Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

Summary This note is to inform about a mistake in my paper (Serizawa, 1996). In that paper, I characterized strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy social choice functions for economies with one public good and one private good. I established as Theorem 3 (page 507) that a social choice function is strategy-proof, individually rational with respect to endowment, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy if and only if it is a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing determined by the minimum demand principle. I also exposed one example (Example 2, page 507) in order to emphasize that non-bossiness is indispensable for this characterization. I claimed that the social choice function in that example satisfies the above axioms except for non-bossiness, and is not a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing. However, the social choice function in the example is actually not strategy-proof, as shown in the simple discussion below. Therefore it is an open question whether or not a similar characterization theorem holds without non-bossiness.I thank Professor Rajat Deb, who kindly pointed out my mistake.     

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Summary. Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998     

Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities

A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than −ε, where ε can be arbitrarily small.     

A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions

We give a dictatorial domain for monotone and unanimous social choice functions.     

Empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting

The derivation of the correct discount rate for intergenerational projects in Cost Benefit Analysis is particularly contentious. Public choice has resulted in lower discretionary exponential discount rates for many intergenerational projects in Britain and the USA. This is shown to be strong indirect evidence that the true social discount rate may be a hyperbolic (rather than an exponential) function. There is also empirical evidence for this hypothesis. The hyperbolic nature of discounting is also a standard finding in the behavioural sciences. For intergenerational time frames hyperbolic discount rates should be employed together with exponential discount rates in cost-benefit sensitivity analyses.Sincere thanks to Maureen Cropper and Paul Portney for supplying their survey results and to Elaine Barrow and Phillip Judge for graphics assistance. Two anonymous referees also provided valuable comments.     

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem

Recent literature has made significant progress in characterizing those social choice functions that can arise, or be “implemented,” as the equilibria of an underlying noncooperative game. This paper studies the implementability of social choice functions via cooperative games. Specifically, we show that if a social choice function arises, in each environment, as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of an underlying cooperative game, whose dominance structure is monotonic and neutral, then the social choice function is essentially oligarchic, in exactly the same sense that “core” selecting choice functions are oligarchic.     

Salience and social choice

The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In a controlled experiment with 100 subjects placed in the role of social planners, we test five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to determine the efficacy of traditional social choice models in predicting social planner allocations when presented with choice sets designed to test the axioms of the theory. We find that three properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, and a framing effect in social choice. We find support for scale invariance and a preference for tail-increasing transfers. Our experiment also enables us to test a model of salience-based social choice which predicts the systematic deviations and highlights the close relationship between these anomalies and the classical paradoxes for risk and time.

     

Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms

Summary. An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information. Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997     

Revealing demand for an actual public good

In spite of important theoretical advances and a number of laboratory tests in recent years, no practicable mechanism for revealing demand for public goods has yet emerged. A method is presented which seems capable of meeting the political demands of such mechanisms. It was successfully tested on an actual public-good project provided by the Swedish government. The method is evaluated against the background of the results of this nonlaboratory and nonhypothetical test.     

Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.     

Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indifferent among all the allocations in it. Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997     

The challenge of akrasia for the theory of rational choice

The phenomenon of akrasia, in which an actor makes a choice she regrets even while choosing it, appears problematic for theories of rational choice, which assume that an agent prefers any chosen course of action. The apparent possibility of akratic action presents a challenge to rational choice theorists, either to demonstrate that it is illusory or to show that akratic action does not violate the axioms of rational choice. The problematic status of akrasia is exhibited most sharply when set against the backdrop of praxeology. Therefore, this paper will explore whether the idea of akratic action can be reconciled with the fundamental principles of praxeology.

Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good

This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications, with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences under which randomization is undesirable.     

Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Summary. We present a new class of rules named augmented serial rules for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) anonymous augmented serial rules by anonymity, and (ii) Moulins serial rule by individual rationality.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 9 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41.This paper is a substantial revision of Serial cost sharing with simple games. I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, an associate editor, and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program Microstructure and Mechanism Design in Financial Markets).     

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice

In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental public choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other public choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.     

Democracy,visibility and public good provision

We examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation across a multiplicity of public goods. We show that a “visibility effect” distorts governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments neglect provision of essential public goods, despite their considerable benefits. We show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation between more visible (such as famine prevention) versus less visible (such as malnutrition prevention) public goods, up to an intermediate level of democracy. Beyond this level, this gap decreases. Furthermore, public goods with low visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation, with voter expectations being shown to be important.