A comparison of machine‐learning classifiers for selecting money managers

Machine‐learning algorithms have performed well on noisy datasets that are typical of financial data. This paper compares the performance of three types of machine‐learning classifier for selecting money managers. Naïve Bayes, neural network and decision tree learners were applied to a dataset of US equity managers. Although other studies have suggested that the performance of classifiers appears to be highly dependent on the nature of the problem and the dataset, the learning algorithms each had similar predictive accuracy and all outperformed by a substantial margin simple manager selection rules that are typical of the ways in which money managers and mutual funds are selected by investors. The results indicate that machine learners can be used as a decision‐support aid to improve the selection of money managers. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International mutual fund selectivity and market timing during up and down market conditions

This study examines the selectivity and market-timing ability of international mutual fund managers. Ninety-seven international mutual funds with a minimum of five-year return history selected from the Morningstar OnDisc database are analyzed. Our findings suggest that managers of international mutual funds possess good selectivity and overall performance. We also find weak evidence of poor market-timing ability. Consistent with prior findings from domestic mutual funds, there is a negative correlation between the international fund managers' selection ability and market-timing ability. Finally, managers for Europea funds show poorer performance than those managing the other three international fund groups.     

High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high‐water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high‐water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed‐form solution to the cost of the high‐water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.     

Operating Performance and Stock Returns of Firms Calling Convertible Preferred Stocks

Abstract:   Using methodologies developed by Barber and Lyon (1996 and 1997 ), we examine the long‐run operating performance and stock returns of firms around in‐the‐money calls of convertible preferred stock. Our study intends to be a direct test of the hypothesis that managers call in‐the‐money convertibles when they view a decline in the firms' performance. We find no evidence that calling firms underperform non‐calling benchmark firms. On the contrary, we find mild evidence that the post‐call operating performance of calling firms is better than a carefully selected group of benchmark firms and call firms' post‐call stock returns are no worse than benchmark firms.     

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk‐averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian mechanisms when one is well ahead, they gamble in the opposite direction when their performance is close. We also examine multiple and mixed‐strategy equilibria. Equilibrium policy of each manager crucially depends on the opponent's risk attitude. Hence, client investors concerned about how a strategic manager may trade on their behalf should also learn competitors' characteristics.     

Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge overforeign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data,we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic moneymanagers when they buy and receive less when they sell for mediumand large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantageof foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence thatdomestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors.The explanation for these results is that prices move more againstforeign investors than against domestic investors before trades.     

Asset Allocation and Selectivity of Asian Mutual Funds During Financial Crisis

This paper evaluates the ability of US-based Asian mutual fund managers in coping with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We find that the actively managed mutual funds under-perform with respect to the market portfolio by 1.71% in average monthly return. Such poor performance is caused by fund managers' relative weakness in country selection as well as in stock picking. Fund managers are also found to be more skillful in picking the correct market when the market is going up than going down. Our results are consistent with the literature that asset allocation in Asian mutual funds is a dominating factor relative to selectivity in explaining fund returns during the financial crisis. In addition, there exists a negative relation between asset allocation ability and selectivity of fund managers.     

Investor Response to Mutual Fund Policy Variables

The effects of investment performance and macro-economic influences on money flow to individual mutual funds previously have been investigated and found to provide little explanatory power. In this article we investigate an additional category of factors that may logically be thought to affect the flow of money to funds, namely, the fund policy factors over which managers have some degree of control. These are: load/no-load status, sales commission structures, minimum dollar investment levels, and expenses. We establish associations between these factors and new money flows. Several significant relationships are found. Overall, however, the policy variables we investigated explain little of the variability in new money flows. A competitive equilibrium appears to exist such that no single fund attracts new money at disproportionately high rates through its policies. Our results, like those obtained for performance and macro-economic variables, highlight the inability of mutual fund research to date to explain adequately the flow of new money to individual funds.     

How skilful are US fixed-income fund managers?

We develop a performance evaluation model that incorporates the factors proposed by Huij and Derwall (2008) and a fund-specific benchmark to analyse the performance of US fixed income funds. Using the full sample, and accounting for the possibility of false discoveries, we find that fund management companies extract most of any abnormal performance produced by their fund managers. Our sub-sample analysis indicates that after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) there was a substantial increase in the number of bond funds with: both positive gross-of-fee alpha and positive net-of-fee alpha performance; and also a reduction in funds with negative-alpha performance. However, because the GFC was such a unique event, it would still be difficult to conclude that these managers offer value for money for investors compared to passive alternatives.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

The Total Cost of Transactions on the NYSE

This paper develops a measure of execution costs (market impact) of transactions on the NYSE. The measure is the volume-weighted average price over the trading day. It yields results that are less biased than measures that use single prices, such as closes. The paper then applies this measure to a data set containing more than 14,000 actual trades. We show that total transaction costs, commission plus market impact costs, average twenty-three basis points of principal value for our sample. Commission costs, averaging eighteen basis points, are considerably higher than execution costs, which average five basis points. They vary slightly across brokers and significantly across money managers. Though brokers do not incur consistently high or low transaction costs, money managers experience persistently high or lost costs. Finally, the paper explores the possible tradeoff between commission expenditures and market impact costs. Paying higher commissions does not yield commensurately lower execution costs, even after adjusting for trade difficulty. We cannot determine whether other valuable brokerage services are being purchased with higher commission payments or whether some money managers really are inefficient consumers of brokerage trading services.     

Surplus or Deficit – Who Cares? Cross-subsidy in Colleges of Higher Education

The traditional ethos of higher education encourages the provision of a broad range of academic subjects aimed at producing overall benefits to society and the economy, rather than focusing on the provision of subjects that can achieve financial viability. Under such an ethos the existence of cross-subsidy goes largely unquestioned. However, pressures on higher education funding, combined with an increasing emphasis on accountability, performance measurement and value for money mean that attitudes to cross-subsidy may be changing. This study, which concentrates on one specific sector of higher education, i.e. colleges of higher education, consists of a pilot study at one institution and a sector-wide survey and examines the extent to which the cross-subsidy of academic departments is tolerated by senior managers. Although a number of reasons for tolerating cross-subsidy were supported by the respondents, an analysis of the results reveal much lower levels of support from the finance directors of colleges of higher education than from other senior managers.     

Data-conditioning biases,performance, persistence and flows: The case of Canadian equity funds

This study constitutes the first comprehensive examination of Canadian mutual fund performance using a dataset free of all conditioning biases. The goal is to test many of the same hypotheses which have been previously addressed using US data. The sample is carefully constructed so as to avoid not only survivorship bias but also a form of backfilling bias that exists because funds have a timing option as to when to first provide results to information vendors. The deleterious impact of both forms of bias is documented. Not unlike what has been found in the US, on average fund managers net-of-expenses underperform benchmarks, but it also seems clear that their analysis and trading contribute to portfolio performance. I also present evidence that, at least on a short-term basis, success breeds success. Investors seem aware of this since money flows to successful funds. The strategy of chasing returns looks to be a viable one. One useful byproduct of this work is that an independent dataset has allowed for the corroboration of many of the same stylized facts that have been previously observed in the US.     

The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders Compete for Flows

Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate governance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of block sale (“exit”) can be an effective governance mechanism. Many blockholders are money managers. We show that, when money managers compete for investor capital, the threat of exit loses credibility, weakening its governance role. Money managers with more skin in the game will govern more successfully using exit. Allowing funds to engage in activist measures (“voice”) does not alter our qualitative results. Our results link widely prevalent incentives in the ever‐expanding money management industry to the nature of corporate governance.     

Market Efficiency and Money Market Fund Portfolio Managers: Beliefs Versus Reality

This paper develops two models of the money market mutual fund maturity decision. The first assumes that markets are efficient but that transactions are costly. The second model relies on a survey of fund managers to select variables that might permit exploiting perceived profit opportunities. Empirical tests provide strong support for the former model, but none for the latter. This can be interpreted as meaning that although managers may believe that financial markets are inefficient, margins are too small and competition too fierce for them to react aggressively on those beliefs. Any actions they do take to exploit alleged inefficiencies are not detectable in the data. In addition, the study finds that managers in the aggregate have no special ability to adjust their funds' maturity to capitalize on interest-rate changes.     

CEO Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile Regression

We provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay‐firm size and pay‐performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high‐wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance than conditionally low‐wage managers? Our results using data over a decade show, for some standard specifications, there is considerable heterogeneity in the returns‐to‐firm performance across the conditional distribution of wages. Quantile regression adds substantially to our understanding of the pay‐performance relationship. This heterogeneity is masked when using more standard empirical techniques.     

Investor biases in Japan: Another pathology of Keiretsu

We examine how keiretsu-related institutional investors behave in the Japanese stock market relative to other investor categories for the period from 1985–1998. Based on the agency problem hypothesis for the general bias of institutional investors and the relational distance hypothesis for the unusual bias of keiretsu-affiliated money managers, this paper finds that keiretsu-affiliated money managers over-invest not only in large firms, but also in imprudent firms. The group affiliation of Japanese domestic money managers may drive their portfolio decisions towards financially weak group member firms at the expense of their client investors. Identifying the conditions for this rescue type of investment, we illustrate a rather weak corporate governance foundation of institutional money management in Japan.     

When is good news really good news?

The impression management literature suggests that managers often resort to biased disclosures. However, there is little systematic evidence on what types of strategies management uses to achieve this bias. Do managers simply lie? Or, do they use more subtle ways of introducing positive bias into corporate narratives, such as selecting specific information items which result in a more positive impression (‘selectivity’) or by keeping their narratives vague and general (‘vagueness’)? In order to differentiate between the two scenarios, I re-examine the positive forward-looking statements examined by Schleicher and Walker (2010) and compare, across firms with improving and deteriorating financial performance, the managerial choices made in relation to eight forecast attributes.

I make two observations. First, there are significant differences in the characteristics of good- and bad-news firms’ positive statements. In particular, bad-news firms’ positive statements involve more non-specific time horizons, more segmental forecasts, and more references to conditions and aims and objectives, but fewer directional forecasts, fewer numbers, and fewer reinforcing qualifiers. Second, the identified differences in good- and bad-news firms’ positive statements can be exploited for classification purposes: including into a classification model additional regressors that measure a positive forward-looking statement's level of selectivity and vagueness significantly increases the model's ability to separate firms with improving financial performance from firms with deteriorating financial performance. Overall, my results are consistent with (a) impression management operating predominantly through selectivity and vagueness and (b) selectivity and vagueness being an important signal for future financial performance.