新政出台

银监会再出台十条措施改进小企业金融服务近日,银监会印发了《关于支持商业银行进一步改进小企业金融服务的通知》。《通知》通过差别化的监管和激励政策支持商业银行进一步加大对小企业的信贷支持力度,将有助于优化信贷结构,降低贷款集中度,促进小企业金融服务的可持续发展,推动产业升级和经济结构转型。     

银监会再出台十条措施改进小企业金融服务

近日,银监会印发了《关于支持商业银行进一步改进小企业金融服务的通知》。《通知》通过差别化的监管和激励政策支持商业银行进一步加大对小企业的信贷支持力度,将有助于优化信贷结构,降低贷款集中度,促进小企业金融服务的可持续发展,推动产业升级和经济结构转型。     

银监会支持商业银行改进小企业金融服务

为进一步推动商业银行支持和改进小企业金融服务,努力实现小企业信贷增速不低于全部贷款平均增速,提升小企业贷款满足率、覆盖率和服务满意率,银监会近日发布了《关于支持商业银行进一步改进小企业金融服务的通知》（以下简称《通知》）。     

欠发达地区小企业贷款难有所缓解依然不足——对某市金融支持小企业的专题调查

2005年7月,银监会发布<银行开展小企业贷款指导意见>,引导和督促金融机构加大对小企业的信贷支持力度,破解小企业贷款难问题.     

商业银行建设小企业信贷专营机构存在的问题及建议

小企业在我国国民经济中发挥着越来越重要的作用,对推动经济增长、解决社会就业等方面具有直接的影响．与此同时,小企业面临的融资难问题却日渐突出,严重制约了小企业的发展。2008年12月银监会发布了《关于银行建立小企业信贷专营机构的指导意见》,鼓励各家商业银行建立专为小企业服务的小企业信贷专营机构,积极开展小企业金融服务。     

小企业信贷业务风险管理研究

最近以来,为缓解小企业融资难问题。国家接连出台了有关金融服务政策．要求商业银行按照科学发展观的要求．改进对小企业的金融服务．加大对小企业的信贷支持力度。因此,在当前形势下．为落实国家有关政策．保障小企业信贷业务健康发展,加强对小企业信贷业务风险管理的研究十分必要。     

浅析建立新型小企业信贷模式

改革开放以来,我国小企业发展迅速,已经成为市场经济的重要组成部分。目前,银监会正着力推动银行加强对小企业信贷支持,银行也都积极采取措施,加大了对小企业信贷服务力度。本文通过分析小企业贷款融资面临的问题,银行改进对小企业贷款的必要性,如何正确认识风险防范,提出了小企业信贷模式的具体建议。     

银监会:大力推动小企业金融服务体系建设

近日,银监会召开2010年度银监会暨银行业金融机构小企业金融服务评优表彰(电视电话)会议.银监会主席刘明康表示,银监会将继续推动健全小企业金融服务的监管政策和外部环境支持体系.针对小企业金融服务中存在前中后台配合不默契、风险和定价不完善等问题,刘明康要求银行业金融机构要进一步加强信贷管理,     

四川银行业开展小企业金融服务情况的调查报告

推进小企业金融服务工作有利于缓解目前小企业贷款难的状况。本文在对四川银行业对小企业的信贷支持基本情况进行调查的基础上，剖析了目前四川小企业金融服务存在的主要问题，并就进一步做好小企业金融服务工作有针对性地提出了有关政策建议。     

建立和完善六项机制推进小企业金融服务——对浙江省农村合作金融机构实施六项机制的调查与思考

改革开发二十年来,浙江小企业如雨后春笋,蓬勃发展,在全省国民经济中已起着举足轻重的作用。然而近年来,越来越多因素制约着小企业的进一步发展,尤其是小企业金融服务问题已成为制约小企业发展的瓶颈。为此,银监会在年初提出了小企业贷款“六项机制”建设,以促进各商业银行不断改善对小企业的金融服务。为掌握我省农村合作金融机构“六项机制”建设情况及遇到的困难,进一步深入探索小企业贷款“六项     

升值之言该如何听

自今年6月中国暗示将松动人民币汇率以来,人民币升值幅度仅为0．4％,这大大低于华盛顿的期待,因此,中美两国的关系日益紧张起来。随着失业率的膨胀,以及选举年即将到来,美国国会再一次将人民币汇率摆上了议事日程：9月6日,华盛顿两位高官为缓和中美关系前往北京,就人民币及其他重要问题进行高峰会晤,以期达成共识。     

商业银行如何应对利率市场化

最近,中国央行的利率政策传达出利率市场化步伐骤然加快的信号,沉浸在央行利率管制环境下的国内商业银行突然感到"利基"竞争的性质发生了重要变化。那么.在利率市场化环境下商业银行应采取怎样的风险偏好,才能使贷款定价覆盖风险溢价?这是银行管理者必须回答的问题。     

When to ally & when to acquire

Acquisitions and alliances are two pillars of growth strategy. But most businesses don't treat the two as alternative mechanisms for attaining goals. Consequently, companies take over firms they should have collaborated with, and vice versa, and make a mess of both acquisitions and alliances. It's easy to see why companies don't weigh the relative merits and demerits of acquisitions and alliances before choosing horses for courses. The two strategies differ in many ways: Acquisition deals are competitive, based on market prices, and risky; alliances are cooperative, negotiated, and not so risky. Companies habitually deploy acquisitions to increase scale or cut costs and use partnerships to enter new markets, customer segments, and regions. Moreover, a company's initial experiences often turn into blinders. If the firm pulls off an alliance or two, it tends to enter into alliances even when circumstances demand acquisitions. Organizational barriers also stand in the way. In many companies, an M&A group, which reports to the finance head, handles acquisitions, while a separate business development unit looks after alliances. The two teams work out of different locations, jealously guard turf, and, in effect, prevent companies from comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the strategies. But companies could improve their results, the authors argue, if they compared the two strategies to determine which is best suited to the situation at hand. Firms such as Cisco that use acquisitions and alliances appropriately grow faster than rivals do. The authors provide a framework to help organizations systematically decide between acquisition and alliance by analyzing three sets of factors: the resources and synergies they desire, the marketplace they compete in, and their competencies at collaborating.     

How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results

Companies, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to tie executives' payoffs to long-term results and avoid rewarding executives for short-term gains. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of top executives' pay, the authors analyze how such compensation should best be structured to provide executives with incentives to focus on long-term value creation.
To improve the link between equity compensation and long-term results, the authors recommend that executives be prevented from unwinding their equity incentives for a significant time period after vesting. At the same time, however, the authors suggest that it would be counterproductive to require that executives hold their equity incentives until retirement, as some have proposed. Instead, the authors recommend that companies adopt a combination of "grant-based" and "aggregate" limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives.
Grant-based limitations would allow executives to unwind the equity incentives associated with a particular grant only gradually after vesting, according to a fixed, pre-specified schedule put in place at the time of the grant. Aggregate limitations on unwinding would prevent an executive from unloading more than a specified fraction of the executive's freely disposable equity incentives in any given year.
Finally, the authors emphasize the need for effective limitations on executives' use of hedging and derivative transactions that would weaken the connection between executive payoffs and long-term stock values that a well-designed equity arrangement should produce.     

NYSE execution quality subsequent to migration to hybrid

In October 2006, the NYSE began rolling-out phase three of a four-phase plan initiate its new Hybrid trading mechanism. The results show that this new trading platform introduced a much larger proportion of electronic transactions relative to floor auction transactions. This migration to electronic transactions is further evidenced by a mirror shift in price discovery from floor trades to trades marked for automatic electronic execution. In addition, the move to Hybrid trading introduced a significant decrease in inventory control costs, as well as a noticeable increase in trade persistence. Finally, the new trading platform has increased the speed with which orders are met, and has also decreased the proportion of executed shares which receive price improvement.

How to stop the race to the bottom

Standard tax multipliers are a widespread feature of fiscal equalization systems. A simple theoretical model shows that actual tax multipliers respond positively to changes in standard tax multipliers. This theoretical prediction is tested empirically using data on municipalities in Germany. A quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia is exploited to identify the incentive effect. The empirical results confirm that local business tax policy is shaped by standard tax multipliers. They provide a straightforward practical tool to avoid a race to the bottom in local business tax rates.