《反垄断法》对汽车行业可能的影响

全国人大于去年通过了已经酝酿十三年之久的《反垄断法》，于今年8月1日实施。中国反垄断法律体系构建的主要目的应针对三类垄断行为：行政垄断、自然垄断企业垄断和在华跨国公司垄断。在对前两类垄断行为的规制语焉不详的情况下，其实就凸显出对在华跨国公司垄断行为的反制意图。另外，在规制滥用垄断地位实施限制竞争行为方面，《反垄断法》仍可能将对汽车行业产生多方面影响。     

《反垄断法》与中国石油石化业的发展

今年8月30日。十届全国人大常委会第二十九次会议通过了《反垄断法》。这部法律将从明年8月1日起施行。《反垄断法》，顾名思义，就是反对垄断和保护竞争的法律制度。它是市场经济国家基本的法律制度。我国出台《反垄断法》的目的，就是要创造一个公平竞争的市场环境，这是我国政府依法维持市场经济秩序的一个重要举措。反对垄断、提倡竞争是经济体制改革必须要解决的问题。     

规制与豁免：电网企业视野中的反垄断法适用解读

<反垄断法>的出台,在制度基础上完善了我国的竞争法律体系.对限制和妨碍竞争的行为规制将有助于我国市场功能的发挥,也是对经济民主和民生诉求的回应.作为传统自然垄断行业,电网企业如何正确理解和适用<反垄断法>意义重大.电网企业一方面要善于利用法律保护国有经济占控制地位、关系国民经济命脉和国家安全的行业及其合法经营活动;另一方面要重点防范或治理自身可能存在的滥用市场支配地位行为,实现依法经营.     

合法竞争防范风险

经过13年的酝酿，《中华人民共和国反垄断法》（以下简称反垄断法）于2007年8月30日在十届全国人大常委会第二十九次会议上获得通过，将于2008年8月1日起开始实施。至此。反垄断法与1993年制订的反不正当竞争法共同构成了我国的竞争法律制度（还包括价格法的部分内容）。有序竞争是市场经济的命脉所在，以反垄断法为核心的竞争法律制度的完善。必将有力维护市场经济的竞争秩序，促进企业间的有序竞争，推进我国市场经济的建设。     

我国反垄断法对企业兼并的规制

兼并是市场集中和企业成长的途径之一。反垄断法中的企业兼并,也有人称之为合并,它并非一般经济意义上的兼并,而是指从数家独立的企业组成一个永久性统一体的过程,并且这一统一过程在实质上限制竞争。企业兼并经历了横向兼并、纵向兼并和混合兼并三个阶段、三种形式。经济意义上的兼并并非法律禁止的对象。由于企业兼并可以扩大生产和经营规模,实现规模经济,提高市场竞争力,因而适当的企业兼并是法律允许的,它对宏观经济和微观经济都是有利的。一、西方发达市场经济国家反垄断法中企业兼并的内涵对企业兼并进行法律规制的思想来源于西方。在…     

竞争政策与企业劳动收入份额——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验

在高质量发展中实现共同富裕应重视初次收入分配的效率与公平，而中国收入分配不平等现象依然存在。《反垄断法》作为竞争政策顶层设计的制度安排，将推动“有为政府”与“有效市场”更好结合，并对企业初次收入分配产生重要影响。本文构建理论模型，刻画竞争政策通过要素市场与产品市场影响劳动收入份额的内在机理，并利用《反垄断法》实施这一准自然实验，实证检验了竞争环境改善对企业劳动收入份额的影响。结果发现，《反垄断法》实施显著提升了高垄断企业的劳动收入份额，并且随着反垄断执法强度加大，其对高垄断企业劳动收入份额的提升作用愈加明显。机制分析表明，《反垄断法》实施对收入分配的影响主要通过要素市场上的要素组成效应与产品市场上的成本加成效应等途径来实现。进一步研究发现，《反垄断法》实施在提升资源配置效率、促进高质量发展的同时，提升了普通员工收入份额、缩小了企业内部收入差距，兼顾了共同富裕。本文研究丰富了《反垄断法》实施的政策效果评估相关文献，为国家达成高质量发展中实现共同富裕的战略目标提供政策启示。     

后产业组织时代的市场特性研究

“抑制规模垄断、促进市场竞争活力”是各国产业组织政策长期以来致力于解决的问题，也是产业组织理论研究的核心问题。结构学派和效率学派的主要分歧正是在抑制集中度，重视结构绩效和忽略集中度，追求行为效率方面各有侧重。今天，经济全球化和活跃的技术变革，改变着市场边界和市场竞争关系，单纯的大规模不再构成市场垄断的主要力量，我们进入了后产业组织时代。新时期的竞争关系和市场垄断特征，应该是我国正在制定中的反垄断法的主要依据。     

医药行业的垄断行为是否需要打击

自我国建立起市场经济以来，反对市场垄断行为、促进市场参与者充分竞争就开始进入立法的议题。一些内容在1993年出台的《反不正当竞争法》中已有所体现。2008年施行的《反垄断法》满足了我国市场机制发展的需要。     

《反垄断法》对电网企业的影响

《中华人民共和国反垄断法》（以下简称《反垄断法》）的出台,对于预防和制止垄断行为,保护市场公平竞争,提高经济运行效率,维护消费者利益和社会公共利益,促进经济健康发展,都将起到积极作用。     

谈企业竞争策略

谈企业竞争策略王世华竞争是现代市场经济运行中的重要经济机制，它反映了商品生产者和经营者之间以市场为中心，为获取各自经济利益而发生的一种经济行为，它是市场运行的动力。我国实行的是社会主义市场经济．企业竞争必不可免。企业要在竞争中取得优势．赢得胜利，就要...     

A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

We identify in this paper the sources and types of administrative monopoly and the possible harms that administrative monopoly causes to the Chinese economy in its current institutional environment. We review the arguments for and against the inclusion of provisions on administrative monopoly in the ambit of the Anti-Monopoly Law and explain the weaknesses of such provisions. After analyzing the clauses against administrative monopoly in some countries?? antitrust laws and two recent litigation cases on administrative monopoly in China, we detail the challenges in practicing anti-administrative monopoly law and provide a number of suggestions as to how the law and its enforcement can be improved.     

Network effects and merger analysis: instant messaging and the AOL–Time Warner case

The AOL–Time Warner merger, announced in January 2000, was and still is the largest merger ever consummated. The merger plan was submitted to the FTC for antitrust review and to the FCC for license transfer review. The FTC approved the merger with conditions relating to open access. The FCC approved the merger subject to a condition (among others) that mandated interoperability for future (but not present) generations of AOL's popular instant messaging (IM) service, based on the potential leveraging of merger assets together with current IM network effects into market power in next-generation IM services. This condition was controversial and represents a new departure in antitrust analysis for industries imbued with network effects. This paper analyzes AOL's IM service and the ability to leverage merger assets into future market power in the context of the FCC condition; counter-arguments are considered and larger lessons for “new economy” antitrust are drawn from this experience and analysis.     

The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets

In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platform-specific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, that the CW standard is capable of addressing the economic concerns that critics have raised, and that the proposed alternatives would make things worse—not better.

     

结构重组、规制滞后与纵向圈定——中国电信、联通“反垄断”案例的若干思考

以反垄断机构对中国电信和中国联通两家公司,在互联网骨干网接入环节"接入歧视行为"的反垄断调查为线索,本文的经验研究发现,2007年中国电信产业重组后所形成的不对称寡头垄断结构,使部分一体化运营商在接入和互联环节获得了一定的垄断势力,可以通过接入的价格或质量歧视,对上下游的竞争者产生一定的圈定效应。这种行为由于获得了行业规制者的许可,也限制了《反垄断法》发挥作用的范围和效力。     

Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic Efficiency

Review of Industrial Organization - This paper addresses the rationale for antitrust legislation. It is a striking fact that the legitimacy of antitrust law has been taken for granted inthe United...     

The Supreme Court and Beer Mergers: From <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pabst/Blatz</Emphasis> to the DOJ–FTC Merger Guidelines

The beer industry in the U.S. has undergone significant structural change in the post-WWII period. The industry also was the object of prominent antitrust challenges to horizontal mergers proposed during this time frame. This paper documents the trend of increasing seller concentration in the brewing industry and assesses the role that mergers played in this structural transformation. We also analyze the change in merger policy that has taken place since the Supreme Court originally addressed mergers in the beer industry as compared to current antitrust enforcement under the DOJ–FTC Merger Guidelines and recent judicial decisions.     

邮政产业属性界定及其政策含义

本文认为,邮政产业的信函传递网、实物配送网、邮政汇兑网不存在显著的纵向关联;长途信函传递网具有一定的规模经济与较弱的范围经济性,而实物配送网与邮政汇兑网则不具有进入与退出的壁垒,邮政产业不具有自然垄断形成的条件。这一理论的实践含义是邮政产业的重组改革不宜简单采用电信重组的以拆分为主要形式的反托拉斯政策,而应对邮政实行三网分离的分类管制政策。     

The NCAA and the Rule of Reason

This brief essay considers the use of antitrust’s rule of reason in assessing challenges to rule-making by the NCAA. In particular, it looks at the O’Bannon case, which involved challenges to NCAA rules that limit the compensation of student athletes under the NCAA rubric that protects the “amateur” status of collegiate athletes. Within that rubric, the Ninth Circuit got the right answer. That outcome leads to a broader question, however: Should the NCAA’s long held goal, frequently supported by the courts, of preserving athletic amateurism be jettisoned? Given the dual role that colleges play, that is a complex question, which raises issues that are not only commercial but also educational. More important for the purpose at hand, is whether jettisoning amateurism in NCAA athletics is a suitable task for an antitrust tribunal. This paper argues that antitrust law is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing that issue. This does not mean that antitrust has no role to play in policing athlete compensation in NCAA schools. But it does suggest that that role be limited to addressing restraints on trade that occur within the rubric of amateur status—at least until such time as a more competent body decides whether amateurism in collegiate athletics is worth preserving.     

The FTC in the 1980s

This paper reviews the antitrust activities of Federal Trade Commission during the 1980s with special emphasis on the role of economics and economists. We contrast the FTC during the 1980s to its record in the 1970s and conclude that the agency was more active during the 1980s than is popularly believed. Perhaps more significant than changes in the level of enforcement activity was the agency's move to a more economics-oriented approach to antitrust enforcement and an increased role for Commission economists. The paper also comments on what FTC economists learned about American industry during the 1980s.     

Price uncertainty and output concentration

This paper conducts an empirical investigation to assess the impact of price uncertainty on industry output concentration. Results show that greater price uncertainty leads to greater output concentration; the result is robust to controls for technological factors, barriers to entry effects and other industry controls. The empirical results are consistent with theory which shows that depending on firms attitudes towards risk, output concentration is likely to be endogenous to price uncertainty. Our empirical finding suggests that examining the magnitude of uncertainty could be a useful additional criteria in antitrust policymaking.