Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.     

Matching markets with price bargaining

The extant microeconomic literature on matching markets assumes ordinal preferences for matches, while bargaining within matches is mostly excluded. Central for this paper, however, is bargaining over joint profits from potential matches. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, a seemingly simple allocation task in a 2×2 market with repeated negotiations. When inefficiency is possible, about 1/3 of the complete matches are inefficient and, overall, more than 3/4 of the experimental allocations are unstable. These results strongly contradict existing bargaining theories requiring efficient matches. Even with regard to efficient matches, the tested theories perform poorly. Standard bargaining and behavioral concepts, such as Selten’s (1972) Equal Division Core, are outperformed by the simplistic ε-Equal Split, i.e., an equal split of the joint profit plus/minus ε.     

Equilibrium in economies with incomplete financial markets

This paper analyses an exchange economy in the absence of Arrow-Debreu complete markets. It is assumed that trading takes place in the sequence of spot markets and futures markets for securities payable in units of account. Unlimited short-selling in securities is allowed. A general equilibrium in such an economy is a set of current and future prices (contingent on uncertain events) and a set of individual plans such that all markets are cleared. The existence of such an equilibrium is proved under usual assumptions. This is in contrast to the case of futures markets for contingent futures commodities where an equilibrium may not exist. The optimality of equilibrium allocations is also discussed.     

Modelling price pressure in financial markets

We present experimental evidence that, unlike traditional assumptions in economic theory, security prices do not respond to pressure from their own excess demand. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities, despite the absence of a direct link between markets. We propose a model of price pressure that explains these findings. In our model, agents set order prices that reflect the marginal valuation of desired future holdings, called “aspiration levels.”In the short run, as agents encounter difficulties executing their orders, they scale back their aspiration levels. Marginal valuations, order prices, and hence, transaction prices change correspondingly. The resulting price adjustment process coincides with the Global Newton Method. The assumptions of the model as well as its empirical implications are fully borne out by the data. Our model thus provides an economic foundation for why markets appear to search for equilibrium according to Newton’s procedure.     

Equilibrium under price controls with endogenous transactions costs

In this paper we present an equilibrium model for an exchange economy with fixed prices and endogenously determined search or transactions costs. Given the fixed prices, endogenously determined equilibrium buying and selling prices (which include transactions costs) result. These costs occur on either the demand or supply side of each market, but not both. We see an eventual application of this approach to an evaluation of welfare costs of either economy-wide wage and price controls, or sector-specific price controls such as energy. In the final section we present some simple numerical examples which illustrate the approach.     

Pricing and price competition in consumer markets

This paper offers a simple model of the price mechanism in markets where buyers take prices as given and prices are set by sellers, as in most consumer markets. It explains price competition by arguing that a market price goes down if—and only if—a price cut appears profitable to a firm even if its competitors follow suit. It also explains why markets do not always clear, that is, why production can be restricted by sales and not capacity at prices set by firms.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Equilibrium in securities markets with heterogeneous investors and unspanned income risk

In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and unspanned income risk. In equilibrium, the Sharpe ratio is the same as in an otherwise identical complete market economy, whereas the risk-free rate is lower and, consequently, the stock price is higher. The reduction in the risk-free rate is highest when the more risk-averse investors face the largest unspanned income risk.     

The asymmetric price adjustment between REIT and stock markets in Asia-Pacific markets

This paper applies the threshold error correction model to examine the relationship for real estate investment trusts (REITs) and stock, and their asymmetric adjustment behaviors in six Asian/Pacific financial markets: Australia, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Our results show that there has been long-term equilibrium in REIT and stock indices in most of these markets. To earn exceptional profits, it is recommended that investors can sell (buy) the REITs when the indices of REITs are lower (higher) than equilibrium in Australia, Singapore and Taiwan; on the other hand, they should sell (buy) when the REIT market goes up (down) in Hong Kong and Japan. A causality test revealed that previous information about stocks predicted changes in the REITs in all the Asian/Pacific markets. One can also find that the lead–lag relationships are significant. The threshold EC model predicts two-way causality under both the regimes for the financial markets in most countries during all the sample periods. In addition, the adjustment speeds for the stock indices are faster than that for the REIT indices as disequilibrium occurs. This paper also finds that the previous mentioned trading strategies generally remained the same during the period of sub-prime mortgage crisis. However, the threshold EC model predicts one-way causality for both the regimes for the financial markets in most countries during this crisis period. In addition, we also find that the severe shock in REIT markets led investors in Australia and Taiwan to be more conservative during this period. The REIT indices had more effect on stock indices after the sub-prime mortgage crisis. According to the empirical results, we can infer that the degree of market imbalance and the occurrence of the sub-prime mortgage crisis induce the changes in the investment behavior of market participants.     

Paradoxical price effects on insurance markets

In this paper we analyze a paradox phenomenon in certain insurance markets of some countries: in spite of there being strong competition, increasing prices can be found in some submarkets. As a reason for this, we need to note the special distribution of insurance products, a distribution primarily based on intermediaries — and, as a result, there is an increasing part for ‘intermediation’ costs within insurance products' cost structure due to competition for the intermediaries. We build an oligopolistic model assuming that the market is saturated, which is able to explain the overemployment of intermediaries and the high commissions involved. We analyze possible interventions and laws/regulations and suggest that the problem can be solved only with major regulation. Finally, we have come up with an empirical analysis to test the model.     

Evolution of trading strategies in a market with heterogeneously informed agents

We present an agent-based simulation of an asset market with heterogeneously informed agents. Genetic programming is applied to optimize the agents’ trading strategies. After optimization, insiders are the only agents able to generate small systematic above-average returns. For all other agents, genetic programming finds a rich variety of trading strategies that are predominantly based on exclusive subsets of their information. This limits their price impact and prevents them from making systematic losses. The resulting low noise renders market prices as largely informationally efficient.     

Competition and price dispersion in the airline markets

We use two ticket-level data sets on one-way domestic flights for the US airlines to examine the potentially nonlinear relationship between price dispersion and three forms of competition: inter-firm, inter-flight and frequency competitions. The linear relationship is rejected at any conventional significance levels. In particular, there is an S-shaped relationship between market concentration and price dispersion. This can be a reason for the mixed results in the literature. Roughly speaking, the inter-flight and frequency competitions have opposite effects on price dispersion. Finally, in general, the size of aircraft has a positive effect on price. However, for very large aircraft, the relationship becomes negative.     

Imperfectly competitive factor markets and price normalization

A two-sector general equilibrium model with imperfectly competitive labor markets is set up. Noncooperative equilibria with wage setting at the sectoral level are shown to depend on the choice of price-normalization rule even though all agents behave fully rationally. Hence, imposing rationality is not sufficient to deprive the choice of price-normalization rule of its importance. It is argued that the importance of the choice of price-normalization rule may follow from the strategic interaction of agents and not from imperfectness of competition per se, and some examples are provided.     

Equilibrium prices in a random exchange economy with dependent agents

Summary. This paper presents a model of a Walrasian exchange economy in which the preferences and endowments of the agents are random. Stochastic interaction among the agents is formally described in terms of dependency neighborhoods. The main result is a characterization of the distribution of market-clearing prices in a large economy. Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 6, 1999     

Vertical price leadership on local maize markets in Benin

This paper considers vertical price relationships between wholesalers and retailers on five local maize markets in Benin. We show that the common stochastic trend and the long-run disequilibrium error must explicitly be considered to correctly interpret the restrictions on the error–correction structure in terms of economic power in the channel. Interesting differences between markets are found. In the two major towns, retailers play a more prominent role in the price formation process than generally assumed in the literature on development economics. In the two larger rural centers, however, wholesalers involved in arbitrage among urban markets do influence price formation.     

Rank tests for price convergence in Australian beverage markets

This article examines the price convergence of beverage products within Australia in order to assess the efficacy of intranational cross-border movements of products under the Australia’s Mutual Recognition Agreement. Since the cointegrating relationship between product prices may not be exact or linear, we adopt the rank tests for analysis which do not require prior knowledge and specification of the linear or nonlinear functional form. Our results validate the price convergence of all beverage products within Australia, with the exception of a few regions in the milk market. Furthermore, a subset of the cointegration relationships exhibits nonlinear long-run price co-movements.