A Framework for Market Discipline in Bank Regulatory Design

Abstract:   Given current debates on the future direction of regulatory design, the first objective of this paper is to contextualise the issues surrounding bank market discipline. Accordingly, the paper raises awareness of the current key themes within incentive‐based regulatory design and analyses the theory underlying market discipline. This leads to the creation of a theoretical framework of market discipline, which provides a powerful tool for understanding the conditions necessary for effective market discipline and for assessing the findings of market discipline‐related empirical research. The second objective is to emphasise the suitability of the theoretical framework for debates on contemporary market discipline and aiding future bank regulatory policy design, in particular, how to incorporate suitable, incentive mechanisms in international banking regulation.     

An Analysis of European Banks' SND Issues and its Implications for the Design of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy

During the last twenty years an increasing number of proposals to improve bank market discipline through the introduction of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) have been presented and critically discussed by academic economists and bank regulators. While theoretical issues are key in this debate, a proper understanding of the market for banks' subordinated notes and debentures (SND) and the main features of securities is also considered relevant for the potential introduction, design and goals setting of such a policy. This paper builds on information concerning issuers, investors, markets, pricing and the technical features of securities to critically discuss these aspects. Data on over 1800 European banks SND issues completed during the 1988–2000:Q1 period together with information on primary and secondary market functioning are presented.     

Does Subordinated Debt Play a Role for Market Discipline?

This paper examines the link between the issuance of subordinated debt by commercial banks and market discipline. Using cross-sectional and time-series data from 2002 to 2007, we empirically examine the relationship between banks' risk level and their decisions to issue subordinated debts in Taiwan. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the commercial banks with low risk levels prefer to issue subordinated debts more than high-risk banks do, and we reject the hypothesis. We conclude that the application of subordinated debt is not a mature channel for providing market discipline for commercial banks in Taiwan. We offer potential reasons for this finding and discuss the policy implications of our findings.     

Dynamics of Banks' Capital Accumulation

We construct a dynamic neoclassical model of banking capital where the dynamics are governed by the process of financial capital accumulation and credit risk realizations in a structure where stylized banking characteristics are maintained. This is aimed at focusing on how the profit‐maximizing capital ratio of banks evolves and how it reacts to exogenous shocks particularly so during periods of prolonged downturn of the economy. We examine impulse responses of our model to credit risk shock, business cycle shock, and monetary policy shock. The convergence of financial capital to its optimal level is also explored.     

Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures

Several recent studies have recommended greater reliance on subordinated debt as a tool to discipline bank risk taking. Some of these proposals recommend using sub-debt yield spreads as triggers for supervisory discipline under prompt corrective action (PCA). Currently such action is prompted by capital adequacy measures. This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the relative accuracy of various capital ratios and sub-debt spreads in predicting bank condition: measured as subsequent CAMEL or BOPEC ratings. The results suggest that some of the capital ratios, including the summary measure used to trigger PCA, have almost no predictive power. Sub-debt yield spreads performed slightly better than the best capital measure, the Tier-1 leverage ratio, albeit the difference is not significant. The performance of sub-debt yields satisfies an important pre-requisite for using sub-debt as a PCA trigger. However, the prediction errors are relatively high and further work to refine the measures would be desirable.     

Did the Market Signal Impending Problems at Northern Rock? An Analysis of Four Financial Instruments

The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support regulatory authority mechanisms in ensuring banking sector stability. This includes, amongst other things, using forward‐looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper's key aim is to analyse whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling qualities of four financial market instruments (credit default swap spreads, subordinated debt spreads, implied volatility from options prices and equity measures of bank risk) so as to explore both the relative and individual qualities of each. The paper's findings, therefore, contribute to the market discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk‐taking and enhancing supervisory monitoring. Our analysis suggests that private market participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock. These findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled banks. The paper identifies equities as providing the timeliest and clearest signals of bank condition, whilst structural factors appear to hamper the signalling qualities of subordinated debt spreads and credit default swap spreads. The paper also introduces idiosyncratic implied volatility as a potentially useful early warning metric for supervisory authorities to observe.     

Building Stable Mortgage Markets: Lessons from Canada's Experience

The global financial crisis illustrated the high costs of boom–bust cycles in housing and mortgage markets and the importance of implementing policy frameworks that mitigate the risk of these events. This article discusses elements of Canada's policy framework that contributed to the relatively good performance of its mortgage market in recent years, including supervisory practices and mortgage underwriting standards. Lender recourse and the nondeductibility of mortgage interest payments played a complementary role. Ongoing policy challenges are also identified, including the need for monitoring to ensure the current prolonged period of low interest rates does not lead to levels of debt and house prices that create future instability in housing and mortgage markets.     

Liquidity Provision,Bank Capital,and the Macroeconomy

New bank equity must come from somewhere. In general equilibrium, raising bank capital requirements means either that banks produce less short‐term debt (as debt holders must become shareholders), or short‐term debt is not reduced and the banking system acquires nonbank equity (as the shareholders in nonbanks become shareholders in banks). The welfare effects involve a trade‐off because bank debt is special as it is used for transactions purposes, but more bank capital can reduce the chance of bank failure (producing welfare losses).     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Bank Recapitalization,Regulatory Intervention,and Repayment

We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed‐out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

次级债能发挥对银行风险承担行为的市场约束作用吗

关于次级债的既有文献基本都在实证研究其市场约束的存在性,而没有揭示次级债作为一种市场约束激励机制的有效程度或内在机理。本文则基于或有权估值理论,研究了次级债对银行风险承担行为的市场约束机理。我们的研究发现:当银行的资产负债水平处于一定的安全边界之内时,随着银行风险承担行为的提高,次级债债权人会在某种程度上补偿高级债债权人。在银行的负债结构中引入次级债,不一定能起到约束银行风险承担行为的目的,它取决于银行既有的资本充足水平。监管当局在允许或强制商业银行发行次级债时,应考虑到次级债市场约束与银行风险承担行为之间的内在关系。为增强市场对银行风险承担行为的约束作用,监管当局应强制资本相对充足的银行发行一定规模的次级债,但这种强制性要求不应覆盖到资本不足的银行。     

Capital Regulation with Two Banking Sectors: Cyclicality and Implementation

We present a capital regulation policy in a model in which banks can choose to be unregulated, by operating in the shadow banking sector, when the cost of being regulated (restriction on portfolio risk) exceeds the benefit (cheaper funding/insurance). We show that the welfare maximizing capital requirement policy can be procyclical: lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

资本监管新规对中国商业银行的影响

中国银监会于2009年10月21日颁发《关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知》,核心是关注次级债和核心资本充足率,也称为资本监管新规。尽管资本监管新规提高了商业银行的安全度,但在短期内会加大其资本金压力和削弱其盈利能力。因此,扩展资本金补充渠道及改进盈利模式是商业银行必须要解决的问题。