ANTITAKEOVER MEASURES…OBSTRUCTIONS TO THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL? COMMENT ON POULSEN and JARRELL

Poulsen and Jarrell (hereafter PJ) review the literature on hostile takeovers and conclude that such takeovers are beneficial to society in general and to shareholders of the target firm in particular. Their prediction that a coalition of corporate and community leaders will eventually succeed in neutralizing hostile bids does not bode well for the market for corporate control. Despite their assertion as to the social cost of antitakeover measures either regulated by the states or implemented by incumbent management of target firms, PJ do not support intervention to limit abusive practices of target firms.     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information

This paper studies price-matching guarantees in a market where entrant does not have perfect information about incumbent’s cost. The low-cost incumbent can adopt price-matching guarantees as a signal to distinguish itself from the high-cost type and thus effectively deter entry. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent can successfully fool the potential entrant under certain conditions. Compared with the equilibriums in situations where the option of offering a price guarantee is not available, the use of this instrument either makes it easier for the low-cost incumbent to signal its cost, or expands the range of parameters over which the high-cost incumbent is able to deter entry successfully.     

Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints

Summary. We model credit contracting and bidding in a first-price sealed-bid auction when bidder valuation and wealth are private information. An efficient separating equilibrium exists only if the wealth levels of both bidder types are sufficiently different. If not, high-valuation bidders signal by borrowing more and using less of their wealth – this is inefficient as wealth is a cheaper source of funds. An increase in the amount of borrowing required to signal does not necessarily decrease seller expected revenue. In contrast to separating equilibria, high-valuation bidders adopt pure strategy bids in pooling equilibria. Conditions are identified under which the lower bound on winning bids is higher in pooling than separating equilibria. Received: January 22, 2001; revised version: August 28, 2001     

Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’

We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all entry deterring contracts. When the wage is also observable, information transmission becomes easier. Most of the time, then, but not always, the efficient contract deters (induces) entry against the low (high) cost incumbent.     

Gales of creative destruction and the opportunistic incumbent: The case of electric vehicles in California

This paper explores the introduction of electric vehicles in response to Californian regulatory pressures as an example of a disruptive technology. The central thesis is that this disruption may open the automobile market to new entrants but only if they collaborate with incumbent automobile manufacturers. This appears to support Schumpeter's argument that large incumbent firms possess innovation advantages over the small entrepreneurial entrant. However, these innovatory advantages lie in the downstream complementary assets required for success in the automobile market.     

基于网络外部性的产品差异化与兼容性选择

本文研究了网络外部性与转移成本存在下的新进入企业的产品差异化与兼容性选择问题,并考虑了在位企业的兼容性动机。研究结果表明:对于新进入企业而言,只存在两种策略组合,即(最大差异化,不兼容)和(最大差异化,兼容);在位企业是偏好兼容的。     

Empirical Evidence Showing The Relationships Between Three Approaches for Pollution Control

Willingness to pay models have shown the theoretical relationships between the contingent valuation, cost of illness and the avertive behaviour approaches. In this paper, field survey data are used to compare the relationships between these three approaches and to demonstrate that contingent valuation bids exceed the sum of cost of illness and the avertive behaviour approach estimates. The estimates provide a validity check for CV bids and further support the claim that contingent valuation studies are theoretically consistent.     

Gales of creative destruction and the opportunistic incumbent: The case of electric vehicles in California

This paper explores the introduction of electric vehicles in response to Californian regulatory pressures as an example of a disruptive technology. The central thesis is that this disruption may open the automobile market to new entrants but only if they collaborate with incumbent automobile manufacturers. This appears to support Schumpeter's argument that large incumbent firms possess innovation advantages over the small entrepreneurial entrant. However, these innovatory advantages lie in the downstream complementary assets required for success in the automobile market.     

Staggered contracts and profitable entry deterrence: an application to professional sports

This paper examines an incumbent league's entry-deterrence strategies in a professional-sports market. The strategy of staggering long-term contracts offered to star players is analyzed and shown to reduce the wage bill of an incumbent league. However, if long-term contracting reduces player effort, the incumbent balances the benefits of a lower wage bill with the cost of reduced sales revenues. An optimal contract duration in the presence of such moral hazard is characterized in terms of the parameterization of the model. Extensions to the model are also discussed.     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Auctions with variable supply: Uniform price versus discriminatory

We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty, where uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity, given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case, this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates a higher expected revenue for the seller and a higher trade volume.     

Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods

Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk preferences. Experimental evidence suggests that the presence of the lottery and risk attitudes (elicited through a preceding experiment) impact auction bids in the directions predicted by theory. Finally, we find that theoretically and experimentally, the subsequent lottery does not compromise the efficiency of the auction component of the hybrid mechanisms.     

Product Market Competition in Transition Economies: Increasing Varieties and Consumer Loyalty

This paper analyzes product market competition between foreign entrants and former SOEs in transition markets with respect to expansion of product variety and consumer loyalty formation. While the market share motive induces the more efficient foreign entrant to price aggressively, the extent of this behavior depends critically on its relative efficiency vis-à-vis the local incumbent. If the efficiency gap exceeds some threshold value, the entrant exploits increasingly its cost advantages by raising price rather than investing in market share. Our result suggests that immediate restructuring of former SOEs is important to realize fully the competitive benefits of opening local markets.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 700–715. International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SURPLUS SUGAR IN THE UNITED STATES

Sugar supply is managed in the United States to support minimum prices set by law. The 2008 farm bill contains the sugar‐to‐ethanol program to sell surplus sugar to ethanol producers and a program that allows bids from sugar processors. The sugar program is required to run at no net cost to taxpayers. Bids for surplus sugar are analyzed under various scenarios. Sugar processors will outbid ethanol producers given current ethanol prices. At present, surplus sugar bids will not exceed the minimum prices, and the sugar‐to‐ethanol program will not be able to help the government achieve no net program costs. (JEL Q18, Q42, Q48)