Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? International Evidence From Bank Ratings

Abstract:   In recent years credit rating agencies have started rating firms who have not asked for a rating. Recipients of unsolicited ratings argue that the assigned ratings are too low and reflect a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the rated firms. We set out to examine these claims using a comprehensive and international sample of 1,060 bank ratings. Our results show that there is a significant difference in the distributions of ratings, and the shadow group has lower ratings. The results also indicate that banks that received shadow ratings are smaller and have weaker financial profiles than banks that have other ratings. This explains, in part, the lower ratings. In addition, we develop a model to explain bank ratings. The two‐step treatment effects model shows that bank size, profitability, asset quality, liquidity, and sovereign credit risk are important factors in determining bank ratings.     

Keeping up with the Joneses: Changing Rating Standards and the Buildup of Capital by U.S. Property-Liability Insurers

There has been a net propensity over the last decade for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, to downgrade property-liability insurers. This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry or an increase in the performance thresholds Best's has deemed necessary to achieve a given rating class. Consistent with a recent study of corporate bond ratings, we find evidence there has been an increase in rating stringency. Specifically, we show pressure for insurers to maintain their existing ratings provides a plausible explanation of the dramatic buildup of capital in the industry during the 1990s. In addition, our analysis suggests Best's raised the bar in terms of the capital required to maintain the highest ratings differentially relative to the increase in standards they required for lower rated categories. The actual pattern of capital buildup across firms in different rating categories is consistent with an attempt by high quality firms to defend these ratings.     

Systemic Risk,Financial Crisis,and Credit Risk Insurance

Differing from conventional insurance firms whose underwriting business does not contribute to systemic risk, credit risk insurance companies providing credit protections for debt obligations are exposed to systemic risk. We show that credit risk insurers (CRIs) underperformed conventional insurance companies during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and such underperformance is attributed to the greater systemic risk of CRIs. We also find that the credit spreads of insured bonds increase significantly after their insurers are downgraded or put in the negative watch list. We control for alternative factors affecting bond credit spreads and the result is robust.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market

This paper studies reaching for yield—investors’ propensity to buy riskier assets to achieve higher yields—in the corporate bond market. We show that insurance companies reach for yield in choosing their investments. Consistent with lower rated bonds bearing higher capital requirements, insurance firms prefer to hold higher rated bonds. However, conditional on credit ratings, insurance portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield, higher CDS bonds. This behavior is related to the business cycle being most pronounced during economic expansions. It is also characteristic of firms with poor corporate governance and for which the regulatory capital requirement is more binding.     

Split Ratings and Differences in Corporate Credit Rating Policy between Moody's and Standard & Poor's

This paper investigates split credit ratings awarded by Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P) to U.S. corporations. Bivariate probit model estimates, analyzing 5,238 firm‐year observations from dual‐rated S&P 500/400/600 index‐constituent corporations, indicate firm‐specific financial and governance characteristics predict split ratings. Large, profitable companies with enhanced interest coverage, a greater percentage of independent directors, and more institutional investment are less likely to receive splits. Moody's appears more conservative in its evaluations, assigning lower ratings to smaller, less profitable companies with low interest coverage. Moody's also associates external, independent constraints on managerial autonomy with a higher corporate credit standing relative to S&P.     

Information effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers' ratings

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.     

Credit ratings and disclosure channels

We study the relation between analysts’ ratings of firms’ credit worthiness and ratings of the quality of firms’ (1) annual report disclosures, (2) quarterly and other disclosures, and (3) manager-analyst communications. We find that credit ratings are better for firms with higher rated annual report disclosures. We also find that marked increases in analyst ratings of annual report quality are accompanied by improvements in credit ratings. We find no relation between credit ratings and analysts’ ratings of either quarterly report disclosures or management-analyst communications. Overall, the results suggest that a commitment to better annual report disclosure is related to a lower cost of credit capital.     

On the Economics of Postassessments in Insurance Guaranty Funds: A Stakeholders’ Perspective

This article proposes a model that suggests there are contagion effects among members of an insurance guaranty fund when postassessments are charged to all other insurers upon the failure of a member company. Indeed, these extraordinary payments are shown to increase the default rate of other firms in the industry, ultimately lowering the value of corporate claims as well as government tax claims. The model is also used to examine the efficiency of different recoupment mechanisms (both existing and new) used by regulators and insurers to potentially reduce these contagion effects. Analysis allows us to stipulate the conditions under which a “tax carryforward” provision could be more efficient than the usual recoupment mechanisms known as “premium rate surcharge” and “premium tax credit.”     

The Role of Holding Company Financial Information in the Insurer-Rating Process: Evidence From the Property-Liability Industry

We examine data for the year ended December 31, 1997 for 80 publicly traded property‐liability insurers that have Best financial strength ratings of their consolidated insurance‐operating subsidiaries. These firms employ a holding company structure, in which a parent owns the stock of multiple insurance‐operating subsidiaries. The operating subsidiaries prepare a consolidated annual report using the Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP), and an analogous set of financial statements based on the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is released by the parent. We find that the financial characteristics important in determining ratings at the individual firm level—capitalization, liquidity, profitability, and size—are also important at the group level. Further, financial ratios from holding company statements are incrementally useful in the ratings' process, after group‐level ratios have been taken into account. Robustness tests based on a subsample of holding companies with minimal investment outside of the property‐liability industry reinforce our conclusion that parent company statements influence consolidated group ratings. However, our data do not allow us to separate the relative contribution of the GAAP model and underlying transactions to the ratings decision.     

Rating agencies and the role of rating publication rights

While credit rating agencies disclose all public ratings as a matter of policy, a firm can choose whether to make a so called private rating public or to keep it confidential. This paper analyzes the economic role of such rating publication rights. In particular, the paper tries to answer the following two questions: (1) If firms have scope to disclose agency ratings at their own discretion, can they use this discretion strategically and conceal low-quality ratings?, and (2), if this is the case, what are the economic implications for rated firms, unrated firms and the rating agency, resulting from strategically motivated selective rating disclosures? Using a theoretical model, it is shown that an equilibrium with partial nondisclosure of low-quality ratings can emerge whenever investors cannot be sure whether rating nondisclosure is due to the firm being not rated, or due to the rating’s adverse content. Moreover, since from an investors’ perspective, strategically acting rated firms and unrated firms are pooled, unrated firms’ debt is always under-valued (compared to a situation in which investors know that the firm is not rated), and the debt of firms concealing their rating is always over-valued.     

Zur Verminderung der Ratingabhängigkeit der deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft

The reliance of the German insurance industry on external credit ratings is strong and increasing. It relates to the assets and the liabilities of the insurer. For the first time, the paper systematically describes this reliance and combines it with the lessons from the current financial crises. The paper discusses measures to reduce the overreliance on external credit ratings and provides a new proposal in order to smooth the rating over time.     

Market Implied Ratings and Financing Constraints: Evidence from US Firms

Financing constraints have been found to play an important role in several aspects of firm behavior, but no attention has been given to their effects on credit ratings. In this paper we analyze a unique and comprehensive data set for US firms rated by Fitch over the period 2001–07. We employ Fitch's market implied ratings derived from bond and equity prices. The analysis finds evidence that financial variables are more important in predicting credit ratings for firms likely to face financing constraints. We conclude that the financing constraint is an important dimension in the market implied ratings process. Our findings are of relevance to managers, investors and rating agencies seeking to understand the mechanism through which financing constraints affect credit ratings.     

Risk-Based Capital and Credit Insurance Portfolios

This paper analyzes the risk-management practices of a vulnerable credit insurer by studying the effects of time-varying correlations, asset risks and loan maturities on the risk-based capital that backs credit insurance portfolios. Since asset correlations may change over a business cycle, we have analyzed these effects by means of a one-factor Gaussian stochastic model as part of an extended contingent claims analysis. Our results show the need to account for cyclical changes to correlations in the pricing of credit insurance. When compared with the reserve of risk-based capital recommended by the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach, our model provides a better capital buffer against extreme credit losses, especially in times of recession and/or in a risky business environment. Using a risk-adjusted performance metric (RAPM), we find insurers perform better when insuring relatively short-term loans. We also make several policy recommendations on creating a reserve of risk-based capital to protect against possible loan losses.     

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

Life insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.     

中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

How Does the Use of Credit Default Swaps Affect Firm Risk and Value? Evidence from US Life and Property/Casualty Insurance Companies

This study uses a unique credit default swap (CDS) transaction data set of insurers to examine the effects of CDS usage on the risk profile and firm value of US insurance companies for the period 2001‐2009. Applying a Heckman two‐stage model to adjust for the potential endogeneity of CDS usage with respect to firm risk and firm value, we find consistent evidence that the utilization of CDS for income generation purposes is associated with greater market risk, deterioration of financial performance, and lower firm value, for both Life and Property/Casualty insurers.     

Actuarial Surplus Management in United Kingdom Life Insurance Firms

This study uses 1991–99 data gathered from the United Kingdom's life insurance industry to test empirically the notion that the reported annual surplus of a life insurer may be influenced by four firm‐specific characteristics: namely, reinsurance, output mix, organizational form and firm size. Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that the annual reported surplus is positively related to reinsurance and firm size and negatively related to the degree of product diversification. Contrary to our expectations, however, we find no evidence that proprietary (stock) life insurers tend to report higher annual surpluses than mutual life insurers.     

Credit ratings and the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions

This paper establishes that credit ratings affect the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. We find that bidders holding a high rating level are more likely to use cash financing in a takeover. We attribute this finding to lower financial constraints and enhanced capability of highly rated firms to access public debt markets as implied by their higher credit quality. Our results are economically significant and robust to several firm- and deal-specific characteristics and are not sensitive to the method used to measure the likelihood of the payment choice or after controlling for potential endogeneity bias.     

Aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für die Tätigkeit von EU-Versicherern in der Türkei

In recent years the Turkish insurance market has exerted a strong appeal, especially for insurers seated in the EU, in view of its exponential growth rates and its dormant growth potential. EU insurers are, however, subject to more stringent insurance supervisory requirements when entering this insurance market, external to the EU, than when expending into other European insurance markets.