Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion

Income tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard optimal tax problem in which there is a good whose sales are observable. If the penalty for evasion is proportional to the tax evaded (the Yitzhaki scheme), the optimal tax structure is unaffected by evasion. If the penalty is proportional to unreported income (the Allingham–Sandmo scheme), it is efficient to tax both the observable good and income. The cost of the risk of tax evasion is traded off against the distortion from taxing the observable good. For equal penalties, Allingham/Sandmo is more efficient than Yitzhaki.     

Tax Evasion and Limited Liability

Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) suggest that imposing very high penalties for tax evasion is not possible under bankruptcy or limited liability constraints. In this paper, we complement their suggestion by showing that, in the presence of these constraints, imposing very high penalties can make an economy Pareto worse‐off. This result helps provide a further insight into why governments typically do not set very high penalties for tax evasion in practice. Implications for optimal deterrence policies in the context of tax evasion are also explored.     

逃税的经济学分析

本文运用对伊兹哈基模型的推导,把分析建立在如何缩小申报收入同真实收入的差距上,指出了对逃税水平变化有重要意义的四个变量:所得水平、税率、发现的概率和罚款率。在社会经济中建立一种能促进所得水平显性化机制,比较容易查出逃税行为。逃税对整个经济具有三方面影响。     

Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion

We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough.     

我国逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税作为一种信息不对称状态下的机会主义行为,在各个国家普遍存在。在转轨经济背景下,我国逃税现象更为严重,它给我们的资源配置及收入分配均带来负面影响。本文在介绍评价A-S经典模型的基础上,结合我国国情,从逃税心理成本的角度拓展了A-S模型的内容,从而更好地解释了我国的逃税现象并据此提出治理逃税行为的政策建议。     

税收流失中的双委托-多代理问题

本文首次给出了税收流失问题中的多委托—多代理模型分析框架,并将政府、国税局和地税局、纳税人置于统一的博弈框架下,作为博弈的三方进行讨论。只要政府给国税局和地税局以适当的激励,政府仍然能设计出让纳税人"诚实"申报的显示机制;国税局和地税局作为税收征管者和纳税人之间的博弈可以看成是一个双委托—代理问题,此时税收征收上的"正外部性"和税收监菅上的"搭便车"效应将是双委托—代理问题中的新现象。     

Global Capital Tax as a Tool to Reduce Tax Evasion

International Advances in Economic Research -     

Income Tax Evasion in a Unionised Labour Market

Labour market outcomes can depend on tax evasion since the returns from working are affected by the amount of taxes paid. In this paper, unionised workers are assumed to select the income which they declare. The rational trade union takes this decision into account. It is shown that the employment effects of a linear income tax are not altered qualitatively by tax evasion if the fine for evasion is a function only of the evaded tax. Moreover, the consequences of changes in the tax enforcement system are determined by the ability to choose evasion activities optimally. The existence of unrestricted tax evasion opportunities lowers wages.     

Evasion Effects of Changing the Tax Mix*

This study assesses claims that shifting toward greater indirect taxes will reduce evasion, thereby improving the distribution of real net incomes and generating a 'fiscal dividend'. Practical considerations suggest that industry sectors which evade income taxes will also be strongly inclined to evade indirect taxes on their output. A general equilibrium analysis finds that changing the tax mix will have little or none of the claimed anti–evasion or distributional effects. Increased indirect taxes on evaders' consumption purchases will be shifted onto suppliers in the compliant sector. Evaders will end up evading less income taxes but evading more indirect taxes     

Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: the Case of Interest Taxation in Europe

This paper uses a game–theoretic approach to analyse the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows us to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non-cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate, but in equilibrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, tax competition leads to less tax evasion.     

纳税人偷税行为原因分析与对策

对于不法纳税人的偷税问题 ,应从纳税人作为“经济人”、“社会人”、“道德人”三个角度出发 ,分析偷税行为产生的深层次原因 ,在此基础上采取诸如加强税务制度与队伍建设、提高惩罚成本、建立公平的税收体系、培养纳税人纳税道德、用税收信息化手段建立舆论监督机制等相应措施 ,借以对不法纳税人的偷税行为进行治理。     

税务违章行为辨析--论偷税、漏税、欠税、抗税的政策界定

我国现行税法对各种税务违章行为的界定极不严密,给实际违章鉴定工作留下许多可以“灵活”解释的余地。国家应进一步修改和完善《税收征管法》,重新明确界定各种税务违章行为,改变“偷税＝漏税＝欠税＝抗税”的状况,以确保税收征管的客观性和准确性,切实维护国家和纳税人的合法权益。     

A Tax Evasion Model with Allowance for Retroactive Penalties*

Discrete models of tax evasion are considered when evasion has occurred over a period of several years. Allowance is made for growth in income, investment of illicit gains from successful evasion, and the imposition of retroactive penalties. Retroactive penalties increase deterrence of evasion if introduced at a point where evasion has been continuing for some years, since the utility gain from continuing successful evasion is unaffected, whereas the utility loss will be increased regardless of attitude to risk. Prohibitive penalty rates are determined, and a range of penalty rates are given in which some dishonest taxpayers may become honest. The formulation of the basic model and consequent conclusions are relevant to the current Australian taxation scene.     

试论走私犯罪偷逃税额核定的法律冲突

一、概述 2000年9月20日．最高人民法院审判委员会通过《最高院关于审理走私刑事案件应用法律若干问题的解释》,该解释第六条规定,走私货物、物品所偷逃的应缴税额。应当以走私行为案发时所适用的税则、税率、汇率和海关审定的完税价格计算,并以海关出具的证明为准。这一规定将海关审价和计税工作推到了刑事斗争的前沿。2002年7月8日,最高人民法院、最高人民检察院和海关总署印发《办理走私刑事案件适用法律若干问题的意见》进一步规定,在办理走私普通货物、物品刑事案件中,对走私行为人涉嫌偷逃应缴税额的核定,应当由走私案件管辖地的海关出具《涉嫌走私的货物、物品偷逃税款海关核定证明书》,海关出具的《核定证明书》经走私犯罪侦查机关、人民检察院、人民法院审查确认,     

个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进及对我国的启示

个人所得税的逃税问题是我国当前税收征管的一大难题。纳税人的逃税决策受到税率、未申报所得或未纳税额、查处概率、罚款力度、以及纳税人的风险厌恶程度和税收隐瞒技术等因素的影响。早期的个人所得税逃税模型主要着重于纳税人与政府强制征税能力的博弈分析,最近的文献则主要对包括税收隐瞒技术在内的更一般的模型进行了分析。本文的目的在于综合述评西方个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进和最新发展,并籍此提出该理论在中国的应用。     

契约理论框架下的企业逃税问题研究

本文以契约理论为切入点对企业逃税行为进行分析,通过在企业所有者和经营者合谋逃税活动中引入线性激励的"可自我执行的协议",构建了一个逃税模型来研究企业逃税主体的决策行为。结果表明:经理人风险态度、逃税边际成本和逃税风险是影响纳税人逃税行为决策的重要因素。     

房地产企业避税行为的会计思考

房地产行业的迅猛发展为国民生产总值的增长做出了积极的贡献,但是反观房地产税收的增长情况不难发现两者之间的发展存在不协调之处。本文从会计制度和房地产税收制度的缺失入手,剖析房地产企业避税行为,并从制度改进的角度提出相应的对策。     

推行预约定价制,有效遏制跨国公司利用关联交易避税

预约定价制以事先确认制度代替了传统转让定价的事后调整制度。由于其无以比拟的优点,预约定价制成为近年来转让定价税制中发展最快的一个领域。我国由于跨国公司滥用转让定价所造成的损失非常严重,因此,应参考发达国家的预约定价规则和做法,制定适合我国国情的预约定价制度,并全面推行之,以有效遏制跨国公司利用关联交易避税行为。