Pricing to Firm: an Analysis of Firm‐ and Product‐level Import Prices*

We use Hungarian Customs data on product‐level imports of manufacturing firms to document that the import price of a particular product varies substantially across buying firms. We relate the level of import prices to firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and market power. We develop a theory of “pricing to firm” (PTF), where markups depend on the technology and competitive environment of the buyer. The predictions of the model are confirmed by the data: import prices are higher for firms with greater market power, and for more essential intermediate inputs (with a high share in material costs). We take account of the endogeneity of the buyer’s market power with respect to higher import prices and unobserved cost heterogeneity within product categories. The magnitude of PTF is big: the standard deviation of price predicted by PTF is 21.5%.     

The Speed and Stability of Price Adjustment in Australian Manufacturing*

A model of industry speed of price adjustment is derived from firm pricing behaviour. The model is applied to quarterly two‐digit Australian manufacturing data for the period 1985 (Q3) to 2002 (Q3). The results suggest that the industry speed of price adjustment is positively related to the average size of large firms within the industry and is negatively related to industry concentration. We also find that import share has a role in attenuating the effects of industry concentration and that growth in a moving average of real gross domestic product reduces the speed of price adjustment. Calculated industry speeds of price adjustment are both stable across the period of examination and small, suggesting that manufacturing prices are sticky.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition

Price cap regulation is typically applied to natural monopolies operating with subadditive costs. Price caps are known to provide superior incentives for the regulated monopoly to pursue cost reduction and, in a multiservice/product context, undertake welfare enhancing price discrimination. It is well known that capping a Laspeyres index of the firm’s prices induces the monopoly to charge socially optimal “Ramsey” prices in the long run. This paper examines the suitability of the Laspeyres form of regulation when the regulated firm faces competition in the market for one of its services (outputs). We present the appropriately modified Ramsey pricing rule for the regulated dominant firm and demonstrate that capping a Laspeyres index of the dominant firm’s prices leads to prices that satisfy this pricing rule in the long run.     

Third-degree price discrimination in a short-stay accommodation industry

This article analyses the pricing in the short-stay accommodation industry in Tasmania. It utilizes a novel 2008 survey of Tasmanian short-stay accommodation firms in which business managers were asked about their perception of the elasticity of their firm’s demand in each of the market segments that their firm supplied. This direct observation of elasticity allows us to demonstrate that firms’ price across market segments act in a manner consistent with the Lerner index and the theory of third-degree price discrimination. Further we show, in line with expectations based on the literature, that increased quality of the accommodation lowers the elasticity of demand, while the elasticity of demand is higher in winter. Surprisingly, Internet sales channels do not exhibit a different elasticity of demand to other sales channels.     

Pricing dynamics and product quality: the case of antidepressant drugs

The rising prices of pharmaceuticals have generated considerable, and often acrimonious, debate. Yet, there is little conceptual work or empirical evidence on pharmaceutical pricing strategies or on the time paths of these prices. This study provides a conceptual framework describing the interplay between quality and product differentiation in determining the preferred pricing strategy. We hypothesize that higher quality products will engage in price skimming strategies in markets where products are sufficiently differentiated, but will choose a market penetration strategy in markets that are less differentiated. We apply an empirical analysis to brand name antidepressants during the years 1999–2002, a market where differences in quality are modest. A nationally representative data set on drug utilization and expenditures is combined with a physician survey on the quality attributes of drugs to examine the effect of drug quality on pharmaceutical pricing strategies. Results indicate that higher quality antidepressants engage in a market penetration strategy, charging initially lower prices that rise over time. At approximately 6–7 years post-entry, prices of the antidepressant drugs examined converge. Prices of higher quality antidepressants continue to increase thereafter, eventually becoming the highest priced drugs in the therapeutic class. These findings are consistent with a market in which product differentiation is modest and consumers learn which drug works best for them through experience.     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Vertical distribution, parallel trade, and price divergence in integrated markets

We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). The manufacturing firm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing interests: restricting competition in the PI-recipient market, avoiding resource wastes due to actual trade, and reducing the double-markup problem in the PI-source nation. These tradeoffs imply the counterintuitive result that retail prices could diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even as the volume of PI increases. Thus, in some circumstances it may be misleading to think that permitting PI is an unambiguous force for price integration.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under network effects

We examine price competition under product-specific network effects, in a duopoly where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. We emphasize the role of consumers’ expectations formation. When expectations are not influenced by prices, the market may be shared but shares must be equal unless product qualities differ or one firm, possibly even the low-quality one, may capture the entire market. When expectations are influenced by prices, which would be the case when there is commitment, competition becomes more intense and the high-quality firm tends to capture a larger market share. Under strong network effects there is a continuum of equilibria and the higher the prices, the smaller the difference between those prices can be. Requiring continuity of expectations, however, delivers a unique equilibrium where one firm captures the entire market.     

Can a decline in search cost increase prices?

This paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers’ price search cost may not lead to lower prices. In a duopoly with price competition, I show that when some consumers are captive to one firm, there may be a non‐monotonic relationship between search cost and market power; firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers’ price search cost falls below a critical level. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric captive segments, expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines.     

On the Cournot–Bertrand Profit Differential and the Structure of Unionisation in a Managerial Duopoly

This paper deals with the issue of the Cournot–Bertrand profit differential by bringing together two different strands of the industrial organisation literature: managerial delegation and unionised oligopolies. Relative to unionisation, two alternative regimes are analysed and compared: ‘decentralised unionisation’, involving firm‐specific unions, and ‘centralised unionisation’, in which an industry‐wide union sets a uniform wage for the entire industry. The ‘reversal result’ – that is, profits are higher under Bertrand than under Cournot – applies irrespective of the unionisation regime and for a very wide range of product differentiation. Moreover, it is more likely to occur when unionisation is decentralised than centralised and, especially when products are not too much differentiated, the profit differential in favour of price competition is also larger in the presence of firm‐specific unions. However, if firm owners not only delegate the choice of the strategic variable but also that of the competition regime, managers always opt to compete in quantities, thus generating an inefficient choice for owners.     

Micro-responses to shocks: pricing,promotion, and entry*

We study the market response to firm-specific demand shocks in a natural experiment setting. In 2006, a boycott of Danish products in several Arab countries was devastating for Danish cheese products firms. In Saudi Arabia, their market share collapsed from 16.5 percent in January to below 1 percent in March, and never fully recovered; by 2009, it was 6.3 percent. By analyzing micro-level (scanner) price and sales data, we find the following. (i) Danish firms lowered prices but kept the product mix the same. (ii) Non-Danish firms kept prices constant but changed their product mix by introducing new products and new product bundles. (iii) Non-Danish firms chose to introduce products that were similar to the Danish products in characteristic space in order to compete head-to-head. We complement the analysis with a theoretical framework that helps to account for our main findings.     

Why Do Prices Remain Stable in the Bubble and Bust Period?

In spite of a large swing in real output growth in the bubble and bust period, aggregate prices remained relatively stable in Japan. Empirical results show that such price rigidity can be explained by the customer market model combined with financial constraints. The degree of financial constraints that firms face in the bubble and bust period fluctuates significantly, and the impact of financial positions on firms’ prices is counter-cyclical. In booms, liquidity-abundant firms invest in market share by keeping prices down, while in a recession financially constrained firms charge a high price to locked-in customers who remain loyal. Such counter-cyclicality is clearly observed in the pricing behavior of large firms that produce differentiated goods. In contrast, small firms whose product brand is not well established in the market cannot lock in customers, and hence financial constraints do not affect their pricing decisions.     

Market structure in congestible markets

This paper analyses market structure of industries that are subject to both positive and negative network effects. The size of a firm determines the quality of its product: when network effects are positive, a larger firm is of higher quality; when the effects are negative, a larger firm's product is of lower quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards quality (firm size), and firms compete in prices. Equilibria are characterised: for example, in any asymmetric equilibrium, it must be that congestion is not too severe. One consequence of this feature is that an increase in the number of firms in the industry can raise individual firms’ profits. Two factors can bound the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium without fixed costs: expectations, and the ‘finiteness’ property (Shaked and Sutton, Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982) 3–13, Econometrica 51(5) (1983) 1469–1483) of price competition.     

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences

A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We characterize optimal nonlinear pricing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers. Since consumers have a preference for commitment, the firm faces a trade-off between offering a small menu that makes the consumers’ self-control easier and offering a large menu that achieves better price discrimination. We show that the optimal menu resembles the one in the standard nonlinear pricing problem with a price ceiling, where the upper bound on prices is determined endogenously by a participation constraint. The ceiling motivates the firm to offer a relatively flat and compact price schedule, serving more consumers with low demand. The characterization also shows that the firm may earn less if consumers have temptation.