Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

What do firms do when dividend tax rates change? An examination of alternative payout responses

This paper investigates whether investor-level taxes affect corporate payout policy decisions. We predict and find a surge of special dividends in the final months of 2010 and 2012, immediately before individual-level dividend tax rates were expected to increase. We also find evidence that immediately before the expected tax increases, firms altered the timing of their regular dividend payments by shifting what would normally be January regular dividend payments into the preceding December. To our knowledge this is the first evidence in the literature about changes in the timing of regular dividend payments in response to tax law changes. For both actions (specials and shifting), we find that it was more likely for a firm to respond to individual-level tax rates if insiders owned a relatively large amount of the firm. Overall, our paper provides evidence that managers consider individual-level taxes in making corporate payout decisions.     

Rational and behavioral motives to trade: Evidence from reinvestment of dividends and tender offer proceeds

We provide evidence of households’ stock market trading in response to clearly identifiable positive cash flow shocks: dividend payments and tender offer proceeds. Transaction cost motives appear important, and there is some support for rational portfolio rebalancing and life cycle considerations as well. Households’ tendency to reinvest is low, even for large and unexpected dividend payments. This is consistent with a default choice bias, and is not due to dividend clientele effects. Reinvestment of tender offer proceeds is significantly higher, controlling for other important factors. This is consistent with mental accounting, i.e., cash flows from different sources are treated differently.     

IMPLICATIONS OF UNSUSTAINABLE DIVIDENDS

In this article, we examine the wealth effects of unsustainable dividend payments and explore the economic forces that may explain why they exist. We find that the larger the dividend–earnings differential, the lower the short- and long-run wealth effects to shareholders. In addition, the dividend–earnings differential increases not only the probability of a subsequent dividend cut over the next four quarters but also the likelihood that the cut will be greater than 5%. Overall, our findings suggest that although investors are not fooled by unsustainable dividend payments, the negative announcement effects are in anticipation of protracted poor performance.     

Executive compensation and dividend policy

This study examines the use of dividend provisions in executive compensation contracts to influence dividend policy. A sample is constructed with the largest companies in the oil and gas, defense/aerospace and food processing industries, where dividend-related agency costs are expected to be high. The results indicate that the existence of a dividend incentive in the compensation plan is positively associated with higher dividend payouts and yields, and higher annual changes in dividend levels. Evidence is also provided on firm characteristics associated with the use of a compensation contract with a dividend provision. The results are consistent with the theory that firms link compensation incentives to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders and management over dividend decisions.     

Managerial entrenchment and payout policy: A catering effect

Agency theory suggests that entrenched managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to the catering theory, external pressures from investors can force managers to increase dividend payments. Hence, we test whether entrenched managers respond to investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. Using a large sample of 9677 US firms over the period 1990–2016 (i.e. a total of 80,478 firm-year observations), we test and find evidence that managerial entrenchment negatively impacts dividend payments. Our findings suggest that catering effects weaken the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on payout policy and that in firms with entrenched managers an increase in the propensity to pay dividends is conspicuous only when there is external investor demand for dividends. Our results indicate that while insiders and institutional owners might not necessarily favour dividend payments, firms respond to catering incentives when dominated by insiders but not institutional owners. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that dividend payments are a result of external pressures to reduce agency problems associated with firms run by entrenched managers.     

Inside shareholders’ effective tax rates and dividends

Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.     

The link between bank monitoring and corporate dividend policy: The case of dividend omissions

This study investigates whether bank monitoring influences investor response to a borrowing firm's decision to omit its dividend payments. We establish a new link between the theories of banking and dividend policy in an examination of how bank monitoring and firm dividend signals complement one another to resolve information asymmetries. Results indicate that, for small firms, investors interpret the dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring and the dividend signals taken together. Also reported are the results of tests examining the differences between the monitoring effects of banks versus public and private non-bank lenders.     

Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

Do dividend tax cuts lead firms to increase dividends: Evidence from China

Dividend taxation is an important component of investors’ taxes and has attracted the attention of policymakers and financial economists. However, the theory of dividends and the reform of dividend taxation remain a puzzle. This paper analyzes the effect of dividend taxation on firms’ dividend policies. Using a natural experiment and difference-in-difference estimation, we find that China’s dividend tax cut in 2005 led firms to increase their dividend payments. Companies with higher proportions of tradable individual shares or investment fund shares were more likely to increase their dividend payments. However, opportunistic behavior also exists, where companies with higher proportions of shares held by executives were also more likely to increase their dividend payments. These findings support the existence of a causal relationship between China’s tax cut and firms’ increased dividend payments and imply that the reform of dividend taxation in 2005 achieved its goal.     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

Linking dividends and capital injections – a probabilistic approach

In the context of collective risk theory, we give a sample path identity relating capital injections in the original model and dividend payments in the time-reversed counterpart. We exploit this duality to provide an alternative view on some of the known results on the expected discounted capital injections and dividend payments for risk models driven by spectrally negative Lévy processes. Furthermore, we present a probabilistic analysis and simple resulting expressions for a model with two dividend barriers, which was recently shown by Schmidli to be optimal in various Lévy risk models when maximizing the difference of dividend payments and injections in the presence of tax exemptions.     

Tax clientele effects of dividends under intertemporal consumption choices

Corporate investors putatively seek high dividends because marginal tax rates on dividends are lower than those on capital gains. However, a lower tax “rate” does not necessarily mean that a higher dividend is desirable. Taking the intertemporal consumption choices given, corporate investors are expected to prefer “time-preference-fitted dividends” if tax rates remain constant over time; otherwise they confront a larger “amount” of tax obligation. If dividend shortfalls exist, they must realize capital gains and thereby suffer unfavorable tax treatment, whereas excessive payments cause intertemporal double taxation on reinvested dividends. Tax-saving problems should be linked with intertemporal consumption choices.     

The Effect of Fiduciary Standards on Institutions' Preference for Dividend‐Paying Stocks

Many researchers apparently believe that some institutional investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks because they are subject to the “prudent man” (PM) standard of fiduciary responsibility, under which dividend payments provide prima facie evidence that an investment is prudent. Although this was once accurate for many institutions, during the 1990s most states replaced the PM standard with the less‐stringent “prudent investor” (PI) rule, which evaluates the appropriateness of each investment in a portfolio context. Controlling for the general decline in dividend‐paying stocks, we find that institutions reduced their holdings of dividend‐paying stocks by 2% to 3% as the PI standard spread during the 1990s. Studies of asset pricing and corporate governance should no longer consider dividend payments when evaluating the actions of institutional investors.     

THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS

We investigate whether insider trading restrictions had their intended effects during the 1960s and 1970s. We examine insider trading and stock market behavior before dividend initiations and omissions announced between 1935 and 1974. Contrary to existing research and commentary, we show that restrictions had meaningful effects. During the 1960s and 1970s, insiders sold less frequently before dividend omissions, and the average profitability of insider trades declined. In addition, the positive (negative) stock price runup before dividend initiations (omissions) decreased after 1961. The results provide some vindication for the Securities and Exchange Commission's adjudicative approach toward insider trading regulation.     

Suspension of payments, bank failures, and the nonbank public's losses

We present evidence on the effects of suspensions of payments from an episode that is close to a controlled experiment for examining those effects. In 1861, about 44% of the banks in Wisconsin closed, 81% of the banks in Illinois closed, and noteholders suffered substantial losses. The historical record suggests that an effective suspension of payments in Wisconsin but not in Illinois may explain the difference. Our statistical evidence indicates that the suspension of payments increased the probability of a bank remaining open by about 21 percentage points and decreased noteholders’ losses by about 14 cents per dollar.     

Debt Financing under Asymmetric Information

We analyze the optimal design of debt maturity, coupon payments, and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information. We show that, if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long-term cash flows, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that partially restricts dividend payments. If the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near-term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that does not restrict dividend payments. Finally, if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates, firms finance with short-term debt.     

On the reversal of return and dividend growth predictability: A tale of two periods

A disconcerting, albeit generally accepted, finding is that aggregate stock returns are predictable by dividend yield but dividend growth is unpredictable. I show that part of this lack of dividend growth predictability stems from how dividend growth is constructed. I then show a dramatic reversal of predictability in the 134 years during 1872–2005: stock returns are largely unpredictable in the first seven decades, but become predictable in the postwar period; dividend growth is strongly predictable in the prewar years but this predictability disappears in the postwar years. New evidence on the predictability of long-run returns and dividend growth is also shown.     

Optimal dividend payments in the classical risk model when payments are subject to both transaction costs and taxes

In this paper, we study optimal dividend problem in the classical risk model. Transaction costs and taxes are required when dividends occur. The problem is formulated as a stochastic impulse control problem. By solving the corresponding quasi-variational inequality, we obtain the analytical solutions of the optimal return function and the optimal dividend strategy when claims are exponentially distributed. We also find a formula for the expected time between dividends. The results show that, as the dividend tax rate decreases, it is optimal for the shareholders to receive smaller but more frequent dividend payments.     

Dividend Policies and Price-Volume Reactions to Cash Dividends on the Stock Market: Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

This study examines the effects of cash dividend payments on stock returns and trading volumes in the stock market. It also investigates whether there is any difference in the investment behavior of investors with respect to the dividend pay out ratio and size in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)from 1995 to 2003. Prices start to rise a few sessions before cash dividend payments, and on the ex-dividend day, they fall less than do dividend payments, finally decreasing in the sessions following the payment. Trading volume shows a considerable upward shift before the payment date and, interestingly, is stable after Thus, cash dividends influence prices and trading volumes in different ways before, at, and after payment, providing some profitable active trading strategy opportunities around the ex-dividend day. The findings support price-volume reaction discussions on the divident payment date and the significant effect of cash dividends on the stock market.