帕累托法则在医院医疗设备管理中的应用

帕累托法则是普遍存在于人类社会中的规律,它已被广泛应用于生活中的各个领域。文章在对广东省深圳市龙岗区人民医院3年来医疗设备维修的相关数据进行统计分析的基础上进行了帕累托法则的验证,发现该数据符合帕累托法则,通过对统计结果的分析找出了影响医疗设备维修相关数据的重要因素,并提出了医疗设备管理水平的改进措施。     

利用"80/20法则"搞好人力资源建设

我们经常可以听到“少部分人存了大部分人的钱” ,或者说“社会财富掌握在一小部分人手里” ,这实质上就是“80 /2 0法则” ,又称为帕累托法则。帕累托法则指的是社会上大部分财富掌握在小部分人手中 ,社会上某一部分人口占总人口的比例 ,与这一部分人所拥有的财富的比例 ,具有比较确定的不平衡的数量关系。这种不平衡的模式会重复出现 ,并具有可预测性。经济学家把这一发现称为“帕累托收入分配定律”。将帕累托法则所内涵的理念和规律运用于组织人力资源管理活动之中 ,管理者必须明确人力资源使用的特殊性 ,以及提高人力资源使用效率的重…     

80／20效率法则在企业管理中的应用

一、什么是80/20效率法则80/20效率法则,又称帕累托效率法则,是著名管理学大师约瑟夫·朱兰(Joseph M．Juran)博士在1937年提出的一条管理学原理。该法则以意大利经济学家费尔弗里多·帕累托(Vilfredo Pareto)的名字命名,     

二八定律对薪酬激励设计的启示

二八定律,又称作帕累托法则、帕累托定律,是由意大利经济学家帕累托于1897年研究19世纪英国人的财富收益模式时发现的,即大部分的财富流向了一小部分人一边。二八定律告诉人们一个道理:在投入与产出、努力与收获、原因与结果之间,普遍存在着不平衡关系。少的投入,可以得到多的产出;小的努力,可以获得大的成绩;关键的少数,往往是决定整个组织的产出、盈亏和成败的主要因20%     

私人银行的起源与服务

上世纪初，意大利经济学家维尔弗雷多·帕累托（Vilfredo Pareto）发现了一个有趣的现象：在意大利，全国大约80％的财富掌握在大约20％的人手中。这就是后来赫赫有名的“帕累托法则”或“80／20法则”的滥觞。腰缠万贯的富贵中人永远都是商家热捧的对象。早在19世纪初期，     

次优和非最优的一般分析:方法的创新

本文运用理性预期思想和随机等价方法开拓性地研究了资源配置的效率，包括帕累托最优（无约束帕累托最优和有约束帕累托最优）和非帕累托最优。基本结论是，一个资源配置中所有商品价格波动的总方差等于零等价于在二阶条件具备下其处于帕累托最优状态，也等价于资源配置满足无约束条件下的怕累托最优条件或有约束条件下的帕累托次优条件；而总方差大于零等价于资源配置处于非帕累托最优状态；总方差与资源配置中期望价格的比值越小，则这个配置的效率越高，反之，则越低。最后，设计了一个“信息逐步披露的预期帕累托改进”模型，讨论了非帕累托最优配置的改进途径及其政策含义。     

帕累托原则在图书馆人才培养和馆藏资源建设中的应用

帕累托原则在经济世界和人类日常生活中的影响已经世人皆知了,它对图书馆工作的指导意义也越来越受到业界重视。本文应用帕累托原则的核心思想,论述了帕累托原则在图书馆人才培养和馆藏资源建设中的应用。     

试疑纯交换帕累托最优条件的充分性及其改进

针对纯交换的帕累托最优条件，核及核收敛，本文表示存在疑问。作者认为，在信息完全的情况下，纯交换的帕累托最优不是核集合，而是惟一一点。并对帕累托最优条件做出改进。最后，对核收敛提出了需要进一步研究的问题。     

任务驱动教学法在Powepoint课程教学中运用的探讨

中职学生在学习PowerPoint课程中存在学习兴趣不足、实践效果不佳等问题.根据中职学生的特点和帕累托法则,文章提出采用任务驱动教学法,充分调动学生兴趣,促进学生动手的积极性,并对任务驱动教学法在教学中应注意的问题进行了探讨.     

基于协调人的多对多谈判支持研究

为了解决多对多谈判难于组织和难与决策支持的问题,协调人被引入到多对多谈判研究,构建了基于协调人的多对多谈判冲突模型,对基于协调人的多对多谈判问题进行分解,利用启发式算法对协调人问题求解帕累托解,通过帕累托解点的移动获取帕累托最优解,最后通过一个实例分析验证了基于协调人的多对多谈判支持模型的有效性和实用性。     

Planning for education in the health services: a multicriterion approach.

Administrators are often confronted with problems for which there exist several distinct measures of success. Such problems can be expressed in terms of linear programming models with several linear “criterion” functions instead of a single objective function. Although a variety of techniques are available for the solution of multicriterion problems, there exists a need for one which does not assume technical sophistication on the part of the decision maker and which provides valid solutions with minimum effort. “Efficient Manifold Presentation”, the approach used here, is based on the concept that the ideal solution must be a Pareto optimal solution. A method for finding an expression for the finite set of all Pareto optimal solutions to a linear program with multiple linear criteria is presented. Two processes are involved; first, the discovery of all Pareto optimal vertices of the feasible region, and secondly a grouping of these into sets each of which defines a convex polyhedron of Pareto optimal possibilities. Alternate versions of the second process are suggested for use under varying circumstances. An example of the applicability of the method for modeling enrollment and staffing policy in an educational institution is provided.     

Pareto optimality in continuous-time OLG economies

The aim of this paper is the achievement of a complete characterization of the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria for deterministic, pure exchange, continuous-time economies with a countable number of overlapping generations, where each consumer’s life-span consists in a bounded interval of time. For such an environment, we obtain separate sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality in the form of the Cass’ criterion, that is, in terms of the equilibrium prices. However, these conditions are not equivalent in general. Therefore, in order to get that equivalence we are compelled to impose certain restrictions, either on consumers’ lifetimes, assuming that all of them have the same longevity, or on the dynamic behaviour of relative intertemporal equilibrium prices. In both cases, we are able to derive a single condition that is sufficient and necessary for efficiency, thus achieving full characterizations.     

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle

Barberà-Sonnenschein (J Econ Theory 18:244–254, 1978) have shown that any binary and Paretian random social choice function can be associated with a mapping which associates a real number with each coalition of individuals. This function gives, for each coalition, the power that this group has in imposing on society, their common preference relation on a pair of alternatives. The aim of this paper is to extend this result, showing that the Pareto criterion is not a necessary condition for the existence of such a coalitional power function.     

Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules

We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategy-proof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategy-proof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences.     

The size distribution of cities: An examination of the Pareto law and primacy

This paper examines the Pareto and primacy measures of the size distribution of cities. The mean Pareto exponent for a sample of 44 countries is 1.136, somewhat greater than the exponent of one implied by the rank-size rule. We find that value of the Pareto exponent is quite sensitive to the definition of the city and the choice of city sample size. The significance of non-linear terms in variants of the Pareto distribution also indicate that the rank-size rule is only a first approximation to a complete characterization of the size distribution of cities within a country. The relatively low correlation between primacy and Pareto measures confirms the need for a variety of measures of city size distributions. This paper also suggests that large cities are growing faster than small cities in most of the countries in our sample. This is indicated by the positive coefficient on the first non-linear term introduced into the Pareto equation. Finally, variations in the Pareto exponent and measures of primacy are partly explained by economic, demographic, and geographic factors.     

On elementary functions of Pareto variables

Pareto variables are widely used. It is useful to be able to obtain the distribution of some simple functions of Pareto variables in a convenient manner. The Mellin transform with its convolution and exponentiation properties is utilized to that end. Specifically, expressions are written for products, quotients, and sums of products of Pareto variables. These include the distribution of the geometric mean and the product of minimum values of Pareto variables.The Office of Naval Research partially supported the work under Contract No. N000-14-75-C-0254.     

Efficient,Pareto-improving processes

We give two optimization programs for determining whether Pareto improving local changes are possible. When they are, the programs compute them. Any procedure generating efficient and Pareto improving changes can be replicated by these programs. The two programs are dual to each other. We apply the programs to Pareto improving exchange processes and to Pareto-improving tax-tariff reforms.     

On stable rules for selecting committees

A voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a fixed-size subset of candidates such that there is no outside candidate who is majority preferred to any candidate in this set whenever such a set exists. Such a set is called a Weak Condorcet Committee (WCC). Four stable rules have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we propose two new stable rules. Since nothing is known about the properties of the stable rules, we evaluate all the identified stable rules on the basis of some appealing properties of voting rules. We show that they all satisfy the Pareto criterion and they are not monotonic. More, we show that every stable rule fails the reinforcement requirement.     

Maximin choice of voting rules for committees

In the context of a probabilistic voting model with dichotomous choice, we investigate the consequences of choosing among voting rules according to the maximin criterion. A voting rule is the minimum number of voters who vote favorably on a change from the status quo required for it to be adopted. We characterize the voting rules that satisfy the maximin criterion as a function of the distribution of voters’ probabilities to favor change from the status quo. We prove that there are at most two maximin voting rules, at least one is Pareto efficient and is often different to the simple majority rule. If a committee is formed only by “conservative voters” (i.e. voters who are more likely to prefer the status quo to change) then the maximin criterion recommends voting rules that require no more voters supporting change than the simple majority rule. If there are only “radical voters”, then this criterion recommends voting rules that require no less than half of the total number of votes.Received: June 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: D71Salvador Barberá, Carmen Beviá, Mirko Cardinale, Wioletta Dziuda, Joan Esteban, Mahmut Erdem, Bernard Grofman, Matthew Jackson, Kai Konrad, Raul Lopez, Jordi Massó, Hugh Mullan, Shmuel Nitzan, Ana Pires do Prado, Elisabeth Schulte, Arnold Urken and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Finally, I also acknowledge financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education and Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Project BEC2002-02130).     

Crossing the Boundary of Economics and Sociology: The Case of Vilfredo Pareto

The aim of the paper is to present the economic sociology of Vilfredo Pareto. We argue that Pareto represents a mode of thinking that has not been used in economic sociology and barely considered in the other branches of sociology. We reject the habitual bifurcation of Pareto into "the economist" and "the sociologist." Pareto stresses the non-logical parts of human life, and he provides empirical examples of this in his writing. He was occupied with the dynamics in society as a result mainly of non-logical actions. We show how one may speak of a distinctly Paretian economic sociology, which primarily has its origin in his theoretical discussions. We also show that Pareto conducted empirical studies drawing from his version of economic sociology. Included is finally a presentation, as well as a discussion of Pareto's idea of rentiers and speculators, which is followed up by a more general discussion of economic types in the market.