Informal insurance in social networks

This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. They act as conduits for both transfers and information; affecting the scope for insurance and the severity of punishments upon noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable networks as suitably “sparse” networks. Thickly and thinly connected networks tend to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability. Finally, we discuss the effect of discounting on stability.     

A three state model of worker flows in general equilibrium

We develop a simple model featuring search frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision along the extensive margin. The model is a standard version of the neoclassical growth model with indivisible labor and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and frictions characterized by employment loss and employment opportunity arrival shocks. We argue that it is able to account for the key features of observed labor market flows for reasonable parameter values. Persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks play a key role in allowing the model to match the persistence of the employment and out of the labor force states found in individual labor market histories.     

Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes

We build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work. We find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work. Moreover, we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers. In our model, micro and macro elasticities are effectively unrelated. Our model is also consistent with other cross-country patterns.     

Volunteering and life or financial shocks: does income and wealth matter?

Volunteering is a dominant social force that signals a healthy state. However, although the literature on volunteering is extensive, knowledge on how life’s discontinuities (life and financial shocks) affect volunteering is limited because most studies work with static (cross-sectional) data. To reduce this shortcoming, we use longitudinal data from Australia (HILDA) that track the same individuals over time to assess how individuals from different income and wealth groups respond to life and financial shocks with respect to volunteering. Although both income and wealth can act as buffers against life shocks by providing stability and reducing vulnerability – which decreases the need to actually change behaviour patterns – we observe more heterogeneity than expected and also stickiness at the lowest income levels. Response delays in post-shock volunteering also suggest that volunteering habits may be driven and influenced by strong commitment and motivation that are not shattered by life or financial shocks. In fact, the amount of time spent volunteering tends to increase after negative income shocks and decrease after positive income shocks.     

Motives for sharing in social networks

What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed ‘real-world’ gift-giving, while other motives measured in the experiment do not predict behavior outside the experiment.     

Exploring the big jump in the Spanish unemployment rate: Evidence on an ‘added-worker’ effect

Spain is destroying more jobs than any other European country. In the third quarter of 2009, the unemployment rate stood at 17.9%, the second-highest rate in the 27-nation EU and the highest rate in the euro area (EA-16). The exponential growth of the Spanish unemployment rate is the by-product of falling employment rates. However, there is a second explanation which is often overlooked by unemployment forecasters: changes in labour force participation rates. On the one hand, in times of recession participation rates tend to increase in order to safeguard sustainable household incomes. This phenomenon is known as the ‘added-worker’ effect. On the other hand, there is also an opposite effect in that individuals leave the labour force in recessions because chances to find employment are low. This is the ‘discouraged-worker’ effect. Applying a threshold cointegration model to Spanish quarterly data over the period 1976-2008, we find that the added-worker effect dominates the discouraged-worker effect, but only when unemployment is below 11.7%. Above this threshold, the two effects cancel each other out so that the participation rate is not influenced by further deteriorations of economic conditions. Since Spain recently passed the 11.7% unemployment threshold, our model predicts that there will be no further increases in the participation rate in the near future.     

Job contact networks

Many workers hear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts. Second, we study strategic network formation. To this purpose, we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents, and the process by which information about jobs is obtained and transmitted. We show that equilibrium networks always exist and that only moderate levels of network asymmetry can be sustained at equilibrium. Also, we establish a general non-monotonicity result on information flow and unemployment with respect to network size in symmetric networks.     

Job displacement and the transitions to re-employment and early retirement for non-employed older workers

Despite the relatively higher frequency of job displacement among older workers in Europe, little is known about its effect on the work-retirement decision. Employing individual data from the European Community Household Panel for a number of countries with differences in their institutional environments, the effect of job displacement for non-employed workers is identified separately for the transitions into re-employment and retirement. The findings suggest that in countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance provisions for the older unemployed, which offer a pathway to early retirement, older displaced workers exhibit lower re-employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non-displaced. These results are robust to dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity and to the endogeneity of displacement.     

Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market

We show that, in settings where meetings can be multilateral, the allocation rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) can be relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a simple model of the labor market are then explored. We characterize the equilibrium properties of this model, which include wage dispersion, and examine its implied Beveridge curve. A dynamic version of the model is calibrated to the US labor market, and we show that the model can account for observed vacancy rates, given parameters that are chosen to match the average wages and the natural rate of unemployment, although the implied wage dispersion is quite small. Finally, in the limit, as the time between offer rounds in the model approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium.     

How does employment protection legislation influence hiring and firing decisions by the smallest firms?

This paper examines the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on hiring decisions by own-account workers and firing decisions by very small firms (one to four employees). Using data from the EU-15 countries, our results show that the strictness of employment protection legislation is negatively related to both these types of decisions, and hence, to labour mobility among the smallest firms. This new evidence may be useful for governments aiming to create a more enabling macro-environment for employment and productivity growth.     

Strategic information transmission networks

We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others? actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Does immigration affect the Phillips curve? Some evidence for Spain

The Phillips curve has flattened in Spain over 1995-2006: Unemployment has fallen by 15 percentage points, with roughly constant inflation. This change has been much more pronounced than elsewhere. We argue that this stems from the immigration boom in Spain over this period. We show that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is shifted by immigration if natives’ and immigrants’ labor supply elasticities and bargaining power differ. Estimation of this curve for Spain indicates that the fall in unemployment since 1995 would have led to an annual increase in inflation of 2.5 percentage points if it had not been largely offset by immigration.     

The low skill trap

Recently, it has become popular to argue that certain workers have fallen into a trap in which they have poor skills, few job opportunities and a low return on training, while others have not. This paper demonstrates how such a trap can occur within a simple matching model with rent sharing. Rent sharing diminishes the worker's incentive to acquire skills; however, since firms also benefit from training, rent sharing likewise induces job creation. The subsequent improved matching prospects may offset the initial disincentive to invest. However, for this mechanism to be effective, firms and workers must coordinate their actions. If they do not, the trap occurs.     

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.