Trade, technology, and unemployment: the role of endogenous skill formation

Abstract .  This paper analyses trade in an asymmetric  2 × 2 × 2  world, where the two countries ('Europe' and 'America') differ in their preferences towards wage inequality. Fair wage considerations compress wage differentials in both countries. European workers are more averse to wage inequality, and Europe is characterized by lower wage differentials and higher unemployment. Allowing for endogenous skill formation, the effects of a globalization shock, global technological change, and a change in the educational capital stock on skill premia and employment levels are derived. In contrast to a model with exogenous factor supplies, international wage and unemployment differentials are affected by global shocks.     

Capital mobility, skill formation and polarization

We bring in hierarchical education and skill formation within a standard Jonesian specific-factor model of production and trade for a developing economy. There are three types of labor, unskilled, medium skilled and high-skilled. The unskilled can only develop into medium-skilled and medium-skilled into high-skilled. As capital becomes internationally mobile, educational capital gets concentrated in particular types of education. In the process the society gets polarized between the highly educated and the absolutely uneducated.     

Countries, regions and trade: On the welfare impacts of economic integration

We study the impact of falling international trade costs and falling national transport costs on the economic geography of countries involved in an integration process. Each country is formed by two regions between which labor is mobile, whereas there is no international mobility. Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally at positive, but different, costs. A decrease in trade costs and/or in transport costs has a direct impact on prices and wages, which allows us to account for the impact of changes in these parameters on the economic geography and welfare of each country. We show that, as trade barriers fall, the benefits of integration come after its costs. We also show that national transport policies are of the beggar-thy-neighbor type. On both counts, policy coordination is required in the process of economic integration.     

Second thoughts on the exporter productivity premium

Abstract Contrary to the prevailing interpretation, this paper shows that the central models of trade with heterogeneous firms ( Melitz 2003 ; Bernard et al. 2003 ) exhibit ambiguous predictions for the exporter productivity premium. This prospect arises because of differences between theoretical and empirical representations of firm productivity. Instead of marginal productivity, we examine in both models the theoretical equivalent of empirically observable productivity (value‐added per employee). Given the presence of fixed export costs or heterogeneous mark‐ups and trade costs, the observable productivity of exporters in proximity to the export‐indifferent firm turns out to be lower than that of non‐exporters; that is, the productivity distributions overlap. The paper reviews empirical literature that reports non‐positive exporter productivity premia in firm‐level data and discusses implications for empirical research on exporter performance, including learning and the role of non‐parametric regressions (stochastic dominance, quantile regressions), fixed costs, and productivity distributions.     

Product cycles, endogenous skill acquisition, and wage inequality

Abstract .  This paper presents an endogenous product cycle overlapping generations model, where the supply of skilled labour is endogenously determined. This is used to examine how production shifts through imitation by developing countries affect the domestic wage differential and supply of skilled labour in developed countries. In the model, production shifts increase the demand for researchers in developed countries and cause higher relative wages for skilled labour: this leads to more individuals acquiring the skills. As a consequence, the model helps to explain the simultaneous increase in the domestic wage gap and in the supply of skilled labour observed in developed countries.     

Productivity, exporting, and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis: direct evidence from UK firms

Abstract.  Case studies suggest exporters learn from clients. Econometric evidence is mixed. We use firm-level panel data on exporting and productivity with direct information on learning sources, including clients. We find: (a) firms who exported in the past are likely to learn more from clients (relative to other sources); (b) firms who learned from clients in the past are more likely to have faster productivity growth; (c) the reverse is not the case; that is, past productivity growth is not associated with more learning from clients and past learning from clients is not associated with more exporting. These results are consistent with the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Trade liberalization, heterogeneous firms and the soft budget constraint

We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease.     

Trade costs, wage rates, technologies, and reverse imports

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of transport costs, tariffs, and foreign wage rates on the domestic economy in the presence of reverse imports, with special emphasis on inter-firm cost asymmetry in an international oligopoly model. To serve the domestic market, a foreign firm produces in the foreign country, while two domestic firms produce either at home or abroad. Surprisingly, an increase in the foreign wage rate may increase the profits of a firm producing in the foreign country. Even if all firms produce in the foreign country, an increase in the foreign wage rate may improve domestic welfare.     

Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters, who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers.     

Trade liberalization and the Labor Market Revisited

This paper provides new insights in understanding the adjustments of the labor market to trade liberalization policies in an economy producing tradeables and nontradeables. The results of the paper indicate that the short-run effects of trade liberalization on wages, labor allocation and worker welfare is contingent on certain explicit production and demand conditions that exist in an economy. The production condition is related to the slope of the labor demand curve in a given economy and the demand condition is related to the difference in the cross-price elasticity of demand of nontradeables to the price of importables and exportables. The necessary combination of these conditions needed for trade liberalization to be welfare improving in the short run is explored.     

Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to analyze formally the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries. In the model, Northern firms invent new higher-quality products, multinational firms transfer manufacturing operations to the South and the Southern firms imitate products produced by multinational firms. It is shown that stronger IPR protection in the South (i.e., the adoption and implementation of the TRIPs agreement) leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer to the South within multinational firms, a permanent increase in R&D employment by Southern affiliates of Northern multinationals, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate.     

Skills, agglomeration and segmentation

This paper studies the role of skill heterogeneity in “new economic geography” models of location. In our setting, products are both horizontally and vertically differentiated, and producing higher quality goods requires workers with higher skills. Selling to customers based in a different location entails iceberg-type transport costs and additional “communication costs” consisting of a fixed quality loss. We show that the presence of pecuniary externalities creates a mechanism which always promotes spatial sorting of workers according to their skill levels. In particular, in all stable equilibria, workers with higher skill choose to stay in the location where aggregate skill and income is higher, while the less skilled stay in the other.     

State-uncertainty preferences and the risk premium in the exchange rate market

This paper shows that state-uncertainty preferences help to explain the observed exchange rate risk premium. In the framework of Lucas (1982) economy, state-uncertainty preferences amount to assuming that a given level of consumption will yield a higher level of utility the lower is the level of uncertainty perceived by consumers. Under these preferences we can distinguish between two factors driving the exchange rate risk premium: “macroeconomic risk” and “the risk associated with variation in the private agents' perception on the level of uncertainty”. Empirical evidence from three main European economies in the transition period to the euro provides empirical support for the model. The model is more successful in accounting for the observed currency risk premium than models with more standard preferences, and the general perception of risk by private agents is shown to be a more important determinant of risk premium than macroeconomic uncertainty.     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries

The present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure. We demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications. The key variables in our analysis are intra-regional trade costs, differences in market size, and minimum wages.     

An analysis of the demand for skill in a growing economy

We construct a trade theoretic model of skill formation with skill as a produced intermediate input. Capital is required for production as well as for education which transforms unskilled labor into skilled. We use this model to reflect analytically on India's rising requirement of skilled manpower. We show that even if growth of capital and supply of skilled manpower match, relative stagnation of unskilled manufacturing sector will magnify the gap between growth in demand and supply of skill. This may happen, for example, if there is a vast pool of workforce who may not have even the basic education to qualify as “unskilled” and excessive capital flows into the skilled sector. Thus a country with lack of education at a very basic level will be forced to import skilled manpower from the rest of the world.     

Costly investment, complementarities and the skill premium

We propose a new framework to analyse the relationship between the relative high-skilled labour endowment, the skill premium and economic growth. Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we introduce physical capital; internal costly investment in both capital and R&D; and complementarities between intermediate goods. We only find a positive relationship between the relative labour endowment and both the skill premium and economic growth within determined intervals of relative labour endowment values, which vary with the absolute productive advantage of high over low-skilled labour. The model thus accommodates theoretically mixed empirical results on the relative labour endowment-skill premium relationship. We further find that the impact on both the relative labour endowment and the skill premium of a rise in investment costs or in the complementarities degree depends on: (i) the absolute productivity advantage of high over low-skilled labour; and (ii) the relative labour endowment.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.