MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PAYMENTS*

We construct a model to clarify the mechanism by which the lender of last resort (LLR) can prevent bank runs. In our model, a bank has both the function of facilitating payments in which inside money is settled using outside money and the function of financial intermediation using a deposit contract. The deposit contract might lead to a bank run, and might even contribute to an efficient allocation. Therefore, to consider the liquidity supply by the LLR, we introduce the deposit contract as a factor of instability in the banking model. We show that the LLR can assist in the recovery of both the efficiency and stability of the financial system.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Herding and bank runs

Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his consumption type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of the bank's portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. Some of these runs are efficient in that the bank is liquidated before the portfolio worsens. Others are not efficient; these are cases in which the herd is misled.     

MONEY AND BANKING IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We develop a new theory of money and banking based on the old story in which goldsmiths start accepting deposits for safe keeping, then their liabilities begin circulating as media of exchange, then they begin making loans. We first discuss the history. We then present a model where agents can open bank accounts and write checks. The equilibrium means of payment may be cash, checks, or both. Sometimes multiple equilibria exist. Introducing banks increases the set of parameters for which money is valued–thus, money and banking are complements. We also derive a microfounded version of the usual money multiplier.     

A classroom experiment in monetary policy

The authors propose a classroom experiment implementing a simple version of a New Keynesian model suitable for courses in intermediate macroeconomics and money and banking. Students play as either the central bank or members of the private sector. The central banker sets interest rates to meet twin objectives for inflation and the output gap or to meet only an inflation target. In both settings, private sector agents are concerned with correctly forecasting the inflation rate. The authors show that an experiment implementing this setup is feasible and yields results that enhance understanding of the New Keynesian model of monetary policy. They propose alternative versions where the central bank is replaced by a policy rule and provide suggestions for discussing the experimental results with students.     

The payment mechanisms and liquidity effects

A general equilibrium model with multiple means of payment in segmented markets is constructed to study the liquidity effects. It is shown that, under certain conditions, stored value – money issued by private entrepreneurs weakens, but does not completely eliminate the liquidity effects that exist when stored value is prohibited. The Friedman rule can be optimal in the regime with floating stored value. The impact of monetary policy now depends not only on the monetary intervention of the central bank, but also on the quantity of the outstanding private money and its velocity.     

Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond–Dybvig Banking Model

Within the framework of a Diamond–Dybvig model [J. Polit. Econ.91(1983), 401–419], but with explicitly modelling the autarky choice during the planning period, we demonstrate that a mixed strategy bank run equilibrium that does not rely on sunspots may coexist with the sunspot run equilibrium previously studied in the literature. In a version of the model with multiple banks, there exist sequential equilibria that imply positive profits. However, the zero-profit contract in which runs never occur can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome if the agents play pure strategies only and their beliefs are restricted to be consistennt with a forward induction argument.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, G21     

管制、竞争与民营银行的发展

金融深化的基础是管制与竞争的均衡。计划体制下,国家对金融业一直采取国有控股或国家垄断,因而产生民营银行压抑现象。市场化改革显化了金融制度与经济制度的摩擦,因而民营银行发展在金融深化中具有现实性,也是金融基础设施建设的重要组成。从竞争的角度看,放松民营银行进入壁垒,有助于金融业适度竞争,同时也是国有银行改革的重要组成部分。当然,金融本身的脆弱性说明银行民营化过程也是管制重建的过程。     

ON THE ESSENTIALITY OF BANKS*

We compare allocations sustained by credit with allocations sustained by bank notes (inside money) in a search model with decentralized trade and limited monitoring. We demonstrate that there exists a credit arrangement that is superior to inside money. However, in contrast with inside money, this arrangement is not robust to an expansion of trade that is not accompanied by an adequate increase in the degree of monitoring. Therefore, banks are essential when trade is intense and monitoring is limited. As a historical application, we argue that our model helps explain the origins of banking in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.     

On exogenous money and bank behaviour: the Pandora's box kept shut in Keynes' theory of liquidity preference?

This essay examines Keynes' views on banking behaviour and the relationships between central banks and banks as they evolved from his Tract on Monetary Reform to The General Theory. The objective is to clarify in what sense money may be exogenous in his final work. We identify a distinctly Keynesian position on the money-supply process, featuring money exogeneity due to bank behaviour. Our findings run counter to both neoclassical synthesis view on exogenous money cum passive banks as well as the post Keynesian challenge of endogenous money cum passive banks.     

Beliefs, Bailouts and Spread of Bank Panics

This article highlights the spread of bank panics across countries, as the public reassesses governments' propensity to bailouts. Policymakers decide whether to save collapsing banking systems by weighing social costs of crises against the costs associated with raising taxes to finance rescue packages. Policymakers know those social costs of bank liquidation whereas the public does not. In this setup, financial crises may result from the public's self‐fulfilling prophecies about equilibrium outcomes, as lenders' expectations impinge on the taxation cost of bailouts. It follows that a banking crisis in a country leads creditors to reexamine policymakers' willingness to bailouts in other countries, which eventually makes their banks more vulnerable to self‐confirming depositors' runs.     

MONEY,SOCIAL STATUS AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH IN A GENERALIZED CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE MODEL

This paper analytically examines the equilibrium growth effect of money/inflation in a standard one‐sector AK model of endogenous growth with the most generalized cash‐in‐advance constraint and relative wealth‐induced preferences for social status. We show that on the economy's unique balanced growth equilibrium path, the sign of the correlation between money and output growth depends crucially on: (i) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; and (ii) the liquidity‐constrained ratio of consumption to investment expenditure. Moreover, our model economy always exhibits a positive output–growth effect in response to changes of the strength for social status. We also undertake numerical experiments to assess the quantitative importance of our theoretical results under an empirically plausible set of parameters.     

Impact of financial reforms on efficiency of state-owned,private and foreign banks in Pakistan

This article uses a unique bank level data from 1991 to 2000 and evaluates how financial reforms affect banking efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in Pakistan. The results suggest that banking efficiency falls during initial reform period when banks adjust to enhanced competition but increases in more advanced stages of reform. While in general foreign and private banks show superior efficiency and factor productivity than do state-owned banks, the relative performance of foreign banks worsens after the consolidation stage of the financial reforms is over. We show the importance of link between bank size, asset quality and bank branches with efficiency indexes and also note that every 10% increase in share of nonperforming to total loans decreases banking efficiency by 6 to 10%.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

The role of financial sector competition for monetary policy

Abstract In this paper, we examine the impact of competition in the banking industry on financial market activity. In particular, we explore this issue in a setting where banks simultaneously insure individuals against liquidity risk and offer loans to promote intertemporal consumption smoothing. In addition, spatial separation and private information generate a transactions role for money. Interestingly, we demonstrate that the industrial organization of the financial system bears significant implications for the effects of monetary policy. Under perfect competition, higher rates of money growth lead to lower interest rates and a higher volume of lending activity. In contrast, in a monopoly banking sector, money growth restricts the availability of funds and raises the cost of borrowing.     

Bank Fragility and International Capital Mobility

The paper presents a model of a small open economy with a fragile banking sector and imperfect international capital mobility. In this model, increased international integration of the market for bank deposits makes bank runs more likely, resulting in a welfare loss for the business sector. Bank depositors may gain or lose depending on the parameters. When depositors gain, whether the gains exceed the losses to the business sector depends on the size of the holdings of foreign assets relative to the deadweight costs of bank runs. Thus, limited international financial integration may not be desirable.     

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank’s depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw. Our results show that (i) bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic, and (ii) subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision. For the multiple-opportunity case, we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules. We find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game, which involves Bayesian updating of probabilities, explains subject behavior better than other rules.     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.