合作策略性行为的产业组织分析

本文按信息条件将合作策略性行为分为默契合作策略性行为和明确合作策略性行为。首先介绍了默契合作策略性行为三种策略 ,然后分析了十种明确合作策略性行为的商业实践 ,最后是对合作策略性行为的公共政策评论。     

激励性管制下企业的策略性行为及其治理

激励性管制目前是西方发达国家自然垄断产业主流的管制方式,它的核心是让企业利用其信息优势和获利动机来达到管制目标。这种情况下,企业会通过采取策略性行为来获取利润。本文从俘获管制机构、降低产品或服务质量、消减高成本地区或低收入人群的服务等方面对企业的策略性行为进行分析,并结合发达国家的实践总结了这些策略性行为的治理措施。由此,对我国自然垄断产业激励性管制的应用提出了政策建议。     

存在潜在进入者的垄断厂商策略性行为探究

本文在存在潜在进入者的情形下,研究了进入成本和产品差异对垄断厂商策略性行为的影响。垄断厂商可供选择的策略包括进入封锁、进入遏制和进入容纳,究竟哪一个能够成为垄断厂商的最优策略取决于进入成本和产品差异度的大小。     

基于收入管理的顾客反应模型及策略行为分析

现有文献中的顾客购买行为模型不能直接解释收入管理中的策略型顾客行为。通过搜索和研究与行为运作、收入管理相关的文献,分析顾客的策略性学习过程、购买时机选择过程、物流风险与渠道选择过程,从收入管理角度提出一个分析顾客策略性购买行为的概念模型。分析发现,顾客在购买决策过程中表现出动态性和复杂性。应用该模型,企业可以识别顾客策略行为的影响因素并对这些因素进行分类,从而为制定有效的收入管理策略提供参考。     

多源媒体情绪传播影响了企业策略性专利行为吗？

以我国2008—2020年A股上市公司为样本,考察多源媒体积极情绪传播对企业策略性专利行为的影响。研究发现,多源媒体积极情绪传播通过管理层迎合和管理层防御机制对企业策略性专利行为产生正向影响。进一步研究表明,控股股东两权分离强化了管理层迎合效应的发挥,证监会减持新规的出台并未弱化管理层防御效应的发挥。多源媒体积极情绪传播引起的企业策略性专利行为使得企业产品竞争力和企业竞争地位下降。     

光明乳业的策略误区

“回产奶”和“早产奶”事件不仅使光明乳业的顺利发展遭受挫折,而且也使其品牌形象受到了严重影响,其根本原因在于策略上的失误,文章从危机公关、事件营销、终端促销以及产品定位四个方面详细地分析了光明乳业的策略性失误。     

论创业企业合法性及其印象管理策略

创业企业的失败率非常高,因为相比成熟企业,创业企业更难获得利益相关者的认同,即创业企业缺乏足够的合法性。合法性的构建、维系甚至重建是创业企业关注的焦点。本文认为创业企业可以通过适当的印象管理策略,获取足够的合法性。并且,通过案例深入分析了长三角地区创业企业印象管理策略性行为及其对合法性的效用。案例研究表明:创业企业实施了适当的印象管理策略性行为后可以获取足够的合法性,避免失败。     

基于治理结构的农村社区性公共产品供给合作行为研究

农村社区性公共产品供给行为发生在一个特定的环境中,决定于村民、村民委员会、乡镇政府间的合作水平。村民委员会在农村社区性公共产品供给过程中扮演着代理人、当家人的双重角色,是农村社区公共产品的组织者,居于核心位置,其合作行为直接影响和制约着农村社区性公共产品供给的配置效率和组织效率。本文以行为主体的关系结构为基本研究视角,采用结构分析方法,将现有农村社区治理结构界定为垂直治理和水平治理的综合体,以农村社区公共产品供给行为是嵌入在现实的社区治理结构中的合作性行为,与农村社区的治理结构密切相关为基本预设,建构起了一个基本的合作行为分析框架,对不同治理结构下的合作行为进行了解释。     

文化传统意识影响对外并购成效

资金和技巧是策略性影响,文化传统意识是战略性影响。中国企业对外资的并购,从20世纪80年代中期以来,曾有过四次峰潮。第四次峰潮从2002年中国入世     

财务保守行为与企业可持续发展——以“张裕”为例

财务保守行为是指企业在较长一段时间内持续采用低财务杠杆的财务政策的一种行为。20世纪80年代中期以来，许多研究都表明产品市场竞争特性会使企业的财务行为趋于保守，而财务杠杆又会对企业在产品市场竞争中的投资能力、产品定价行为和业绩产生重要影响。本文拟以烟台张裕葡萄酿酒股份有限公司（简称张裕）为例，考察其面临的竞争环境和产品竞争状况，分析其是否存在以及是否应该采取财务保守行为，进而探求在竞争环境中，     

浅谈第三方物流企业核心能力的培育

主要研究了第三方物流企业核心能力的表现和培育。阐述了第三方物流企业只有从自身的特点出发，结合具体的战略实施，培育最为稳定、最有竞争性、最不易为竞争对手获得的独特“战略资产”，才能获得长久的竞争优势。     

Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short‐term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long‐term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade‐off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.     

Categorizing risks in seven large projects—Which risks do the projects focus on?

In a hierarchy of project objectives, strategic objectives will often be principally different from the operational ones. Operational objectives concern the project outputs/results, and strategic objectives concern the project goal and purpose. In this study, risks are categorized as risks to operational, long‐term, or short‐term strategic objectives, and, by studying a dataset of some 1,450 risk elements that make up the risk registers of seven large projects, we examine how operational and strategic risks are distributed in the projects. The study strongly indicates that risks to a project's strategic objectives rarely occur in the project's risk registers, though project success and failure stories indicate their importance.     

Dynamic competitive retail pricing behavior with uncertainty and learning

When competing retailers lack full information about rivals' decision processes, how will dynamic pricing behavior vary from patterns observed in more traditional static or full-information models? We investigate this question in a dynamic alternating-moves duopoly model. Retailers update (linear) conjectures about rivals' future prices in a Bayesian fashion. We show that as observed and expected prices converge, a pricing equilibrium is always achieved, whether or not the conjectured and actual values of the slope of the rival's best response function are consistent. Assuming specific parameter values, we compare equilibrium prices and associated profits in our Bayesian learning model with those obtained under the assumptions of static Nash behavior, collusive behavior and dynamically optimal behavior with full information. We apply the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity to the analysis and find that when products are strategic complements, conjectures of higher rival price responsiveness lead to higher steady-state prices and profits. The reverse is true for strategic substitutes. We also find that learning about a rival's behavior proceeds more quickly, the less intensely related in demand are products. We find, in general, that equilibrium pricing patterns and profits can vary considerably from those in full-information environments, but that even with grossly wrong beliefs about rival behavior, competing retailers are still attracted to an equilibrium. The analysis suggests not only the value of investigating lessthan-full information situations but also the potential incremental value of signalling greater or less aggressiveness than truly characterizes one's behavior as a strategic option.     

The intrapreneurial employee: toward an integrated model of intrapreneurship and research agenda

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - The intrapreneurial behavior of employees has become of strategic importance for the performance of organizations. However, the literature on...     

Firm-strategic behavior with industry-demand externalities

This paper investigates the effects of industry-demand externalities on the firm's strategic decision making, with an industry-demand externality being defined as a change in industry demand resulting from the efforts of a particular firm to develop, advertise or price a particular product. Profit-maximization models of the firm's strategic behavior that incorporate industry-demand externalities created by a particular firm and the competitive responses of its rivals reveal that the presence of such an externality serves as an incentive for the firm to engage in the form of strategic behavior that generates the externality.     

The concept of stable strategic time periods in strategic group research

This paper briefly reviews previous research on strategic groups and concludes that the concept needs further refinement. In particular, strategic grouping studies have typically ignored the influence of time on competitive strategy and have assumed homogeneity in strategic behavior over the time period researched. Therefore, a general analytical method is proposed in order to identify time periods of similarity in strategic behavior—so-called stable strategic time periods. It is argued that following the identification of stable strategic time periods meaningful strategic groupings of companies within industries can be derived and further analysis of the dynamics of strategic group shifts can be performed.     

Strategic Buying to Prevent Seller Exit

We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first‐period purchase decision not only depends on current period preferences and prices, but also on the potential effect that their behavior has on the probability of seller survival. Specifically, some buyers may choose to purchase from the seller with the lower survival probability even though they like the other seller's product better, a behavior that we call “strategic buying.” We analyze how the incidence of strategic buying depends on parameters and also the implications of the strategic buying motive for sellers' first‐period pricing decisions.     

企业战略控制探析

企业战略是从全局来对企业具体生产经营过程进行科学的、合理的安排与筹划,具有长期性、整体性、时期性特征,战略环境和前提的转化会导致旧战略的消亡和新战略的产生。要使企业战略管理中各项活动能够顺利进行和协调发展,必须构建一个合理有效的、制度化的集团战略管理体系。本文主要从战略控制的起源、环境与战略控制的关系、战略控制与组织绩效关系、战略风险与战略控制关系、财务控制与战略控制关系、董事会与战略控制关系、战略控制程序、战略控制方法这八个方面对企业战略控制理论进行阐述。战略控制是高层次的管理控制,它受到公司治理主体的影响,关注的是长期的、具有战略意义的问题。