefines market failure, emphasizing the need to consider thefull array of constraints that combine to make a market workimperfectly. The various reasons for market failure are discussedand set in the context in which credit markets function in developingcountries. The article then looks at recurrent problems thatmay be cited as failures of the market justifying intervention.Among these problems are enforcement; imperfect information,especially adverse selection and moral hazard; the risk of bankruns; and the need for safeguards against the monopoly powerof some lenders. The review concludes with a discussion of interventions,focusing on the learning process that must take place for financialmarkets to operate effectively.      

How the provision of inflation information affects pension contributions: A field experiment

Ignoring the effects of inflation in retirement planning can have severe consequences for an individual's future financial well-being. Yet, many pension funds do not communicate inflation-related information, presumably for the fear of reduced contributions once the members understand how low the “real” return on saving for retirement is. As an alternative prediction, the provision of inflation information could increase pension contributions, because it reveals possible pension shortfalls. In cooperation with a major German pension fund, we conduct a field experiment, in which we vary the inflation information provided to the fund members, to explore this important issue. Among all participants, we find mostly positive but insignificant effects of the inflation information on pension contributions. Among those participants who voluntarily changed their pension contributions after the experimental intervention, the provision of inflation information significantly raises the likelihood of increasing pension contributions.     

股指期货对市场波动性影响的比较——基于非对称GARCH模型的探讨及成因分析

在理论上,股指期货为投资者提供了不同于传统证券的投资工具及避险工具,为控制市场风险提供了可能。但在实践中,股指期货的推出并不必然地降低证券市场的波动性。为此,本文选取处于不同发展阶段的八个国家和地区的市场予以考察,试图比较在理论和实践层面,波动性产生差异的成因。其结果显示:一、股指期货推出对市场波动性的影响,除日本显著增大,印度显著减小外,其余市场均无显著变化;二、有6个市场存在非对称效应,即利空消息对市场的冲击显著强于利好消息;三、将股指期货推出的影响从总信息冲击中抽离后发现,其推出对于比利时、中国香港、中国台湾和中国大陆是利好消息,对日本是利空消息,其余市场没有显著变动;四、上述变动的差异是宏观经济、市场结构和交易者行为共同作用的结果;五、对于中国市场而言,应当着重改善市场结构,引导交易者理性投资。     

CECL: Timely Loan Loss Provisioning and Bank Regulation

We investigate how provisioning models interact with bank regulation to affect banks' risk-taking behavior. We study an accuracy versus timeliness trade-off between an incurred loss model (IL) and an expected loss model (EL) such as current expected credit loss model or International Financial Reporting Standards 9. Relative to IL, even though EL improves efficiency by prompting earlier corrective action in bad times, it induces banks to originate either safer or riskier loans. Trading off ex post benefits versus ex ante real effects, we show that more timely information under EL enhances efficiency either when banks are insufficiently capitalized or when regulatory intervention is likely to be effective. Conversely, when banks are moderately capitalized and regulatory intervention is sufficiently costly, switching to EL impairs efficiency. From a policy perspective, our analysis highlights the roles that regulatory capital and the effectiveness of regulatory intervention play in determining the economic consequences of provisioning models. EL spurs credit supply and improves financial stability in economies where intervening in banks' operations is relatively frictionless and/or regulators can tailor regulatory capital to incorporate information about credit losses.     

构建区域金融稳定机制基本要素的实践探析

人民银行济南分行通过对特定金融风险案件的处置经验,借助金融稳定监测和重大事项报告制度等确立了较为成型的金融稳定机制工作框架,并从中提炼出了信息知情权、风险早期介入、信息共享机制和金融稳定协调是构建金融稳定机制不可或缺的基本要素。     

Strategic Complementarity,Stabilization Policy,and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study's key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications; specifically, in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.     

'Accounting talk' in a caring setting

An action research study, designed to investigate the effects on cost control of individually designed cost reports, uncovered indications that the use of financial information may be socially, rather than cognitively, determined. For financial information to be used sensibly it has to be given meaning in context, i.e., in the professional discourse. The financial language, related to a different conceptual framework, and dealing with secondary effects of professional activities, was assumed to be blocked from entering into the learning processes of professionals. Therefore, a 'modest' intervention was designed. It was oriented towards conceptual training and design, and redesign, of reports. The effects of the intervention would be monitored in regular interviews about the problem solving process in professional groups. As the study proceeded over a 1 year period it gradually became evident that the interviews, or 'talks' as we prefer to call them, played a more important role than the individually adapted financial reporting.     

Do dividends signal safety? Evidence from China

Our paper examines whether dividends convey information about future cash-flow volatility in the Chinese stock markets. We observe that dividend changes are followed by cash-flow-volatility changes in the opposite direction. Taking advantage of the unique context of China, we show, in both the two-way sorting analysis and the regression analysis, that the strong relation between changes in dividend and cash-flow volatility is robust after controlling for potential confounders, including firm-level financial market frictions, macroeconomic and market conditions, and government intervention in firms' decision-making, and holds after we control for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we perform the theoretic mechanism tests of the relation and present supporting evidence on the signaling theory under the setting of asymmetric information, instead of the free cash flow theory based on the assumption of agency conflict. This study enriches our understanding of the source and nature of cash-flow information contained in dividends.