中国股票市场对政策信息的不平衡性反应研究

本文将影响股票市场的政策信息区分为"好消息"和"坏消息"。通过 EGARCH 模型研究中国股票市场对"好消息"与"坏消息"的不平衡性反应,指出"好消息"对我国股票市场的影响大于"坏消息"的影响,这与国外股票市场的情况正好相反。根据这一结果本文创建了"信息效应曲线",具体分析我国股票市场对"好消息"与"坏消息"的不平衡性反应的特征,提出现有交易机制下的股价波动模式。     

PRICE DYNAMICS WITH CUSTOMER MARKETS

Using microdata from a U.S. retailer we document that customer turnover responds to pricing. We study the optimal price setting of a firm when its demand has an extensive margin that is elastic to price due to customers' opportunity to search for an alternative supplier. The price pass‐through of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is incomplete, with the most productive firms passing through more. Firm demand is more persistent than price. Higher demand is associated with lower markups due to higher search intensity, despite flexible prices. We find empirical support for these predictions in microdata from the retail industry.     

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy-maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy-maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy-maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy-maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.     

中国资本市场披露现金流量信息的有用性

基于扩展后的DKW模型,结合中国的经济环境,可以设计出检验历史现金流的增量预测价值模型,用以验证“中国资本市场披露现金流量信息具有决策有用性”这一主题。实证结果表明,增加现金流量表后的现金预测模型具有更强的预测能力,从而印证了《企业会计准则——现金流量表》引言中的断定:现金流量信息的披露有助于投资者预测企业的未来现金流量。     

VALUE OF INFORMATION IN COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS

We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction: There exist changes in information that make all agents better off and changes for which all agents are worse off. In contrast, for any change in information, a Pareto improvement is feasible, that is, attainable by a planner facing the same informational and asset market constraints as agents. In this sense, the response of competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal.     

LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.     

DYNAMIC TRADING IN A DURABLE GOOD MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof–Wilson “lemons” market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods—prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved—particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONING

This paper outlines the development and exposits some of the central ideas and implications of asymmetric information in the credit market.     

中国资本账户开放进程中跨境证券投资对国内金融市场的影响*

随着中国资本项目开放进程的推进,跨境证券投资对国内金融市场的冲击日益增强。在此背景下,本文首先通过构建考虑了资本市场收益率以及有管理浮动汇率制度的IS LM BP模型对跨境证券投资与中国国内金融市场的相互影响机理进行了理论探究,并基于中国2005年7月—2016年8月的月度数据,运用马尔科夫区制转移向量自回归模型对中国资本账户开放进程中跨境证券投资与人民币汇率、股票市场收益率、短期利率的联动关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明：第一,四者的关联性存在明显的区制特征,区制1主要包括次贷危机时期（2007—2008年）、欧债危机时期（2010—2012年）以及后金融危机时期（2015—2016年）,经济呈现“股票市场收益率较低、跨境证券投资较少、短期利率较高、金融市场波动性大”的状态;区制2主要包括次贷危机前夕（2005—2006年）、次贷危机后的量化宽松时期（2009—2010年）以及欧债危机后的调整期（2013—2014年）,经济呈现“股票市场收益率较高、跨境证券投资较多、短期利率较低、金融市场波动性小”的状态。第二,当处于资本市场化进程较快、金融市场波动性较大的区制阶段（区制1）时,跨境证券投资与国内金融市场的联动关系更加明显。本文研究结论对于我国进一步开放资本市场具有借鉴价值和政策启示。     

MARRIAGE,DIVORCE, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We use data on people's valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses' options. The data demonstrate that, in some couples, one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages, suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information. We estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies. Our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses better off and, in doing so, offset much of the inefficiency generated by their imperfect knowledge. Thus, we find evidence of asymmetric information and interdependent utility in marriage.     

OPTIMAL PRICE SETTING IN FIXED‐ODDS BETTING MARKETS UNDER INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY

This paper develops a model of optimal pricing under information uncertainty for fixed‐odds betting markets. The model suggests that bookmakers require a premium for quoting the odds several days before an event. This premium reflects the uncertainty of public information that can be exploited by expert bettors. The model predicts that when bookmakers set optimal prices, expected returns to bettors increase as a monotonic function of winning probabilities. In this manner, an information‐based explanation is given for the celebrated favourite‐longshot bias in fixed‐odds. Using an extensive data‐set of football odds from two major European bookmakers, we estimate the probability of informed betting.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE LACK OF PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION*

There is pervasive evidence that individuals invest primarily in local stocks and thus hold poorly diversified portfolios. The present article develops a theoretical model in which the presence of informational asymmetries introduces home equity bias. The main departure from previous theoretical work is the assumption that local investors outperform nonlocal investors in identifying the correct ranking of local investment opportunities, instead of possessing superior information about the aggregate performance of the local stock market. The second key assumption is based on the evidence that short‐selling is a costly activity.     

TAXATION IN MATCHING MARKETS

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be nonmonotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative nonpecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.     

FLOWS OF THE PACIFIC: ASIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS THROUGH TRANQUILITY AND TURBULENCE

Using the longest data set on foreign exchange (FX) order flow to date, along with the broadest coverage of currencies to date, we examine the effect of FX order flow on exchange rates across small and large currencies, currencies with floating or fixed regimes, and across both tranquil and turbulent periods. Over our 15 years of data for 11 Asian and Australasian currencies, we find that order flow has a potentially strong impact on all exchange rates in the sample. The effect is strongest on floating exchange rates, both economically and statistically, but is sizeable also on the other exchange rates, especially during periods of turbulence. By creating a measure of regional order flow, we show that all exchange rates depreciate as flows are moved out of Asia/Australasia and into US dollars. This is true both across regimes and if their own flow is not included in the structure of the regional flow.     

NONLINEAR PRICING IN ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY

We characterise, for both separate and interdependent markets, the local pure-strategies Nash equilibrium of a spatial duopoly game, where consumers are horizontally and vertically heterogeneous, and firms have different cost structures and ranges of product lines. We show that standard results which emerged in the monopoly context can not be generalised to strategic contexts where firms retain market power and there is sufficient competitive pressure. We prove that in the asymmetric duopoly case, when markets are interdependent, the incentive compatibility constraints are slack, and there is no quality distortion.     

FUTURES MARKETS AND BUBBLE FORMATION IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS*

Abstract. We construct asset markets of the type studied in Smith et al. (1988) , in which price bubbles and crashes are widely observed. In addition to a spot market, there are futures markets in operation, one maturing at the beginning of each period of the life of the asset. We find that when futures markets are present, bubbles do not occur in the spot markets. The futures markets seem to reduce the speculation and the decision errors that appear to give rise to price bubbles in experimental asset markets.     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.