Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

中国加入WTO以来的美国对华贸易政策

中美贸易摩擦并未因中国加入WTO而得到缓解,相反却向更深层、更宏观、更关键的层面发展。这表明美国对华贸易政策的制定和实施有其自身的逻辑和规律,并不受具体事件或外在机制的影响。美国贸易政治的实质是政府、国会和利益集团三方之间的博弈和平衡,而本文就中国加入WTO承诺履行、知识产权、反补贴、特保措施以及人民币汇率等美国对华贸易政策中的重大议题展开分析,重点剖析美国政府、国会和利益集团在各个议题上的不同立场,探索美国对华贸易政策选择的政治和经济根源,并进而预测美国对华贸易政策的前景。     

反补贴产业损害评估指标体系的构建

随着我国参与国际贸易的深度和广度的不断增加,我国面临的贸易摩擦问题已经由企业的微观层面向政府政策的宏观层面发展,补贴与反补贴问题越来越受国内外学者的关注。为科学合理的确定反补贴产业损害程度,应对国外反补贴以及通过反补贴手段保护国内产业。文章通过对WTO规定的反补贴实施的条件及其影响因素分析,构建了反补贴产业损害评估指标体系。     

Trade Destruction and Trade Diversion: Evidence from China

Over the past three decades, we have seen a dramatic increase in the incidence of temporary trade barriers such as antidumping duties and countervailing duties. China has been at the receiving end of a large number of such measures. In this paper, we study how China's exports to its major trade partners have been affected when its major trade partners have used these measures either against China or against other countries. We find that Chinese exports to the country that imposed an antidumping duty decreased by approximately 35 percent. At the same time, an antidumping duty used by the importing country that was directed towards other countries but not against China led to an approximate 30‐percent increase in China's exports to the policy‐imposing country. These results remain robust across various specifications. Our findings have important policy implications. In particular, the magnitude of these effects highlights why it is important to curb the recent widespread use of these barriers.     

论出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利的经济效应

本文从经济学角度分析了出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利和进口国福利的影响,认为补贴措施会降低出口国的总福利并容易遭到进口国的反补贴报复,反补贴税的效果受多种因素影响,具有不确定性,指出我国在实施出口补贴政策时应考虑产品市场的供求弹性,选择合适的补贴类型、数量和形式,以求在达到补贴的预期目的的同时尽量降低补贴的不利影响。     

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act: An Economic Analysis

Under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000, the U.S. government distributes the revenue from anti-dumping and countervailing duties to domestic firms alleging harm. In this article, we develop a simple model to examine the economic effect of the CDSOA. For the case in which the “offset payments” to domestic firms are linked to the volume of foreign imports, the CDSOA may increase foreign imports when the domestic market is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium. This finding runs contrary to what the E.U. and some exporting countries have claimed. But if the market is less competitive than in Cournot, the CDSOA becomes an instrument of trade protectionism.     

Trade and stabilization: Another look at British India's controversial foodgrain exports

In keeping with its avowed policy of promoting free trade, the government of India resisted demands for bans on the export of foodgrains during the numerous severe famines of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This paper assesses the relevance to India of the arguments made for free trade as a food consumption stabilization policy. An estimate is made of the quantitative effect of external trade in buffering domestic foodgrain consumption from output uncertainty. The results suggest that, while trade did have a stabilizing influence, the effect was small, particularly in the short run. Alternative explanations for this are examined.     

反倾销反补贴的双向措施操作与现实指向

国际发展环境深刻变化,反倾销反补贴联动措施已成为贸易领域中的重要政策工具。基于世贸组织贸易规定,对反倾销反补贴联动实施原则进行梳理与分析,提出双项措施实施必要条件的判定过程及判定方法。研究结果表明,中国应在反倾销反补贴联动措施主要受调查目标国和发起国双重角色中合理变换,以保障国内产业安全,积极维护国际公平贸易秩序。     

跨国公司与母国政府的协调问题——以海尔集团为例

跨国公司是母国重要的创汇来源,母国政府必须处理好与跨国公司的关系。就政府而言,充分发挥政府管理经济的职能,在政策、资金和技术方面支持跨国公司;就跨国公司而言,要不断进行技术创新,提高产品质量和信誉度,将自己做强做大。只有正确处理二者之间的关系,实现母国政府和跨国公司之间权利和义务的平衡,才能为中国创造更多的利润;也只有多创自己的世界名牌,中国才能从贸易大国发展为贸易强国。     

我国面临的反补贴形势及对策分析

随着我国经济的快速发展与对外贸易的持续增长,对华发动反补贴调查已成为贸易伙伴转移国际贸易竞争压力、遏制中国发展的重要手段之一。继2004年4月加拿大对中国首开反补贴调查以来,针对中国的反补贴调查案件快速攀升,并呈现出愈演愈烈的势头。面对日益严峻的反补贴形势,我国应依据WTO反补贴规则和中国入世承诺,修改与完善反补贴立法,清理与调整国内补贴政策,运用WTO反补贴规则,应对与化解反补贴诉讼,保护国内产业的安全和国家利益。     

中国工业遭遇反补贴的理论机制与现状研究

随着中国制造业在世界贸易中所占份额的快速上升,中国工业品遭遇反补贴的贸易政策博弈问题日益成为中国工业贸易发展的重要制约因素。本文首先分析了两国(贸易体)关于工业补贴政策的关联效应机制,并阐述了现阶段我国工业出口遭遇反补贴的主要特征,对影响机制因素进行了实证分析,最后对中国工业品如何应对反补贴贸易救济提出了若干对策。     

The ‘Special’ World: Stalin's Power Apparatus and the Soviet System's Secret Structures Of Communication

ABSTRACT

Two of the most defining trends of the nineteenth century were the growth of international trade and the increased role of government activities in the economy. In the conjuncture between these developments lie taxes on foreign trade. Sweden was one of the examples where customs revenue became the single most important source of revenue before WWI. This article sets out to test how this source of revenue could increase as much as it did. The analysis focuses mainly on trade policy and how tariffs were set and how that affected revenue. The results show that Swedish liberalisation of trade forced a switch in the fiscal structure of tariffs, moving revenue to fewer commodities. Increased importance was given to consumption goods with lower elasticity of demand. Trade continued to increase under fiscal taxation, which led to increases in revenue. During the early period increased revenue was achieved with higher tariffs on a few key commodities. Towards the end of the century tariffs on agricultural and capital goods became more fiscally relevant, which could have clashed with protectionist intentions. The article highlights that more work is needed on this fiscal component of trade policy.     

利益集团对贸易政策影响的理论模型研究综述

在西方民主代议制国家,由于政府与公众、个人与集体之间存在着利益分歧,政府并非以社会福利最大化作为标准制定贸易政策,利益集团往往可以通过众多方式向政府决策者施加政治压力,影响本国贸易政策。围绕着利益集团影响贸易政策的途径、方式以及政府的决策过程,经济学家提出了一系列理论模型,其中包括政治支持模型、游说支出模型、政治捐献模型以及信息传递模型,用以揭示利益集团对贸易政策的影响力以及最终贸易政策取向。     

中等收入人群住房供应体系与“限价房”政策探索

我国在逐步完善低收入人群住房保障体制的同时,也需要关注中等收入群体的住房问题。限价房政策体系有助于解决中等收入人群的住房问题。政府应合理管制住宅产品结构与价格,通过租售结合、分层供应的方式,以限价房满足占市场多数的中等收入人群一户一套住宅的住房消费需求,构建中等收入人群的住房供应体系。     

A Note on the Endogenous Timing of Tariff Policy in the Presence of a Time Lag between Production and Trade Decisions

Using the Hamilton–Slutsky extended endogenous timing game of observable delay framework, we analyze the endogenous timing of tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. In particular, focusing on the strategic relationships between an importing country’s government and an exporting monopoly firm, we show that a natural Stackelberg situation exists in which the importing country’s government as first mover determines the tariff rate and the exporting monopoly firm as second mover determines the production level. We also find that the natural Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to both the Nash and alternative Stackelberg equilibria. This implies that commitment to an ex ante optimal tariff policy before the production decision is made is optimal for the affected parties.     

汇率的不确定性、投资区位选择与公司内贸易

本文通过建立投资国一受资国一国际市场的三国框架,分三种投资区位的国际生产模式,就汇率冲击对垂直型FDI的区位选择和公司内贸易的影响进行分析。研究表明：（1）当区位成本优势不能抵消汇率不确定性导致的损失时,跨国企业将会调整投资区位决策,考虑撤资回母国;（2）当汇率相对波动幅度处于某一范围时,跨国企业具有较强烈的倾向将投资从原东道国转移到其引资竞争国;（3）汇率不确定性对出口价格的传导效应,具有不完全性特点。出口价格的汇率波动风险弹性取决于国际市场的外部竞争度以及子公司组装成本占国际市场该产品价格的比重;（4）汇率波动风险对公司内贸易余额的传导程度具有不确定性。随着汇率风险程度的逐步加大,其对公司内贸易余额的影响作用渐强,逐步从弱弹性转化为较强弹性的传导。     

我国应对国外反补贴调查的对策

中国在入世至今的近六年中,经济迅速发展的同时也在补贴和反补贴方面面临严峻的形势。文章通过对我国遭受的国外反补贴调查现状的分析,总结出我国出口产品屡遭调查的原因。最后提出,政府应根据中国入世时的承诺以及WTO的规章制度,着力调整补贴政策,对相关立法进行修改补充,使之能符合世贸组织的要求,同时增强企业自主应对反补贴调查的能力,从政府政策,国家立法和企业自身三个方面共同应对国外的反补贴调查,切实保护我国企业的国际合法权益。     

Trade liberalization and child labor

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment – the U.S. granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China after China's accession to the World Trade Organization – to examine whether trade liberalization affects the incidence of child labor. PNTR permanently set U.S. duties on Chinese imports at low Normal Trade Relations (NTR) levels and removed the uncertainty associated with annual renewals of China's NTR status. We find that the PNTR was significantly associated with the rising incidence of child labor in China. A one percentage point reduction in expected export tariffs raises the odds of child labor by a 1.2 percentage point. The effects are greater for girls, older children, rural children, and children with less-educated parents. The effect of trade liberalization on the incidence of child labor, however, tends to weaken in the long run, probably because trade liberalization can induce exporters to upgrade technology and thus have less demand for unskilled workers.     

Impact of temporary trade barriers: Evidence from China

With a decrease in tariffs around the world, temporary trade barriers (TTBs) have increased dramatically to take their place. These TTBs are usually in the form of antidumping duties, countervailing duties and global safeguards. Recently, an increasing number of these TTBs have been targeted towards China. In this paper, I explore the impact of the US temporary trade barriers (TTBs) on Chinese exports. Using detailed product level data for the period 2002–2008, I find robust evidence of trade deflection i.e. the US trade barriers against China led to an increase in the growth of Chinese exports to other countries. However, I do not find any evidence of trade depression. The results are robust to a wide variety of specification and robustness tests. While I do not find any difference in the impact of TTBs across developed and developing countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in response to TTBs depending on the type of products involved. Specifically, I find that, while the US TTBs on non-steel products lead to an increase in Chinese exports of those products to third markets, there is a significant chilling effect in case of steel. Finally, most of the trade-deflection seems to be along the intensive margins i.e. an increase in exports to the existing third country markets rather than exports to new markets. If anything, the US TTBs on China seem to decrease Chinese exports to newer and more volatile markets.