Has the Basel Accord improved risk management during the global financial crisis?

The Basel II Accord requires that banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) communicate their daily risk forecasts to the appropriate monetary authorities at the beginning of each trading day, using one or more risk models to measure Value-at-Risk (VaR). The risk estimates of these models are used to determine capital requirements and associated capital costs of ADIs, depending in part on the number of previous violations, whereby realised losses exceed the estimated VaR. In this paper we define risk management in terms of choosing from a variety of risk models, and discuss the selection of optimal risk models. A new approach to model selection for predicting VaR is proposed, consisting of combining alternative risk models, and we compare conservative and aggressive strategies for choosing between VaR models. We then examine how different risk management strategies performed during the 2008–09 global financial crisis. These issues are illustrated using Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index.     

Did small or large US banks transmit more risk during the Subprime crisis?

This paper investigates bank size as a factor of risk transmission in the US banking sector during the Subprime crisis. Risk transmission is examined in two directions: from large to small banks and from small to large banks. To do this, we estimated a Spatial Autoregressive model using information on all US commercial banks from 2005 to 2010. Our results show that risk transmission from small to large banks appeared during early stages of the Subprime Crisis and transmission from large to small banks appeared later but was more long lasting.     

TFP change and its components for Swedish manufacturing firms during the 2008–2009 financial crisis

Journal of Productivity Analysis - A driving force of economic development is growth in total factor productivity (TFP). Manufactured goods are, to a large extent, exports, and represent an...     

Government support and bank performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Though previous studies suggest a state participation has a negative impact on banks, this paper highlights the potential benefits of state ownership for confidence and stability in the post-crisis period that can outweigh the inefficiencies and potential for corruption of political intervention. We find that the state guarantees are valuable during the crisis. The negative (positive) relation between state ownership and bank profitability (risk) is mitigated in the post-crisis period. Financially troubled banks that receive a transfer payment or capital injection experience improved performance during the post-bailout period.     

Trading income and bank charter value during the financial crisis: Does derivatives dealer designation matter?

Derivative markets have exploded over the last decade, remained active in the midst of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and continue to be dominated by a small group of bank holding companies (BHC). BHC motives for derivative usage are usually tied to hedging purposes (balance sheet risk management), trading purposes (profit motives) or some combination thereof. This paper examines the relationship between derivative trading income and bank charter value for 27 BHC between 2001Q1 and 2011Q3. We find that the impact of derivative trading income on bank charter value, using Tobin's Q, is very small and seems to be tied to BHCs derivatives dealer trading designation. We also find that trading incomes are a modest fraction of net operating revenue, highly volatile, and did not contribute to overall BHC income during the crisis.     

Does financial regulation affect the profit efficiency and risk of banks? Evidence from China's commercial banks

The goal of financial regulation is to enable banks to improve liquidity and solvency. Stricter regulation may be good for bank stability, but not for bank efficiency. This research aims to examine whether banks have met the CBRC's standard of financial regulations and explores how the previously implemented financial regulations have affected bank efficiency and risk in the past. In addition, we also explored the trade-off relationship between efficiency and risk. Unlike other studies, this study used bank assets as a classification standard from the financial risk and differential regulatory perspective.The empirical results indicate that the CBRC regulates the provision coverage ratio and cost-to-income ratio, which seems relevant to large banks and the loan-to-deposit ratio, capital adequacy ratio, and leverage ratio, which seems relevant to small banks. The CBRC regulates the current ratio to reduce the risks of banks. Based on our empirical results, the current ratio did not affect the risks and led to different efficiency results between large and small banks. In an environment with asymmetric information, a bank decision-making is unobservable. The characteristics of financial regulation provide market clues if a bank is operating at the most efficiency and risk condition.     

Should the monetary policy rule be different in a financial crisis?

This article reviews the finding that standard loss functions in output and inflation are higher during discretionary periods than in periods during which monetary policy is described by a rule, such as the Taylor rule. It shows that the finding is consistent with earlier research, but argues that we really do not know if the Taylor rule would have improved performance during the recent financial crisis. The article then considers modifications of policy rules to deal with changes in interest rate spreads, credit aggregates and banks׳ balance sheets.     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.

     

Banks’ capital,regulation and the financial crisis

This paper investigates whether regulatory capital requirements play an important role in determining banks’ equity capital. We estimate equity capital regressions using panel data of a sample of 560 banks for 2004–2010. Our results suggest that regulatory capital requirements are not first order determinants of banks’ capital structure. We document differences on the effect of most factors on banks’ share of equity according to the type of bank and to the region of the bank. Finally, we show that the determinants of this share are sensitive to the recent international financial crisis and to a set of regulatory country factors.     

COVID-19 crisis and the efficiency of Indian banks: Have they weathered the storm?

The purpose of this study is to determine whether Indian banks were able to weather the COVID-19 storm. We estimate banks’ deposits-generating and operating efficiencies using a two-stage directional distance function-based network data envelopment analysis (DDF-NDEA) approach and seek to capture the immediate impact of COVID-19 on these efficiency measures by comparing their magnitudes in the pre-pandemic (2014/15–2019/20), just 1-year prior to the pandemic (2019/20), and during the pandemic year (2020/21) periods. The study looks at whether the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was uniform across ownership types and size classes. The empirical findings suggest that the Indian banking system was resilient and withstood the immediate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the study period, however, the large and medium-sized banks experienced some efficiency losses. By and large, regardless of bank group, banks have shown resilience to the shock of the global health pandemic and improvements in efficiency.     

Are we there yet? On the convergence of financial reforms

Since the 1970s, there have been substantial financial reforms across the world, however little research has been devoted to studying the convergence path of these reforms. While Abiad and Mody (Am Econ Rev 95:66–88, 2005) find that there is movement towards a global ‘norm’ of financial reform, their findings are based upon a cross-sectional approach that has been widely criticized in the literature. In this paper we offer new time-series evidence on the convergence of financial reforms both across and within regions, which can also act as a metric to measure the degree of globalization among countries’ financial systems. We find that some regions of the world have fully converged, but the advanced economies and Sub-Saharan Africa are not converging. In addition, while most countries have fully converged within their own region, notable exceptions are also identified. These results suggest that while financial reforms have largely become homogenized, important distinctions still remain.     

Are exchange rates less important for trade in a more globalized world? Evidence for the new EU members

We evaluate the effect of exchange rate misalignments on the balance of trade and the role that global value chain participation plays in this effect for 11 new European Union member states. Using heterogeneous panel cointegration methods, we first estimate the real equilibrium exchange rate and detect episodes of currency misalignment. We find asymmetric effects of real currency misalignments: overvaluation has a negative effect, but undervaluation has no effect on the trade balance. Additionally, we find that global value chain participation weakens the effect of currency misalignments on the balance of trade. Therefore, our results suggest that globalization reduces the role of exchange rates in stimulating the domestic economy.     

Should the government directly intervene in stock market during a crisis?

Unlike foreign exchange markets where central banks frequently intervene, the governments strive not to intervene in the stock markets since intervention transmit negative signals and carry market-related side effects. The main reasons often cited in support of intervention are to bring price stability and to restore investors’ confidence. During the recent economic turmoil, opportunities for the governments to intervene in the stock markets were mainly exploited in emerging and developing countries. We study the outcome of the Russian government's intervention in its major stock market between September and October 2008. This intervention was intended to reverse the sudden and swift declining trend in traded security prices by altering the market's expectations. By using a combination of event study and a multivariate GARCH model, our findings does not support direct government intervention in the stock market during a crisis.     

Non-structural and structural models in productivity analysis: study of the British Isles during the 2007–2009 financial crisis

Journal of Productivity Analysis - The paper compares unrestricted and restricted reduced-form estimates of productivity and efficiency performance constructed from non-structural stochastic...     

Has recent financial crisis changed permanently the correlations between BRICS and developed stock markets?

The paper finds recent financial crisis has changed permanently the correlations between BRICS and developed U.S. and Europe stock markets. 70% of BRICS stock markets⿿ conditional correlation series demonstrate an upward long-run trend with the developed stock markets. Our results provide convincing evidence that the reducing diversification benefits are a long-run and world-wide phenomenon, especially after recent financial crisis.     

Did covenants distort risk signals from bank subordinated debt yields before the financial crisis?

Restrictive covenants on bank debt require a bank to take or refrain from specific actions that affect the riskiness of that debt. Although covenants all but disappeared in the 1990s, they re-emerged after 2004 with an increase in bank risk leading up to the financial crisis. Subordinated debt yields potentially enable better risk monitoring by supervisors, but covenants can shift risk from bondholders to stockholders without reducing overall bank risk. This can distort the risk signal used by market participants to discipline excessive risk taking. Because covenants are endogenous and increase during periods of bank stress, the yield signal is dampened the most precisely when regulators most need accurate risk monitoring.     

Transmission of US financial and trade shocks to Asian economies: Implications for spillover of the 2007–2009 US financial crisis

This paper describes an investigation of the transmission of US shocks to Asian economies with consideration of financial linkages and trade linkages. Using the sign restriction vector autoregression (VAR) approach during 2000–2012, our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, both US financial and trade linkages exert a significant impact on production in Asian economies. Second, through both financial and trade linkages, US spillover shocks account for around 50% of the production fluctuation in Asian economies. Third, during the episodes of 2007–2009 US financial crisis, the impact of financial shocks is greater than that of trade shocks. Results suggest that (i) Asian economies are not decoupled with US; and (ii) different from conventional findings, financial linkages between US and Asian economies are strong, especially for highly developed Asian economies. Therefore, investors and policymakers of Asian economies should take account of US financial conditions.     

Was the 2007 crisis really a global banking crisis?

We argue that the 2007 crisis was not a global banking crisis. Stock prices of banks in emerging countries faced a temporary shock but quickly recovered, while stock prices of banks located in industrial countries remained much lower than before the 2007 crisis. Our results also suggest that stock prices of large banks were affected more during the crisis than those of small banks. We also find that managerial efficiency, loan quality, leverage, and the volume of outstanding loans affect bank stock prices.