论股票期权激励机制异化与舞弊财务报告

本文探讨和分析了美国股票期权激励机制背离其激励初衷的原因,认识到由于股票期权的滥用、公司治理结构的缺陷、外部监管的不力和法律上的漏洞导致股票期权激励机制的异化及由此产生的舞弊财务报告。针对上述原因,结合我国实施股票期权激励机制的情况,对防范我国股票期权激励     

关于股票期权激励机制设计的实证研究

股票期权是一把双刃剑,有利也有弊。我国部分上市公司已经开展了股票期权激励机制的尝试,但在尝试过程中还存在着很多问题。本文在简要介绍了股票期权的含义、利与弊的基础上,分析了股票期权激励机制在我国的适用范围及实施条件,阐述了股票期权激励机制设计所运用的理论,并重点从组成股权激励机制的各要素方面探讨了股票期权激励机制的设计。     

股票期权激励机制在我国的发展状况

股票期权激励机制对上市公司能够起到协调利益冲突的作用,引入经理人股票期权可以缓解股东与经理层之间的矛盾,设计出科学的股票期权激励机制对企业的发展具有重要的作用,对企业生存发展产生一定的影响。文章研究股票期权激励在我国的发展以及取得的成就并着重分析盈余管理存在的可能、股票期权终止和制度保障力度等情况。通过分析对我国股票期权激励机制发展进行深入探析,分别从市场监管、激励机制设计、会计制度基础方面阐述。     

浅析公司治理中股票期权激励机制的运用

股票期权激励机制在公司治理中处于重要地位，是企业所有者对经营者的一项长期激励制裒。然而，在我国现阶段，股票期权在实施过程中存在诸多问题。本文从公司治理理论入手，在分析股票期权实践中存在的问题的基础上，提出了完善股票期权激励机制的相关建议。     

对执行经理层股票期权激励机制的思考

起源于美国的股票期权作为一种有效的激励机制促进美国高新产业的发展壮大,并推动了其20世纪90年代的经济繁荣。随着股票期权激励机制作用的日益明显,日本、欧洲也开始引入了股票期权制度,与此同时,股票期权也受到了包括中国在内的许多发展中国家越来越多企业的青睐。本文对此进行了简单的阐述,并就股票期权在我国的实施现状及存在的问题提出了一些建议。     

经理股票期权的理论思考

经理股票期权是现代企业一种行之有效的激励机制,它具有激励的长期性、有效性和激励对象的有限性、操作过程的复杂性等特点。国有企业对经理人员采取的年薪制和在职消费的激励方式存在明显缺陷,“武汉式股票期权”对国有企业经理人员激励机制进行了有益探索,但它还不能算是真正意义上的“股票期权”,当前在我国实行“股票期权”还存在诸多障碍。     

对我国股票期权激励机制的模式探讨

本文对我国现有的股票期权激励机制的典型模式进行比较和综合分析。在借鉴西方经验和吸纳我国各模式精髓的基础上，探索具有中国特色的股票期权激励模式的多元化，并对股票期权的创新进行探讨以及提出配套政策的调整建议。     

股票期权激励机制的利弊分析

股票期权制度作为一种长期激励机制,是解决由于所有权与经营权分离所引起的委托人与代理人之间利益冲突的有效机制,但在实践中也存在着诸多的弊端。本文分析了实施股票期权制度的利弊,指出我国企业引进股票期权制度必须注意的问题。     

对我国上市公司建立股票期权激励制度的思考

股票期权制度作为一种长期激励机制，在国外受到了普遍的重视，在我国也日益引起人们的关注。本文对我国上市公司建立股票期权制度所需的客观环境进行了全面的分析，并提出了在我国逐步建立股票期权制度的对策：先规范试点、总结经验，然后分类推广、逐步实施。     

从股票期权制度看上市公司的外部监管

薪酬性的股票期权计划是对企业管理者实行的一种长期激励机制。它要求授予企业管理者一定数量的经营者股票期权(E xecutive Stock O ption,ESO),即在某一期限内,以一个固定的执行价购买本公司股票的权利,股票出售价与执行价之间的差额就是期权持有者的获益。股票期权激励机制运     

股票期权、激励机制衍生综述与引申

股票期权回溯是指公司通过观察过去某一时期的股票价格,然后将期权的授予日期倒填至股价较低的某一日期的行为。这一行为为股票期权的获得者提供了尽可能大的获利空间。股票期权回溯是股票期权激励机制衍生出的问题,国外学者从期权回溯的内在动机、产生因素、经济后果、期权回溯调查的市场反应以及期权回溯的有效治理等方面对其进行了研究。     

Why more restricted stocks,less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?

This paper provides an empirical explanation of the more frequent use of restricted stock plans for executives than stock option plans, to reveal the determinants of a restricted stock plan and understand its subsequent effects. We find that firms with higher growth opportunity, smaller size, higher executive ownership, smaller rent-seeking probably, and dividend payment prefer to grant restricted stock plans. Moreover, the preference of regulators drives the tendency of using restricted stock plans, designed to have higher pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and lower pay-risk sensitivity (vega). Under the intensive regulation, the restricted stock plans designed by firms with executive ownerships and large agency debt costs are more sensitive to risk. As a result, granting restricted stock plans rather than stock options helps improve firm performance and the preference of regulators on restricted stock plans can also enhance firm performance and decrease firm risks.     

The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs*

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.     

Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income Considerations*

Canadian firms face a trade‐off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in‐the‐money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade‐off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider‐trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior.     

Readability of 10‐K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.     

Is pay related to performance in The Netherlands? An analysis of Dutch executive compensation, 2002–2006

This paper analyzes the characteristics of Dutch pay arrangements. We show that (1) studying executive compensation outside the Anglo-American countries adds insights to the pay for performance literature, (2) pay for performance relations are different for various types of executives and for various compensation components, (3) attention to the methodological treatment of conditional stock (option) grants is important, and (4) researchers should go beyond stock market performance indicators to detect the performance relatedness of pay. All in all, a myriad of pay-performance relationships has been found for the Dutch case, when the above is accounted for.     

浅析我国股票期权激励制度的税收方案

股票期权制度作为一种有效的激励机制,它把经理人的利益和其对企业在未来发展中的贡献紧密地联系在一起,因此我国越来越多的企业采用这种制度。本文从我国推行股票期权制度过程中遇到的税收法律问题作了分析,并提出有效的对策建议。     

国有企业股票期权制度研究

经理股票期权制度将股票期权作为薪酬包的一部分授予经理人,激励其持续提升公司价值。与发达国家相比,由于产权归属不清、公司治理结构混乱、法律制度欠缺、资本和经理人市场不成熟等问题,国企股票期权制的激励效果有待改进。需要进一步完善法人治理结构,建立健全法律法规体系,培育资本股票市场,并加快市场化经理人选拔机制。     

CEV模型下有交易成本和随机波动率的亚式期权定价问题的文献综述

随着金融衍生品的发展,对其进行定价成为理论和实务操作中的重点。亚式期权作为一种强依赖路径的衍生品,在金融市场中有套期保值作用,在管理中有经理股票期权激励作用。因此,设计出更加切合市场实际的定价模型非常重要。本文选取了相比较B-S模型更加实际的CEV模型作为标底资产的路径过程,加入随机波波动率服从有限Markov链的情况下有交易成本的亚式期权定价公式。在已有的相关文献参考下,可以得出其偏微分方程。并且通过二叉树算法,实现定价计算。     

我国经理人的市场化——以我国股票期权法律制度的推行为视角

自改革开放以来,我国企业特别是国有企业一直在寻求一种有效的激励与约束机制,以推进现代企业制度的建立。如今,股票期权法律制度已经开始试行,但其实施的一个重要条件——经理人市场远未建立,这严重制约了股票期权制度的推行和发展,也阻碍了现代企业制度的建立和完善。以股票期权法律制度的试行为契机,以人才市场法治化建设为手段,不断探索我国经理人市场化,无疑具有一定的理论价值和实践意义。