Office triage and the physician's supply curve

This paper contains a theoretical and empirical model of the physician firm. The utility maximizing physician chooses the number of hours of labor to supply and the mix between patient visits and time per visit. Theory suggests that a serious specification error may occur if one estimates the labor supply curve and patient demand curve without simultaneously estimating the mix between patient visits and time per visit. A Chi-Square specification test reveals that this “triage” model statistically dominates the simple supply/demand model. Estimation results indicate relevant backward-bending labor and negatively sloped service supply functions.     

New Keynesian Versus New Classical Theories of Aggregate Supply: Evidence from the Oecd Countries

Using annual and quarterly data for the OECD countries this paper tests four theories of aggregate supply, namely the sticky wage, the sticky price, the worker misperception and the producer misinformation models. The empirical estimates suggest that the short run aggregate supply curve is positively sloped as a result of price and wage stickiness. Furthermore, the slope of the aggregate supply curve is found to be a positive function of the rate of inflation which is consistent with the sticky price model.     

Money disillusion and stagflation

In the conventional income-expenditure model with rigid wages, the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping. Increases in demand therefore imply increases in real output and employment. We demonstrate here that this conclusion depends on the form of money illusion implied by the rigid wage assumption. If we assume instead that labor supply is more sensitive to price increases than to wage increases, the aggregate supply curve is negatively sloped, and the conventional policy multipliers are thereby reversed. In the second section, we show that this result also follows if labor supply depends on the expected real wage.     

Arms production,national defense spending and arms trade: Examining supply and demand

Scholars have estimated demand functions for national defense spending and investigated international arms trade for a long time. The relationship between supply and demand for military goods has, however, only been examined on aggregate level or in formal models yet. I investigate how the supply of military goods by arms-producing companies and the demand for military goods by both the national government and foreign governments are related by using a panel of up to 195 arms-producing companies in 21 countries for the period 2002–2016. The results show that if the demand for national defense spending increases by 1%, the arms sales by a country’s largest arms-producing companies increase by up to 1.2%. If exports of major conventional weapons increase by 1%, sales increase by up to 0.2%. Arms imports do not affect domestic arms sales because imported and domestically produced arms are complements, and countries mainly import those arms they do not produce themselves. Country-specific estimation results suggest that differences among countries in geopolitical conditions and international relations determine whether a country’s arms industry serves economic rather than security purposes.     

Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her target supply.     

The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs

There has been commentary on the seeming success of the world trading system in responding to the large shock of the 2008 financial crisis without an outbreak of retaliatory market closing. The threat of large retaliatory tariffs and fears of a 1930s style downturn in trade have been associated with numerical trade modelling, which projects post retaliation optimal tariffs in excesses of 100%. In the relevant numerical modelling, it is common to use the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity by country. Here, we argue and show by numerical calculation that the widespread use of this assumption gives a large upward bias to optimal tariffs, both first step and post retaliation, relative to alternative homogenous good models used in trade theory. The reason is that optimal tariffs equal the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity and are negatively related to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. The Armington assumption model has a much more bowed foreign offer curve, which generates unrealistic larger optimal tariffs.     

Seigniorage and public good in an OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints

This paper is a contribution to the theory of the optimal monetary policy in overlapping generations models with a cash-in-advance constraint applying on old age consumption purchases. We are particularly interested in the study of seigniorage when the latter is used to finance public goods valued by consumers. Assuming that a public good enters the utility function and the existence of cash-in-advance constraints, we find a Laffer curve of seigniorage at steady-state. We also analyze the dynamic optimal monetary policy when the government maximizes an intertemporal social welfare function and can only resort to seigniorage to finance the purchases of the public good. We show that the optimal rate of money growth may be strictly higher than the one which maximizes steady-state seigniorage: the optimal amount of seigniorage may lie on the decreasing part of the Laffer curve of seigniorage. We finally suppose that the government can use lump-sum taxes in addition to seigniorage. Then, the Friedman rule prevails and public expenditures are only financed through lump-sum taxes.     

The supply and demand for imports and exports in a simultaneous model

Previous studies on the behaviour of aggregate exports and imports have tended to ignore the simultaneous relationship between quantity and price. This paper investigates the price responsiveness of export and import demand and supply in eight African countries. The results indicate that export demand price elasticities are smaller when the sample is African. The import supply and demand elasticities were found to be generally large. The Marshall–Lerner condition of balance of payment stability is found to be easily satisfied. A positively sloped function of export supply is found to exist for a majority of countries in the sample. The average time lag of export supply is found to be about a year. The disequilibrium model is found to be more appropriate for import demand, import supply and export supply.     

HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: WHY IS SUPPLY SO PRICE INSENSITIVE?

Health spending as a percentage of gross domestic product in the U.S. economy is growing, from 5% in 1960 to about 16% in the current period, and it is predicted to grow to as much as 30% in 2050. Then why is the supply of health care in the United States so insensitive to steeply rising prices? This paper conducts an econometric study to show that high health‐care costs have an adverse impact on labor productivity, causing a negative production externality in all industries. So, can the rising cost of health‐care affect the U.S. comparative advantage? The paper seeks answers to these questions in a general equilibrium model and finds that the labor productivity shock is responsible for the sluggish or declining supply of health care. Consumers are able to afford less health care due to a possible decline in real wages. U.S. comparative advantage becomes a nonissue, provided that the equilibrium is stable in spite of a negatively sloped health‐care supply curve. Negative externality, leading to market failure, may be addressed in two alternative ways. (JEL F11, I11, I12, I18)     

The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory

It is somewhat common for heterodox economists to come to the defense of neoclassical microeconomic theory. This is due to many reasons, but perhaps the commonest one is ignorance. It seems that most heterodox economists are not aware of the many critiques or that as a collective they completely undermine neoclassical theory. The objective of the article is to dispel ignorance by using the existing criticisms to delineate a systematic critique of the core components of neoclassical microeconomic theory: the supply and demand explanation of the price mechanism and its application to competitive markets. The critique starts by examining the choices, preferences, utility functions, and demand curves, followed by examining production, costs, factor input demand functions and partial equilibrium, and ending with perfect competition and the supply curve. In the conclusion, the implications of the results will be extended to the firm and imperfectly competitive markets, and then the question whether general equilibrium theory or game theory can save neoclassical microeconomic theory.     

通过加总推出的总供给曲线

总供给曲线的推导是宏观经济学中的最重要内容之一。在大多数宏观经济模型中 ,在推导总供给曲线时 ,加总问题 (aggregationproblem)往往被忽略。一般认为 ,总供给曲线是各企业供给曲线的简单算术和或是一个代表性企业供给曲线的简单放大。但是 ,在现实中 ,各个企业是不同的。只有在非常严格的条件下 ,总供给曲线与企业供给曲线在性质上才是等价的。考虑到中国经济的制度性特点并在解决加总的一系列技术问题的基础上 ,本文推导出了在企业劳动生产率服从均匀分布情况下的总供给曲线。通过这种方法推出的总供给曲线具有许多传统总供给曲线所不具有的新性质。笔者希望本文能为进一步研究处于微观经济和宏观经济之间的往往被忽视的一块重要领域 (“中观经济领域”)做出贡献。     

DRAMs, fiber and energy compared with three models of market penetration

When a new technology is introduced in the market, this technology generally follows an S-shaped curve, especially if measured on a relative (market share) basis. Marchetti and Nakicenovic and Norton and Bass have modeled the multivariant case of various technologies introduced at different times. A new, simple and flexible model has been proposed based on potential penetration. Potential penetration is penetration on the assumption that no other new technology will enter the market. In a stable competitive environment, potential penetration curves are typically positively sloped S-curves. The new model gives a good fit in markets with a limited number of competitors, which are capable of totally cannibalizing previous generations of technologies. It also fits well with markets with many competitors in a competitive equilibrium situation. Examples are the Dynamic Random Access Memory chips (DRAMs), fiber and energy market. The new model features fewer variables compared with existing models and can readily be adapted to technological processes with time varying parameters, which is particularly important in volatile competitive markets.     

基于免疫视角的企业产权安全反应模型

参与企业产权安全反应的要素有侵权要素、识别要素和维权要素。它们所产生的行为分别叫做侵权行为、识别行为和维权行为。产权安全反应包括识别反应和维权反应。识别反应就是认识侵权行为,识别反应的结果;维权反应就是直接保护企业权益,将侵权要素逐出企业或进行阻隔。产权安全反应的速度主要由反应体系中能发挥作用的侵权要素、识别要素和维权要素共同决定。当侵权要素的浓度与识别要素的浓度比等于识别要素的平均识别力与侵权要素的平均侵权力之比时,识别要素对侵权要素的识别效率最高,产权保护也最为适度有效。     

Stock externalities,Pigovian taxation and dynamic stability

Stock externalities represent a type of consumption externality in which individual consumption of a particular good leads to production of a public bad, such as in the arms race and in the greenhouse effect. Certain of these stock externalities can be regulated by Pigovian taxation of the good that produces the externality. For others, however, depending on an ordinal property of preferences, the equilibrium becomes dynamically unstable, so it is necessary to use direct regulation to support an optimal equilibrium.     

STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A LABOUR‐MANAGED DUOPOLY

Developing a Cournot two‐stage game model with strategic capital interaction, we compare two different kinds of equilibrium in a labour‐managed (LM) duopoly. An LM firm's reaction function is negatively sloped when capital and output are simultaneously determined, while the slope of its reaction function in the second stage changes in sign depending on the magnitude of its labour‐expansion elasticity. Hence, whether the LM firms employ more capital and produce greater output at the equilibria in the two‐stage game model than at the equilibria resulting from the simultaneous selection of capital and output depends on the magnitude of their labour‐expansion elasticity.     

Public good provision rules and income distribution: Some general equilibrium calculations

A central issue in the analysis of public goods is the relationship between the optimal provision level and the distribution of income. Theoretical research has stressed the conditions under which the optimum is independent of the distribution of income. Here we focus on numerical analysis of more policy-relevant concerns. Specifically, to what extent is a given redistribution of income likely to affect the optimal level of public good supply? And how significant are the welfare costs of not adjusting public good supply when income distribution changes? We use an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model of the Australian economy and public sector to generate numerical estimates of the impacts of redistributive policies on these variables. Results suggest that the traditional separation of allocation and distribution in determining the level of public good supply may be a justifiable empirical simplification, except where very dramatic redistributions are involved.     

中国基础领域反垄断与弱势群体福利变迁

本文从宏观和微观两个层面分析了中国基础领域放松规制的趋势与弱势群体福利变迁之间的联系。基本观点是：民资参与基础领域对弱势群体福利的总体效应不明确,但蕴含着侵害弱势群体福利的风险。反垄断、放松规制和民资参与中国基础设施服务是改革的方向,但这样的改革必须以政府完善的规制体系为前提。公共决策者要独立、公正地设计出精巧的机制,寻求放松规制与普遍服务之间的平衡。     

WHO’S THE BOSS? HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN A NON‐COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK

When labour market participation influences bargaining power in a household, the male and the female labour supplies can be either positively or negatively related. If negatively related, possibilities include: ‘balance of power’, the complete dominance of one member, and circumstances where inequity persists with incomplete dominance. If effort levels are positively sloped, it is possible to have equilibrium at either high or low effort levels leading to equity. The effects of economic development and wage discrimination are also discussed.