China's Belt and Road Initiative: Can Europe Expect Trade Gains?

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to improve cross‐border infrastructure to reduce transportation costs across a massive geographical area between China and Europe. We estimate how much trade might be created among Belt and Road (B&R) countries as a consequence of the reduction in transportation costs (both railway and maritime) and find that European Union countries, especially landlocked countries, will benefit considerably. This is also true for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, South‐East Asia. In contrast, if China were to seek to establish a free trade area within the B&R region, EU member states would benefit less, while Asia would benefit more. Xi Jinping's current vision for the B&R, centered on improving transport infrastructure, is advantageous for Europe as far as trade creation is concerned.     

Trade Policy Versus Competition Policy: Substitutes or Complements?

This paper deals with the difference between trade policy and competition policy for domestic prices, wages, and employment when product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive. We show that in the presence of country-specific institutions like trade unions, trade policy and competition policy are no longer substitutes in disciplining product and labour market distortions. While both domestic entry and foreign imports affect domestic price-cost margins, they differ in their effectiveness and their impact on the domestic labour market. The results in this paper suggest that enforcement of competition policy without a sufficient degree of openness to imports is typically not a first-best outcome. While domestic entry increases union welfare, foreign imports reduce it. Competition policy in the presence of labour unions is insufficient to reduce labour market distortions, while international competition reduces both labour and product distortions.     

International Trade and Bank Groups: Welfare Enhancing or Welfare Reducing?

In international competition, are bank groups efficiency enhancing or efficiency reducing? This paper attempts to clarify this issue by asking instead: efficiency for whom? In a simple, illustrative model, this paper shows that bank groups can be efficiency enhancing for the bank and the member firms, but hurting its competitor. More important global welfare rises with bank groups. These results are robust when we allow the bank and the member firm to bargain over its loan rate, when bank groups can be formed endogenously and when there are multiple exporters. Results in this paper suggest alternative interpretations of existing econometric results concerning the role of Japanese groups in U.S.–Japan trade. J. Japan. Int. Econ., June 2002, 16(2) pp. 212–226. Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California.     

China's ‘New Normal’: Is the growth slowdown demand- or supply-driven?

China's ‘New Normal’ has been much discussed in recent years. An important aspect of the New Normal is the growth slowdown from levels of around 10% per annum to a more modest 6 or 7%. Not surprisingly, there has been widespread discussion of whether the slowdown is permanent or not and, in either case, what the sources of the slowdown are. However, much of this discussion has been based on informal analysis of the data rather than formal econometric results. We make a move in the direction of formal empirical analysis of this issue by estimating and simulating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model which distinguishes between demand, supply and foreign shocks as possible drivers of changes in economic growth. We analyse both two-variable (growth and inflation) and three-variable (foreign growth, domestic growth and inflation) VAR models and identify demand, supply and foreign shocks, using a modification of the Blanchard-Quah identification procedure. In the two-variable model we identify two shocks (demand and supply) and find that the slowdown since the GFC has been mainly supply-driven. This conclusion is not changed when a foreign growth variable is added to the model and a foreign shock is allowed for – we find that demand continues to be of relatively little importance, that the foreign shock also makes little contribution to explaining the long-run growth decline in China which continues to be driven by long-term supply factors. This conclusion is robust to a number of alternative formulations of the model. Thus, the growth slowdown may, indeed, be characterised as the ‘New Normal’.     

Are Financial Development and Trade Openness Complements or Substitutes?

This article studies the long‐ and short‐run relationships between financial development and trade openness. Using the pooled mean group estimator of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) for unbalanced panel data for 87 countries over the 1960–2005 period, our empirical results indicate that long‐run complementarity between financial development and trade openness coexists with short‐run substitutionarity between the two policy variables. But when splitting the data into OECD and non‐OECD country groups, this finding can be observed only in non‐OECD countries. For OECD countries, financial development has negligible effects on trade. In addition, we find nonlinearity in the relationship in that long‐run responses of trade decrease with financial development. The article further finds coexistence of negative trade effects of financial fragility and positive trade impacts of financial depth.     

How Does Trade Openness Affect Regional Demographic Transitions? Evidence from China's Provincial Panel Data

This paper investigates the effect of trade openness and other variables on the demographic transition in China using the instrumental variables regression method based on provincial panel data for the period between 1981 and 2013. The results indicate that trade openness is one of the determinants of China's demographic transition and has two distinct effects: (i) an income effect that accelerated the demographic transition by increasing per capita income; and (ii) a human capital effect that suppressed the demographic transition by reducing human capital accumulation. The effects of trade on demographic transition vary across different regions. This study identifies the important determinants of demographic transition in China's regions, and has rich policy implications for demographic transition and the upgrading of trade structure.     

China's Free Trade Agreements Unlocking the "Hidden" Cost Savings

The China price is reshaping how and where products are manufactured in today’s global economy．With China’s abundant workforce and Iow cost structure,products with the Made in China IabeI can be produced for a fraction of the costs incurred in other countries．GIobaI consumers have come to expect lower prices as a result．     

Why privatize or why not? Empirical evidence from China's SOEs reform

Using a firm-level panel dataset which covers over 50,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across China for the years 1998 to 2003, we attempt to answer the question of why some SOEs are privatized while others remain under state control. By applying a Heckman two-stage procedure, we investigate the causes that determine SOE privatization outcome. We find that the factors most conducive for privatization are the rise of competition, the increase of FDI concentration of both industries and provinces, and the hardening of SOEs' budget constraints. Moreover, it is shown that relatively better performing SOEs, measured by per employee value-added, profitability, and export propensity, are more prone to privatization. However, we should be careful in interpreting this result, due to the problem of selection bias. Results of the first-stage selection equation suggest that many small and non-performing SOEs dropped out of the sample, possibility due to privatization. What we can conclude is that, among the remainders, the better performing SOEs are more likely to be privatized.     

China's explicit social security debt: How large?

Local governments in China have used a large amount of funds from individual accounts to finance deficits in the pay-as-you-go social pooling account, resulting in explicit social security debt. It is undoubtedly useful to know how large the debt is and how it will evolve in the future. This paper assesses the debt in China's social security individual accounts. It shows detailed calculations of the revenue, the anticipated funds, expenditures, and the debt in the individual accounts since their inception in 1997. The social security debt for China reached 1.59% of the GDP in 2015. The paper also assesses the historical social security debt in the individual accounts for each province. It shows that social security debt is unevenly spread, reaching more than 10% in Heilongjiang province and being negative in Guangdong province in 2015. The determinants for high debt in the individual accounts are examined based on the data from thirty-one Chinese provinces from 1997 to 2015. The paper also forecasts social security debt in the future and finds that the social security debt will reach over 8% of GDP in 2025 if the current system remains unchanged. Various ways to reduce the social security debt are also explored.     

China's oil product pricing mechanism: What role does it play in China's macroeconomy?

The oil product pricing mechanism is a regulation system that was introduced in the late 1990s to control the oil product prices in China. For the first time to our knowledge, we provide an empirical evaluation of this regulation system, with a particular focus on its role in China's macroeconomy. Based on monthly data between 2000 and 2013, we find that: (i) contrary to the general public's impression, the mechanism is ‘fair’ overall in the sense that it responds to the rise and fall of international oil price symmetrically; (ii) the effect of the mechanism on the Chinese economy, however, is very limited; and (iii) the limited effect of the mechanism holds for different levels of regulation during the studied period, suggesting that potential deregulation may have little impact on the economy.     

Are China's Farms Growing?

China's agricultural sector faces challenges because most farms are still small scale. China's policy is to encourage the consolidation of farms and promote farms that are larger in scale. A question that arises is: Are China's farms growing? The goal of the present paper is to determine whether large farms in China have emerged or if farms remain small. To meet this goal, we systematically document the trends in the operational sizes of China's farms and measure the determinants of changes in farm size. Using a nationally representative dataset, the study shows that in 2013 China's farming sector was still mostly characterized by small‐scale farms. However, at the same time, there is an emerging class of middle‐sized and larger‐sized farms. Most large farms are being run by households but there is a set of large farms that are company/cooperative‐run. Today, farmers on larger farms are younger and better educated than the average farmer.     

Whether to Abolish or Introduce Dual Regulation as Trade and Environmental Policy?

China, which has already introduced an environmental tax in an effort to decarbonize, has recently begun emissions trading and is using two environmental policies in tandem, but there are concerns about the impact on growth and trade. Trade and environmental policies affect firms' entry and exit, resulting in changes in aggregate productivity and pollution emissions. This study compares the impacts of single regulation and dual regulation on welfare, using a research-and-development based growth model with heterogeneous firms. Under single regulation, the cleansing effect of trade liberalization could be undermined. Under dual regulation, trade liberalization decreases pollution and improves average productivity whereas decreasing total permits reduces pollution. From the perspective of improving welfare it is desirable to choose dual regulation because trade liberalization can reduce total pollution emissions via the cleansing effect of trade liberalization.     

Are China's Exports Crowding Out or Being Crowded Out? Evidence from Japan's Imports

Previous studies have investigated whether Chinese exports have crowded out those from other countries. However, what has yet to be considered is the evidence based on different quality varieties. Using the most detailed Harmonized System 9‐digit product‐level data, the present paper provides evidence of crowding‐out and crowded‐out effects across different product quality segments and across manufacturing sectors by quality segments. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that the crowding‐out effects of Chinese exports have been greatest at the lower end of the quality spectrum but less significant at the higher quality spectrum. Moreover, since 2007, China's own exports of lower quality manufactured goods have been increasingly crowded out. The key policy implication is that China's export path is in line with that taken by other Asian economies in previous decades; the crowded‐out effect could achieve win–win outcomes for countries involved; and lower income countries would do well to be open to receive those relocated low value‐added industries from China. However, the relocation policy in China is best implemented gradually as climbing up the product quality ladder takes time.     

Has China's Housing Production Peaked?

China's real estate has been a key engine of its sustained economic expansion. This paper argues, however, that even before the COVID‐19 shock, a decades‐long housing boom had given rise to severe price misalignments and regional supply–demand mismatches, making an adjustment both necessary and inevitable. We make use of newly available and updated data sources to analyze supply–demand conditions in the fast‐moving Chinese economy. The imbalances are then compared to benchmarks from other economies. We conclude that the real estate sector is quite vulnerable to a sustained aggregate growth shock, such as COVID‐19 might pose. In our baseline calibration, using input–output tables and taking account of the very large footprint of housing construction and real estate related sectors, the adjustment to a decline in housing activity can easily trim a cumulative 5–10 percent from the level of output over a period of years.