Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention

This paper discusses how to improve the identification of the preference of a decision‐maker (DM) with limited attention proposed by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012). in “Revealed Attention”. Their identification method relies on choice reversals so the obtained revealed preference is often incomplete. We propose three approaches to address this problem. The first one is accommodating a model‐free approach, which respects the DM's choice in making a welfare analysis, as long as it does not contradict the revealed preference of Masatlioglu et al. The second approach incorporates the DM's exogenously obtained attention/inattention information into the model of Masatlioglu et al. The third approach is to take framings that influence the DM's attention into effect for the identification.     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY SHOCKS IN SVAR MODELS: A GRAPHICAL MODELLING APPROACH

We apply graphical modelling (GM) theory to identify fiscal policy shocks in SVAR models of the US economy. Unlike other econometric approaches – which achieve identification by relying on potentially contentious a priori assumptions – GM is a data based tool. Our results are in line with Keynesian theoretical models, being also quantitatively similar to those obtained in the recent SVAR literature à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , and contrast with neoclassical real business cycle predictions. Stability checks confirm that our findings are not driven by sample selection.     

Binary games with many players

Summary. We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual’s payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 24 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D02, D49, L19.Flavio M. Menezes: Correspondence toThis paper has benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the ANU, Boston University, Harvard University Law, Economics and Organization Seminar, University of Wisconsin and at the Econometrics Society Australasian Meetings, Auckland New Zealand. We also thank Lucian Bebchuk, Eddie Dekel, Oliver Hart, Luis Kaplov, Paulo Monteiro and John Quiggin for very useful comments. All errors are our own. Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (grant no. 00000055) and the hospitality of EPGE/FGV and RSPAS/ANU.     

How are preferences revealed?

Revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent's observed actions. Normative preferences represent the agent's actual interests. It sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences. But there are many cases where this assumption is violated. We identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal choice. We then discuss six approaches that jointly contribute to the identification of normative preferences: structural estimation, active decisions, asymptotic choice, aggregated revealed preferences, reported preferences, and informed preferences. Each of these approaches uses consumer behavior to infer some property of normative preferences without equating revealed and normative preferences. We illustrate these issues with evidence from savings and investment outcomes.     

Market equilibrium with heterogeneous recursive-utility-maximizing agents

Summary This paper considers a heterogeneous agent Lucas style exchange economy. For a class of recursive utility functions containing the standard additive expected utility functions, I demonstrate that there exist market equilibria characterized by stationary (ergodic) Markov processes for consumption, portfolio holdings, asset prices and the unobserved utilities. No assumptions about market completeness are made, and there are no restrictions on the underlying information filtration.Other contributions of this paper include: (i) an existence and uniqueness theorem of intertemporal utility for the general class of recursive generators; (ii) the optimum principle as well as its corresponding Euler equation derived for the agent's consumption and portfolio choice problem under recursive utility, and (iii) a single-agent equilibrium asset pricing formula which generalizes that of Epstein and Zin (1989).This paper is a part of my PhD dissertation at the University of Toronto. I would like to thank Larry Epstein for his enthusiastic supervision, helpful discussion and valuable comments. Thanks also to Tan Wang and especially Darrell Duffie for valuable comments.     

ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC PROJECTS: EFFICIENCY AND DECENTRALIZATION*

The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies with a finite set of agents, infinitely many private goods, and a set of public projects. The problem of efficiency and decentralization is addressed under the following very general assumptions: (a) the commodity–price duality is endowed with a consistent locally convex topology; (b) the set of public projects is without any mathematical structure. Moreover, any agent is characterized by a nonordered preference relation depending on consumption goods and public projects. Approximate and exact welfare theorems are discussed throughout the article.     

On the stability of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility under high degrees of uncertainty

Growth models under uncertainty and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility are fragile in explaining consumers’ choice, as equilibrium consumption is dependent on distributional assumptions. We show that, under semi-nonparametric distributions, general equilibrium models are stable, as the existence of expected utility is guaranteed.     

Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities

The existence of Markov equilibria for stochastic games with a continuum of states is a complex issue for which no general result holds as yet. In this article, the problem is solved for a class of stochastic games that satisfy assumptions of complementarity and monotonicity. The proof of existence relies on results from lattice programming. In the Markov equilibria singled out by the Theorem of Existence, the policies and continuation values are increasing and Lipschitz continuous functions of the state variable.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C62, C73.     

Finite Sample Limited Information Inference Methods for Structural Equations and Models With Generated Regressors

We propose exact tests and confidence sets for various structural models typically estimated by IV methods, such as models with unobserved regressors, which remain valid despite the presence of identification problems or weak instruments. Two approaches are considered: (1) an instrument substitution method, which generalizes the Anderson–Rubin procedure, and (2) a sample‐split method, that allows the use of “generated regressors.” Projection techniques are also proposed for inference on general parameter transformations. The asymptotic theory of the tests under weaker assumptions is discussed. Simulation results are presented. The suggested techniques are applied to a model of Tobin's q and to a model of academic performance.     

Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart′s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529–546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart′s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.     

Explaining the spatial variation in housing prices: an economic geography approach

This study is concerned with the validation of parametric functional representations of the conditional mean of wages using Philippine data. This is done in the light of studies confirming relative weaknesses associated with parametric approaches to the modelling of human capital earnings functions (Zheng, 2000; Heckman et al., 2003; Lemieux, 2003; Miles and Mora, 2003). Extending the approaches in Lemieux (2003), Zheng (2000) and Miles and Mora (2003), we conduct consistent specification tests not only on parametric functional forms but also on the semiparametric partially linear model to verify the effect of modelling choice on the schooling-earnings as well as the experience-earnings relationships. Test results indicate that parametric models may still be valid representations of the wage function. In some instances, the semiparametric partially linear wage function holds promise as a modelling alternative to parametric models.     

Typicality and Novelty: Schütz and Shackle on the Paradox of Choice

This paper discusses the thoughts of the Austrian/American phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) and the British economist George Shackle (1903–1992) and their views on choice, which are in many ways very different, perhaps even inconsistent, but also complementary and may even have some shared elements. This is in particular so with regard to the problem of the paradox of choice, the overall insight that for choice to be informative, it must neither be predetermined nor random. Shackle has mainly focused on the creative aspect—on how choice originates while Schütz has tended to focus more on how people are able to make non-random choices by referring to the typical features of action. The paper argues that there are many differences Schütz and Shackle. The possibility that they are complementary approaches is indicated.     

A COMMENT ON “ESTIMATING DYNAMIC DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING” BY HANMING FANG AND YANG WANG

Fang and Wang's (2015) Proposition 2 claims generic identification of a dynamic discrete choice model with hyperbolic discounting under exclusion restrictions. We note that Proposition 2 uses a definition of “generic” that does not preclude that a generically identified model is nowhere identified. We provide two examples of models that are generically identified under this definition, but that are, respectively, everywhere and nowhere identified. We then show that the proof of Proposition 2 is incorrect and incomplete. We conclude that Proposition 2 has no implications for identification of the dynamic discrete choice model and suggest alternative approaches to its identification.     

Location Choice of Multinational and Local Firms in Vietnam: Birds of a Feather Flock Together?

Vietnam enacted the Enterprises Act in 1999, leading to a sharp increase in the number of registered enterprises. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country continued to increase in the 2000s. Thus, this paper examines the location choice of multinational and local firms in Vietnam. We adopt the mixed logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of the possible interaction of neighbouring regions and attracting FDI. Using firm‐level data for the period 2000–2005, the results show that most provincial characteristics exert similar influences on foreign and domestic entrants, except for wage rates, which exhibit an opposing effect. The agglomeration of FDI entices foreign and domestic firms to locate in the same region, whereas the agglomeration of local firms is less relevant to the location choice of all firms. The spatial interdependence effect of attracting investment is particularly relevant to local entrants. Provinces with more foreign (domestic) firms reveal a complementary (competition) effect on the attractiveness of their neighbouring provinces.     

Sensitivity analysis for applied general equilibrium models in the presence of multiple Walrasian equilibria

Summary. Pagan and Shannon's (1985) widely used approach employs local linearizations of a system of non-linear equations to obtain asymptotic distributions for the endogenous parameters (such as prices) from distributions over the exogenous parameters (such as estimates of taste, technology, or policy variables, for example). However, this approach ignores both the possibility of multiple equilibria as well as the problem (related to that of multiplicity) that critical points might be contained in the confidence interval of an exogenous parameter. We generalize Pagan and Shannon's approach to account for multiple equilibria by assuming that the choice of equilibrium is described by a random selection. We develop an asymptotic theory regarding equilibrium prices, which establishes that their probability density function is multimodal and that it converges to a weighted sum of normal density functions. An important insight is that if a model allows multiple equilibria, say , but multiplicity is ignored, then the computed solution for the i-th equilibrium generally no longer coincides with the expected value of that i-th equilibrium. The error can be large and correspond to several standard deviations of the mean's estimate. Received: December 7, 1999; revised version: December 4, 2000     

Experimentation with heteroskedastic noise

Conclusion The direction of information with respect to the choice variable can easily change under a general class of distributions. The implication is that, when information is a function of the choice variable, the result of a model may be an outcome of the structure of the uncertainty and not of the existence of uncertainty. Thus, incomplete information does not always have such a clear effect on an agent's decision as previous models have suggested. If such results are key to the conclusions, then the structure of the model should be examined.The model presented here can be used to determine the relationship between information and the choice variable and to derive basic insights into the particular model being examined. It can also be used to eliminate the informational aspect of decisions so as to examine other aspects of a model, e.g., the incentive for information transmission (jamming) and other dynamic aspects (e.g., capital accumulation). Finally, the functional form of the unknown function as well as the error function are inportant in determining the direction of increased information, as the direction of increased noise can be the direction of experimentation.In models ofactive learning orexperimentation with noisy observations, the informativeness of the signal obviously depends on the (not always evident) relationship between the choice variable and the noise. This previously implicit relationship is made explicit by introducing heteroskedastic noise into the model. The general conditions for the informativeness of the signal to beindependent ordecrease with respect to the choice variable are obtained. Furthermore, the model reveals that many of the results in previous models of learning do not arise from what is unknown nor the existence of uncertaintyper se, but rather from how incomplete information is modeled.JEL D42, D83.     

An analysis of the German university admissions system

This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a stability condition that is adapted to the institutional constraints of the German system. I introduce matching problems with complex constraints and the notion of procedural stability. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. In the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.     

The theorem of proportionality in contemporary capital theory: An assessment of its conceptual foundations

It is ascertained that the theorem of proportionality, which maintains that replacement investment is a constant proportion of the outstanding capital stock, has several fundamental shortcomings. It derives from a model founded on assumptions that are highly restrictive and unlikely to hold in reality. It is alien to the thinking of researchers in industrial organization and other neighboring fields to economics that treat the durability of capital goods as a choice variable. It ignores several thorny conceptual and methodological issues, and, perhaps most important, it may have restrained seriously the progress towards developing models based on more realistic approaches of production. However, despite its shortcomings, the theorem continues to dominate the contemporary theory of capital, most probably because of (a) its simplicity and (b) the lack of a model that might yield a better theorem in terms of standard criteria, like explanatory and predictive power, fruitfulness, etc. For this reason, attention is drawn to recent research which shows that a model centered on the heterogeneous structure of capital and the useful lives of its components is both feasible and exceedingly rich in theoretical and empirical implications.     

Differences in measures of the fiscal multiplier and the reduced-form vector autoregression

The literature has recently asked whether the effects of fiscal policy vary with the state of the economy (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Rendahl 2014; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012). We study this question in the context of vector autoregression (VAR) estimation. We show formally that, if (asymptotically) the parameters of the reduced-form VAR differ, then the dynamic effects of fiscal policy differ as well, generically and for any set of identification assumptions. Thus, in theory, the econometrician can detect these differences (either across time or space) generically just by relying on reduced-form VAR estimation.     

Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling

Summary. For his proof of the existence of a general competitive equilibrium Abraham Wald assumed a strictly pseudomonotone inverse market demand function or, equivalently, that market demand satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. It is well known that more recent existence theorems do not need this assumption. In order to clarify its role in Wald's proof, the question of existence of an equilibrium for a modified version of the Walras-Cassel model is reduced to the solvability of a related variational inequality problem. In general, the existence of a solution to such a problem can only be proved by advanced mathematical methods. We provide an elementary induction proof which demonstrates the essence of Abraham Wald's famous contribution. Received: July 22, 1997; revised version: December 11, 1997