Trade costs, international production shifting, and growth

In this paper I present a North-South endogenous growth model in which the impact of globalization on production location and growth can be analyzed. In the model the skilled-labor abundant North is the only innovator in the world. Using the model, I illustrate a scenario that is particularly interesting. Globalization (a reduction in trade costs) leads to a relocation of production to the South in a differentiated-product sector. As a result, more resources are shifted to R&D in the North, and the growth rate in the world increases. The model has several empirically consistent implications, such as rising relative wages of skilled to unskilled labor under globalization in both the North and South. I also discuss the welfare impact of globalization in this model.     

Trade costs, wage rates, technologies, and reverse imports

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of transport costs, tariffs, and foreign wage rates on the domestic economy in the presence of reverse imports, with special emphasis on inter-firm cost asymmetry in an international oligopoly model. To serve the domestic market, a foreign firm produces in the foreign country, while two domestic firms produce either at home or abroad. Surprisingly, an increase in the foreign wage rate may increase the profits of a firm producing in the foreign country. Even if all firms produce in the foreign country, an increase in the foreign wage rate may improve domestic welfare.     

Agglomeration and tax competition

Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration.     

Agglomeration and fair wages

Abstract.  This paper implements a fair wage constraint into an analytically tractable core-periphery agglomeration model. This enables us to study the role of imperfect labour markets for the pattern of agglomeration. In the short run, a marginal increase in fair wage preferences leads to an unambiguous compression of the national factor price differential between skilled and unskilled labour, involving an increase in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. In the long run, this mechanism renders full dispersion of an unstable equilibrium already at higher trade costs than in perfect labour markets. There is a tendency for fair wage preferences to enforce agglomeration.     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

Trade costs and productivity in services sectors

This paper provides the first evidence linking lower international trade costs with higher productivity in services sectors. On average, lowering trade costs by 10% is associated with a gain in total factor productivity of around 0.5%, which is an effect of similar magnitude to that for goods sectors.     

Additive versus multiplicative trade costs and the gains from trade liberalizations

This paper addresses welfare effects from trade liberalization in a Melitz ( 2003 ) heterogeneous‐firms trade model including the empirically important per‐unit (i.e., additive) trade costs in addition to the conventional iceberg (i.e., multiplicative) and fixed trade costs. The novel contribution of the paper is the result that the welfare gain for a given increase in trade openness is higher for reductions in per‐unit (additive) trade costs than for reductions in iceberg (multiplicative) trade costs. The ranking derives from differences in intra‐industry reallocations and, in particular, from dissimilar impacts on the number of exporters (i.e., the extensive margin of trade).     

Trade policy and productivity

Previous studies on the determinants of productivity emphasized the role of trade and institutions but omitted trade policy due to endogeneity concerns. This paper considers the role of one important element of trade policy: free trade agreements (FTAs). Based on recent work on the determinants of FTAs, we suggest an instrument which is based on the propensity to enter an FTA due to (exogenous) geographical characteristics. We find that differences in institutional quality and trade, due to variations in geography and trade policy, have a sizeable effect on productivity and can explain the huge variation in per capita income across countries.     

Strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm’s profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm’s incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the role of trade costs

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last two decades. This paper analyses the role of trade costs in explaining the increase in the number of cross-border M&As. In particular, we distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and investigate whether trade costs affect these two types of mergers differently. We analyse this question using industry data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1990-2001. Our findings suggest that while in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger activity negatively its impact differs importantly across horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. The impact of trade costs is less negative for horizontal mergers, which is consistent with the tariff-jumping argument.     

Trade taxes and international investment

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that international investment disturbs the conventionally understood equivalence between import tariffs and export taxes. Fundamentally, remittances to foreigners introduce an additional pecuniary channel between countries so that two-good Lerner Symmetry generally will not hold. Moreover, because tariffs subsidize investors in the local import competing sector while export taxes can extract rent from foreign investors in the export sector, the pattern of international investment will influence government preferences over trade policy  instruments  as well as levels. Notably, trade tax symmetry is restored by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on international remittances.     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

Interregional Trade Linkages and the Commercial Role: The Spanish Case

The development of a national or regional economy depends on its own actions as much as on those of its commercial partners. Trade transmits economic events from one economy to another. The type and the degree of interdependence between territories—regions or countries—determines the consequences of external actions in a region. Multipliers translate the effects of a change in one variable on the others. Using an input–output scheme to express interregional commercial flows, some coefficients are developed to classify and identify the role that each region plays in interregional trade. An empirical application of the methodology on Spanish Comunidades Autonomas is presented. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eight International Atlantic Economic Conference, Chicago, October 7–10, 2004. The authors greatly appreciate the comments and suggestions from the participants at the meeting. The authors also wish to thank an anonymous referee and editor for their constructive suggestions and comments. This research was partially supported by the DGI project SEJ2004-07924/ECON.     

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).     

Competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the ‘Core–Periphery’ model

We modify Paul Krugman’s (1991) ‘Core–Periphery’ model by replacing the traditional competitive sector with a monopolistically competitive one. We show that the structure of spatial equilibria remains the same as in the original model. This result continues to hold true under Cournot or Bertrand oligopolistic competition with free entry in the traditional sector. The key factor that explains why the nature of competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the spatial equilibria is constant expenditure shares–due to nested Cobb–Douglas and CES preferences–which imply that trade in the traditional sector is independent from its sectoral characteristics.     

Agglomeration,backward and forward linkages: evidence from South Korean investment in China

Abstract With a firm‐level data set, we study the location decision of South Korean multinationals across China's regions. Our conditional logit estimates confirm agglomeration effects along industry and along national lines. We add an upstream and downstream (backward and forward) linkage effect. We find that the presence of upstream and downstream South Korean affiliates significantly increases the likelihood that a South Korean multinational invests in a particular region. However, linkages that do not differentiate by nationality do not seem to matter much. As such, our analysis of investors' location choice brings together two perspectives: linkages and agglomeration along national lines.     

Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

Firms agglomeration and unions

Economic geography models predict the agglomeration of manufacturing activies only if the workforce is mobile. Still, as the E.U.'s experience shows, core-periphery patterns exist even though the workforce is rather immobile. The paper provides a theoretical explanation for such core-periphery patterns through the effect that unions have on firms’ incentive to agglomerate in a region. The paper offers fully analytical results about location equilibria and some interesting welfare properties.     

Economic integration and the profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

The 1990s was a decade of increased economic integration. The decade also witnessed a sharp increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. From a theoretical perspective, the increase in international mergers in more integrated economies is rather puzzling. It is a well-established result that due to the “business stealing effect”, mergers in integrated markets are not likely to be profitable. A reasonable conjecture would therefore be that closer integration of markets would reduce the attractiveness of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The present paper demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case: Economic integration may trigger cross-border acquisitions by reducing the business stealing effect and by reducing the reservation price of the target firm. The paper thus provides explanations to the observed increase in cross-border mergers in a world of more integrated economies.