论我国劳动关系契约化中的正式约束与非正式约束

由于我国社会习俗、文化、价值观等非正式约束与正式约束的不匹配,导致《劳动合同法》的实施效果不尽如人意,这些非正式约束的限制主要表现在:关系经济降低了正式劳动合约的作用;集体主义制约了正式契约关系的拓展;等级制不利于建立平等的劳动契约关系;人治不利于劳动契约按法律的手段有效实施。正式制度只有在与非正式制度相容的情况下才能发挥作用,我国劳动关系契约化中正式约束与非正式约束不相适应会带来一些问题,主要表现在:它将影响我国社会从身份到契约的进程;影响我国《劳动合同法》的实施及其效果;它使劳动合同的作用难以发挥。     

关子“诚信征税”的一点制度经济学思考

文章将运用新制度经济学的理论和方法对我国征税人“诚信”缺失现象进行解释，并据此提出实施非正式约束制度和正式约束制度及其实施机制创新。     

用机制约束人力资本

知识经济时代，人力资本发挥的作用日益显著。加入WTO以后，跨国公司将对中国实施拉人力资本的战略。因此中国必须采取更有利于中国企业发展的，人力资本的政策，要建立对人力资本的约束机制。人力资本指的是职业经理人和技术创新人。对于人力资本的约束机制可分为内部约束和外部约束两个部分。 所谓内部约束，就是当事人双方的约束，企业和人力资本之间的相互约束。在现实中有五条措施可以考虑：首先是公司章程。遗憾的是，我们国家的公司章程根本没有约束人力资本这种功能，都是按工商局的摹本一写了事，应付差事，根本没有把公司章程…     

完善法人治理结构健全激励约束机制

完善法人治理结构 ,重点在于建立人力资本的激励机制和人力资本的约束机制。人力资本的激励机制如何建立 ,这是新的法人治理结构中首要解决的问题。文章阐述了激励机制包括的主要内容 ,并对内部约束机制进行了分析。     

关于"诚信征税"的一点制度经济学思考

文章将运用新制度经济学的理论和方法对我国征税人"诚信"缺失现象进行解释,并据此提出实施非正式约束制度和正式约束制度及其实施机制创新.     

我国制度经济学研究中的四大问题

西方新制度经济学对我国改革的理论和实践产生了重要的影响，中国的改革实践也为我国理论界对制度经济学的研究提供了土壤。本文认为，我国制度经济学研究中有四大问题值得我们深入探讨。一是制度是自然演化的结果还是人为设计的结果。我们应该重视自然演化这种制度创新方式。二是正式约束与非正式约束的关系。我们应该注意与市场经济相适应的非正式约束建立垢滞后对我国改革的制约。三是诱导性制度变过与强制性制度变迁的关系。在我国市场化的过程中，扩大诱致性制度变迁的范围越来越重要。四是制度设置与制度实施机制的问题。我们在注重制度创新的同时更要注意实施机制的建立。     

人力资本参与国有企业收入分配的安排与制度供给

人力资本参与国有企业收入分配是人力资本地位提升的表现,也是国有企业建立现代企业制度要求。人力资本参与企业收入分配的制度结构包括:补偿性层次、增值性层次和辅助性层次三个方面。为保证这一制度的实施,必须从正式制度、非正式制度和制度环境三个方面来加强制度供给。     

中西部地区生态旅游产品绿色创新的制度支持体系

制度创新包括正式规则、非正式规则及制度的实施机制创新3个层次。在正式规则方面,中西部地区生态旅游产品绿色创新的制度支持体系,应改变生态旅游资源所有权、管理权、经营权三权合一的现状,构建中西部地区生态旅游资源三权分离的激励与约束机制;在制度的实施机制方面,应构建中西部地区生态旅游产品开发经营中正外部性的补偿机制和负外部性的监管机制;在非正式规则方面,应以生态伦理道德及生态价值观念推动生态旅游的可持续发展。     

基于非正式约束的宏观经济调控机制及其工具模式研究

文章从非正式约束的全新视角切入,剖析了非正式约束与经济增长的关系,并研究了目标的选择、调控的顺序和调控机制的完善,阐述了在非正式约束影响下宏观经济调控工具模式的创新,指出了民债与国土资源作为新的工具模式的出现。     

对高校教师人力资本投资风险及规避的新探讨

当今高校的竞争已日趋激烈,而竞争的根本在于高校优质的教师人力资本。优质教师人力资本的获得需要进行投资,但高校教师人力资本投资存在风险,如何规避风险成为高校关注的焦点。本文对高校教师人力资本投资风险进行了界定,认为高校教师人力资本投资风险主要表现为对教师投资后并没有达到预期的效果。深入分析了高校教师人力资本投资风险产生的原因,认为主要是由外部原因和内部原因两方面造成的,外部原因是由于市场供求的不平衡所决定的,内部原因是由于教师人力资本载体一教师的机会主义行为倾向和高校的体制缺陷所决定的。并提出了要从高校、教师自身和学生三方面入手,即学校方面要进行高校管理改革;教师方面要提高教师自身素质;学生方面要提高学习热情,来共同形成高校教师人力资本投资风险规避体系,来规避高校教师人力资本投资风险,为高校人力资本投资决策提供依据;     

人力资本积累与西部地区可持续发展

人力资本的积累对经济的发展有巨大的促进作用，西部地区的发展应走人力资本积累型的可持续发展之路，本文分析了妨碍西部地区人力资本积累的主要因素，并提出了大力发展教育事业，吸引外地人才，完善人力资源的市场化配置机制等对策。     

Avoiding arbitrary exclusion restrictions using ratios of reduced-form estimates

We show how to obtain coherent structural-form (SF) exclusion restrictions using the reduced-form (RF) parameter ratios. It will be shown that an over-identified SF corresponds to a group of regressors sharing the same RF ratio value; those regressors should be excluded jointly from the SF. If there is no group structure, then the SF is just-identified; in this case, however, it is no longer clear which regressor should be excluded. Hence, just-identified SF’s are more arbitrary than over-identified SF’s in terms of exclusion restrictions. This is in stark contrast to the notion that the former is less arbitrary than the latter, because the former excludes fewer regressors. We formalize these points, and then suggest to find the number of modes in the estimated RF ratios as a way to find groups in the ratios. For this purpose, an informal graphical method using a kernel nonparametric method and a formal modality test are employed. An empirical example with selling price in a residential real estate market and duration on the market as two endogenous variables is provided. The authors are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for their comments     

促进我国区域间产业资本转移的税收政策研究

现阶段我国区：域经济发展仍不协调．东部地区的产业资本向中西部转移尚存制度上的障碍。文章基于东部产业资本向中西部转移的动机分析,对我国现行税收政策在促进区域间产业资本转移的效果进行评价,为有效促进我国区域间产业资本转移。提出尽快在中西部全面实施资源税改革、落实增值税扩围和增加对中西部产业的流转税优惠以及推进消费税、个人所得税和企业所得税改革等政策建议。     

Job-search and foreign capital inflow — A three-sector general equilibrium analysis

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields' (1989) multi-sector job-search model in a three-sector general equilibrium framework by introducing international trade and capital as input. The three sectors are the rural sector, the urban informal sector and the urban formal sector. The rural sector and the urban informal sector use one type of mobile capital while the urban formal sector uses a sector-specific capital. We find that the effects of an inflow of foreign capital in the urban formal sector on unemployment and social welfare crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the rural sector and the urban informal sector. We show that there is a possibility of trade-off between the government's twin objectives of improvement in social welfare and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results are extremely crucial from the view point of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income developing economy.     

Social capital as a substitute for formality: Evidence from Bolivia

The paper studies the role of social capital in the urban informal sector in Bolivia. It shows that a formal firm has about 6.4 times the sales of an informal firm with no social capital, but informal firms use their social capital to compensate for the lack of formal productivity benefits. By being formal, firms obtain permanent visibility because they can operate a shop or a visible production location and they can produce in locations with better public infrastructure. Informal firms, in contrast, sell in one place – typically in street markets in front of formal shops – and produce in another — typically in the outskirts. Social capital increases accessibility of informal firms and provides them with security benefits at their production location.     

Formal microlending and adverse (or nonexistent) selection: a case study of shrimp farmers in Bangladesh

Microcredit schemes have become a popular means of improving smallholders’ access to credit and making long term investment possible. However, it remains to be explored whether the current microcredit schemes are more successful than earlier formal small scale lending in identifying successful borrowers. We studied shrimp farming in a rural region in Bangladesh where formal microlending is well established, but where more expensive informal microlending coexists with the formal schemes. Farmers – both those who exclusively use formal loans and those who also use informal loans – remain credit-constrained; both types overutilize labour in order to reduce the need for working capital. However, the credit constraint is actually milder for the informal borrowers: the implicit shadow price of working capital is substantially higher in the group that only takes formal loans than in the group that also uses informal loans. These results suggest that informal lenders – with their closer ties to the individual farmers – remain more successful in identifying those smallholder farmers that are most likely to use the borrowed funds successfully. Informal lenders have an information advantage that formal microlenders lack: the latter need to find routes to access this information in order for formal microcredit schemes to succeed.     

Testing for forward-looking behaviour: evidence from the enactment of smoking restrictions

This paper develops a new test for forward-looking behaviour based on the establishment of public smoking restrictions. Given that the announcement of these restrictions effectively increases the future cost of smoking, we should expect forward-looking smokers to curb their consumption before the restriction is effective due to complementarity between present and future consumption. I perform the estimation using detailed, high-frequency household-level purchase data. The results provide evidence against the forward-looking behaviour of smokers. Households do not reduce their cigarette purchases before announced public smoking restrictions are established; they only do so once the restriction is in effect.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.