TAXES,INCOME, AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS: DIFFERENCES BY PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INCOME

This article examines the determinants of and benefits from saving for retirement in tax‐preferred accounts by permanent and transitory income levels. We find that higher incomes (both permanent and transitory) are associated with a greater probability to contribute and larger contributions. We also find that tax benefits for retirement savings increase strongly with income, although the increase is slightly smaller when taxpayers are ranked by their permanent (rather than current) income. In addition, we find that a large portion of the benefits from the Saver's Credit go to taxpayers who would not be eligible based on their permanent income. Finally, we find that recent tax changes (including the introduction of the Saver's Credit) significantly increased contributions among low‐income households, although the effect was centered among those with only transitorily low income. (JEL H24, H31, E21)     

Taxes,Retirement Transfers,and Annuities*

In most countries, retirement benefits from pension saving must be taken as an annuity. By contrast, Australia allows benefits to be taken as a lump sum, and instead has recently introduced various tax incentives to encourage annuity purchase. This paper investigates the effectiveness of these tax concessions, and concludes that they do little to achieve this objective This is because they are nullified by the provisions of the broader tax and social security framework within which Australian private pension policy is set     

Do tax subsidies for retirement saving affect total private saving? New evidence on middle-income workers*

We exploit exogenous variation from a pension reform in Denmark to estimate the effect of tax subsidies on total private saving. We present new evidence on individuals in the middle of the income distribution and show that a reduction in tax subsidies for retirement saving reduces total private saving. The reform changed the tax incentives for saving in the pension scheme that holds the highest tax advantage for middle-income workers in Denmark. We find that for each unit of reduced saving in this pension scheme, only 64 percent is substituted to other types of saving.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

The Effect of Benefit Reductions on the Retirement Age: The Heterogeneous Response of Manual and Non‐Manual Workers

I estimate the effect of benefit reductions on the timing of retirement. The introduction of actuarial adjustments in the German public pension system serves as a source of exogenous variation to estimate discrete time transition rates into retirement for individuals of age 60–66. Responses to benefit reductions are elaborated separately for manual and non‐manual workers. On average, individuals postpone retirement by 13.2 months if pension benefits are reduced by 3.6 percent for each year of early retirement. This result is in line with the previous quasi‐experimental literature and suggests that people respond to the incentive of reducing the implicit tax on further periods of work. However, among men the response is about 50 percent lower for manual workers compared to non‐manual workers. Surprisingly, this does not necessarily indicate that retirement incomes of manual workers deteriorate. The explanation is that disability pensions are available at age 63—without benefit reductions.     

Optimal retirement age,leisure and consumption

In this paper, we study the determination of optimal retirement age, optimal leisure time, and optimal consumption, and we also analyze their relationships using an optimal control theory. We establish a life cycle model and analyze the factors of consumption, leisure, saving, mortality and retirement behaviors simultaneously with an orthogonal-array experimental design. Our results show that the initial salary level and the growth rate of salary are the most important determining factors of the optimal retirement age. The initial consumption level and the interest rate are also important factors affecting optimal retirement age. The mortality improvement has a minor effect on the optimal retirement age. The effects of the Social Security on the optimal retirement age depend on the Social Security tax and the level of Social Security benefit.     

The tradeoff between mortgage prepayments and tax-deferred retirement savings

Many households face the tradeoff between paying an extra dollar off the remaining mortgage on their house and saving that extra dollar in tax-deferred accounts (TDAs) used for retirement. We show that, under certain conditions, it becomes a tax arbitrage to reduce mortgage prepayments and to increase TDA contributions because of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and tax-exemption of qualified retirement savings. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we document that a significant number of households that are accelerating their mortgage payments instead of saving in TDAs forgo a profitable tax arbitrage opportunity. Finally, we show empirically that this inefficient behavior is unlikely to be driven by liquidity or other financial constraints. Rather, the observed behavior can be attributed to a certain extent to the reluctance of many households to participate in financial markets as either lenders or borrowers.     

Pension funds saving individuation

This paper considers a pension insurance problem using an intertemporal framework. We assume a deterministic framework in order to obtain tractable and yet revealing results regarding the propensity to save for retirement. The essential conclusions of this paper include a condition for a single switch, that is, when the saver will decide the switching time, prior to retirement, to start saving. Because of the linear objective used in this paper, saving rates were found to be of the bang-bang type. In addition, we show that the tax effects are important. The richer the saver, the greater the tax advantages for pension savings.     

THE LABOUR SUPPLY AND SAVINGS EFFECTS OF SUPERANNUATION TAX CHANGES*

This paper investigates the effects on labour supply, consumption and savings of a change in the superannuation tax structure, involving the taxation of contributions to a fund, pre‐retirement earnings of the fund, and the benefits received from the fund during retirement. The effects on lifetime plans of tax changes are investigated using a simple three‐period model in which the final period is retirement. The effects of unanticipated changes, requiring revisions to plans, are examined. Although the partial effects of particular tax changes are unambiguous, the effects of allowing for a government budget constraint mean that it is difficult to predict a priori how labour supply is likely to be affected. However, private savings unambiguously fall.     

Retirement planning in the light of changing demographics

With increasing longevity and decreasing fertility rates, governments and policy makers are increasingly engaged in the question of long term retirement planning. In many cases this has included emphasising the need for individuals to take more responsibility for their own retirement planning through tax incentives, compulsion and changes to the age at which state retirement benefits become available. In the case of Australia, as is considered here, long term retirement planning has been focused around the development of a compulsory defined contribution (DC) superannuation system. Here we investigate the interaction between population ageing and the sustainability of the superannuation system by modelling a general superannuation scheme to compare the adequacy of retirement funds under a number of alternative scenarios. The model incorporates stochastic longevity forecasts and provides insight into the sufficiency of compulsory retirement saving both now and future. We find that the current pension scheme is more robust to longevity improvements for mid-class individuals however significant gaps arise for low-income individuals as longevity improves. Without addressing these issues, government expenditure is expected to increase substantially.     

Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Means‐tested Benefits

This paper studies the interaction between capital income taxation and a means‐tested age pension. Our results document that the existence of a social insurance program financed from general revenue puts an upward pressure on the optimal tax rate. We also show that there is a negative relation between taper (benefit‐reduction) and optimal capital income tax rates. The potential welfare gain from optimizing capital taxation in the presence of a universal retirement transfer system is relatively higher. However, when the transfer is substantially means tested, the gain is lower, because the means test effectively operates as a tax on retirement capital.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO RETIREMENT PROGRAMS: THE ROLE OF TAX AND BENEFIT TIMING

It is well known that pay-as-you-go retirement programs reduce steady-state welfare and the capital stock in dynamically efficient overlapping generation (OLG) economies. The common two-period OLG model obscures, however, the relationship between the magnitude of these effects and the ages at which taxes are paid and benefits received. Program changes that shift taxes to older workers or benefits to younger retirees have effects similar to reductions in program size, yielding steady-state welfare gains and increases in capital accumulation while imposing transition costs on current generations. This analysis has policy implications for both tax and benefit timing . ( JEL H55, E62)     

Are stocks desirable in tax-deferred accounts?

Existing literature suggests that, in order to maximize the tax benefit of retirement accounts, investors should follow a “pecking order” location rule of placing highly taxed assets (e.g., bonds) in a tax-deferred account and lightly taxed assets (e.g., stocks) in a taxable account. Empirical evidence, however, documents that a large number of investors violate this rule. In this paper, we show that such violations can be optimal for risk-averse investors who face portfolio constraints. In particular, while the strategy of placing bonds in the tax-deferred account maximizes the expected level of tax benefit, it may lead to volatile benefits under different realizations of stock returns. By holding a similar portfolio in both accounts, investors can achieve a more balanced growth in the two accounts, minimize the likelihood of violating the constraints in the future and hence “smooth” the volatility of the tax benefit. For some risk-averse investors, this smoothing motive can lead to the observed violation of the pecking order location rule. Our model predicts that such violations are more likely when future tax benefits are more volatile, which can occur, for example, when: (i) the tax rate differential across assets increases over time due either to tax law changes or to tax bracket changes for investors; (ii) asset returns are more volatile; and (iii) investors anticipate large future liquidity needs.     

退休年龄、教育年限与社会保障

在本文中，我们用养老金的缴纳费率和养老金替代率代表社会保障制度，采用有限生命预期的连续时间状态代际交叠模型作为基本框架，分析了社会保障制度对消费者接受教育的年限、退休年龄、工作年限的选择、GDP增长率和利率的影响。同时，我们还分析了消费者的预期寿命对个体消费者接受教育的年限、退休年龄、工作年限的选择以及对社会保障制度的影响。     

Age-Dependent Taxation and the Optimal Retirement Benefit Formula

Abstract. This paper presents a comprehensive view of lifetime taxation including both explicit taxation through the general tax system and implicit taxation via the retirement benefit formula. Differences in productivity between individuals are unobservable, which provides a rationale for the use of distortionary taxes. It is shown that the optimal structure of age-dependent taxation can be characterized by a generalized Ramsey formula. Furthermore, the paper derives the optimal retirement benefit formula in the presence of the general tax system and examines the compatibility with the financial stability of the pension system.     

Planning Retirement Income in Australia: Routes through the Maze

Individual retirees face a daunting task when they consider how best to invest their accumulated superannuation account and non-superannuation savings. This article highlights the fact that there is rarely an obvious decision in this choice and that the optimal decision depends on a number of factors. These factors include the valuation criterion adopted, the level of benefits, the individual's income level, the means-tests, the tax rates on income and superannuation benefits and the person's life expectancy. The optimal behaviour at retirement is significantly affected by the individual characteristics of relative lifetime earnings and post-retirement rates of mortality.     

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND USE OF LONG-RANGE ACTUARIAL COST ESTIMATES FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

This paper describes the methodology underlying the actuarial cost estimates for the Social Security program and the assumptions needed therefor. With this as a background, the use to which these estimates is made in developing legislation is described, with emphasis on the current financing problems. Finally, various possible solutions to these problems are discussed. These solutions involve either increasing the income of the program or decreasing the rate of growth of its outgo. Increased income could be derived by increasing the payroll tax rates, by injecting general revenues (either directly or indirectly, such as taxing Social Security benefits and putting the proceeds in the trust funds or financing part of all of the Hospital Insurance program from general revenues and moving some of its payroll tax rate to the cash-benefits program), or by covering government employees who are not now covered. The growth of outgo could be reduced by changes in the cost-of-living adjustments of benefits, by gradually increasing the normal retirement age, or by gradually decreasing the relative benefit level     

PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS,PENSION AWARENESS,AND CHANGING PERSONAL FINANCES

Workers with 401(k)s and similar defined contribution pensions adjust contributions facing large fluctuations in personal finances. Using administrative tax records linked to the Health and Retirement Study, this paper shows that adjustments differ for contributors who are aware and unaware of their pension coverage. Unaware contributors are more likely to stop contributing facing deteriorating finances, but adjust contributions similarly along the intensive margin. For example, 25% of unaware contributors stop contributing facing earnings declines, but only 15% of aware contributors do so. These findings have implications for policies like automatic enrollment and information campaigns that encourage retirement savings. (JEL D14, J14, J32, D83)     

International differences in social security and saving

The U.S. Social Security Administration, in cooperation with similar agencies in other countries, recently developed estimates of social security benefits for twelve major industrial countries. The present paper uses these data to estimate the effects of social security benefits on saving and retirement in an extended life cycle model. The parameter estimates indicate that, with retirement behavior given, social security significantly reduces private saving; an increase of the benefit-to-earnings ratio by 10 percentage points reduces the saving rate by approximately 3 percentage points.     

ANNUITIZED ASSET ADEQUACY IN JAPAN: THE DEMAND FOR INDIVIDUAL PENSIONS

In this paper, I analyze the impact of social security wealth, retirement payments, and living expenses during retirement on people's retirement savings in general, and on their individual pension holdings in particular, using micro data from a 1996 Japanese household survey. I confirm a replacement effect of social security on saving for all types of households and on individual pensions for self‐employed households only. This suggests that the social security assets of self‐employed households are less than their optimal level of annuitized assets and that they would increase their demand for individual pensions if social security benefits were to be reduced.