Power and efficiency in production pillage games

A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.      

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Received: March 2004, Accepted: October 2004, JEL Classification: D72, D74 We thank Joan Maria Esteban, Kai Konrad, Debraj Ray, Stergios Skaperdas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the paper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants in Barcelona, Istanbul, Paris and WZB Berlin.     

How Strategic Groups Act Competitively Within and Across Markets

Our study analyzes rivalry within and across markets of size‐defined strategic groups in the banking industry. We consider that, owing to group‐level effects, like efficiency and funding, the degree of rivalry of size‐defined strategic groups depends on whether the competitor is acting in the same or in a different market and whether the competing firms are within the same strategic group or in different groups. We estimate the effect of group interactions within and across loans and deposits markets on firm performance in the Spanish banking industry. We find evidences of rivalry as described in our hypotheses. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Über die Verteilung von Produktionszeiten in Assemblage-Prozessen

Zusammenfassung Es werden Produktionszeiten in Assemblage-Systemen behandelt;p parallele Produktionslinien erzeugen Teilstücke, die zu Gruppen vonp Stücken, je eines aus einer Linie, zusammengestellt werden. Als Produktionszeit wird die Zeit zwischen zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Gruppenoutputs definiert. Aus der Verteilung der Produktionszeiten an den einzelnen Linien wird die Grenzverteilung der Produktionszeiten hergeleitet. Dabei zeigt sich, da? diese Grenzverteilung im wesentlichen von den Wahrscheinlichkeiten abh?ngt, da? bestimmte Produktionslinien zurückbleiben und dadurch den Produktionstakt der Gruppen bestimmen. Sind — das ist der interessanteste Fall — die Mittelwerte der Produktionszeiten an den einzelnen Linien gleich, so sind diese Wahrscheinlichkeiten als Funktionen der Varianzen der Produktionszeiten darstellbar; sie lassen sich darüber hinaus als Volumina gewisser nichteuklidischer Simplexe in sph?rischen R?umen mit konstanter Krümmung deuten.

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Summary Production times in assemblage-systems are considered;p parallel production lines produce pieces, which are combined to groups ofp pieces, each from another line. Production time is defined as the time between two consecutive outputs of such groups. Given the production time of the individual lines, the limiting distribution of the group production times will be derived. This limiting distributions are essentially dependent on the probabilities that a specified line will lag behind all others and so will determine the production time of the groups. If the means of production times of the single lines are equal — this will be the most interesting case — then these probabilities can be expressed as functions of the variances of the production time of the single pieces. They also can be interpreted as volumes of certain non-euclidean simplices in spherical spaces of constant curvature.

     

On the accuracy of bootstrap confidence intervals for efficiency levels in stochastic frontier models with panel data

We study the construction of confidence intervals for efficiency levels of individual firms in stochastic frontier models with panel data. The focus is on bootstrapping and related methods. We start with a survey of various versions of the bootstrap. We also propose a simple parametric alternative in which one acts as if the␣identity of the best firm is known. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the parametric method works better than the␣percentile bootstrap, but not as well as bootstrap methods that make bias corrections. All of these methods are valid␣only for large time-series sample size (T), and correspondingly none of the methods yields very accurate confidence intervals except when T is large enough that the identity of the best firm is clear. We also present empirical results for two well-known data sets.      

Stable and efficient coalitional networks

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and efficiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide insights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.     

Decisioni di gruppo e consenso: Un modello nell'ambito della teoria degli insiemi sfocati

Si propone un modello di consenso in ambiente sfumato, simile al cosiddetto metodo Delphi.Nel nostro approccio opinioni individuali e pesi sono numeri sfumati e la transizione tra stati è ottenuta per mezzo di operazioni max-min estese.Nel nostro approccio si prova che, dato un gruppo din individui, sotto opportune condizioni dopon–1 iterazioni le opinioni individuali si stabilizzano.

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Here we propose a model of consensus in a fuzzy environment similar to the so called Delphi method.In our approach individual opinions and weights are fuzzy numbers and transition from one state to another one is obtained via extended max-min operations.While in the classical stochastic approach to Delphi method (see De Groot [1] and Kelly [6]) conditions for reaching consensus are established, in our approach it is proved that, given a group ofn individuals, under suitable conditions aftern–1 iterations individual opinions become stable.

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Lavoro eseguito con il contributo CNR n. 83-02619.10.     

Agreement and consensus in a Q-mode research design: an empirical comparison of measures,and an application

Subject of this paper is the analysis of consensus within small groups of respondents, based on a proportionally large number of variables. The target group is researchers who are interested in Q-mode research. Measures of agreement are compared, and an application from a recent project is presented. Cohen’s κ is the preferable measure, Krippendorff’s α is an alternative, which is based on a different concept of expected disagreement. At group level, along with κ and α for multiple raters, additional measures are r _wg, intraclass correlation, and κ _SC. Predictions about level differences between groups can be assessed by a t-test and θ     

Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization

The basic difference between Nash and strong (Nash) implementations originates from the possibility of coalition formation. The results of Nash implementation are applicable when agents in no group can cooperate (or form a coalition) and those of strong implementation are applicable when agents in every group can cooperate. In the present paper we consider an environment where agents in some groups can cooperate and agents in other groups cannot. We completely characterize the set of correspondences that are implementable in such a general environment, and we provide an algorithm which enables us to verify whether a correspondence satisfies the condition that appears in the characterization results. By applying the algorithm in an exchange economy, we show that the core, the definition of which depends on the possibility of cooperation, is implementable in the equilibrium corresponding to the cooperation possibility.     

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.     

Spatial pillage game

A pillage game is a coalitional game as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game. Players are located in regions and can travel from one region to another. The players can form a coalition and combine their power only within their destination regions, which limits the exertion of the power of each coalition. Under this spatial restriction, a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation that defines stable states in which powers among the players are endogenously balanced. With the spatial restriction, the set of stable states changes. However, if the players have forecasting ability, then the set of stable states does not change with the spatial restriction. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.     

Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations.     

A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible weight-profiles of assemblies as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of both neo-parliamentary and semi-presidential government forms provided that the majority formation rule is collegial, namely there is one electorally fixed minimal majority coalition.      

The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.     

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle

Barberà-Sonnenschein (J Econ Theory 18:244–254, 1978) have shown that any binary and Paretian random social choice function can be associated with a mapping which associates a real number with each coalition of individuals. This function gives, for each coalition, the power that this group has in imposing on society, their common preference relation on a pair of alternatives. The aim of this paper is to extend this result, showing that the Pareto criterion is not a necessary condition for the existence of such a coalitional power function.     

Not-for-profit pressure group work: A marketing analysis of whether to operate solo or in coalition

Pressure (or interest or lobby) group work in charities/not-for-profits can benefit from a marketing approach. Product development, other player (competitor) analysis and positioning of the pressure group vis-à-vis associated and sometimes competitor organisations or groups are explored, as are the conditions (including advantages and disadvantages) under which solo versus coalition ways of working are likely to be most effective.     

Locally lipschitz cooperative games

A locally Lipschitz cooperative generalized game is described by its coalition worth function v defined on the set [0, 1]ⁿ of generalized (or fuzzy) coalitions of n players. We assume that v is positively homogeneous and locally Lipschitz. We propose the Clarke's generalized gradient ∂v(c^N) of v at the coalition c^N=(1,…,1) of all players as a set of solutions, and we study its property. We point out that it coincides with the core when v is super–additive and to the Shapley value when v is smooth.     

Intra-industry structure and the response toward rivals

This paper is a study of the pricing behavior of airline monopolists toward potential entrant carriers from different strategic groups. The results suggest that formerly regulated carriers price lower when faced by potential entrants from the newly certified carrier group than they do when they face only potential entrants from their own group. These results are consistent with the heretofore-untested hypothesis from Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1979) that rivalry is greater across groups than within groups.     

Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with () and without (n = 1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player rent-seeking contest. However, under rent contestability the bureaucracy no longer serves as a means of extracting resources from the public. The paper concludes with the study of the effect of ‘net costs’ on bureaucratic friction. It turns out that under cotestability the only reason for creating bureaucratic friction is the ‘negative costs’ it incurs while when n = 1 the effect of the bureaucrat's net costs of generating bureaucratic friction on the optimal degree of such friction is ambiguous. Received: October 30, 2000 / Accepted: December 28, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments     

On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

Faynzilberg and Kumar (Rev Econ Design 5(1):23–58, 2000) show that the usual Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions to validate the first-order approach in moral hazard agency models are no longer valid in the generalized agency case. They consider the risk-averse agent case and identify one set of technological conditions, where the production technology satisfies the linear distribution function condition in actions and types, that validates ex-ante the first-order approach. With the usefulness of their decomposition approach, we show that the first-order approach in the generalized agency case can be checked ex-ante under the Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions when the agent is risk-neutral but there is a binding limited liability constraint on the agent’s wage.