Statement no.134 a proposal for privatization of the Federal Home Loan Bank system

Statement no.134 a proposal for privatization of the Federal Home Loan Bank systemMay 6, 1996     

从财务会计报表谈银行信贷管理工作

由于现行会计报表体系对未来信息提示不明显、对企业财务状况和经营成果揭示不清晰，因此会对银行信贷管理工作产生不良影响。为消除其对银行信贷管理工作的不良影响，一方面，要完善现行财务会计报表体系，增加预测会计报表和比较会计报表；另一方面，银行信贷管理人员必须掌握企业会计核算方法，了解有关会计科目核算内容及其相互关系。     

Statement no.103 principles of regulatory restructuring

Statement no.103 principles of regulatory restructuringFebruary 14, 1994     

Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? International Evidence From Bank Ratings

Abstract:   In recent years credit rating agencies have started rating firms who have not asked for a rating. Recipients of unsolicited ratings argue that the assigned ratings are too low and reflect a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the rated firms. We set out to examine these claims using a comprehensive and international sample of 1,060 bank ratings. Our results show that there is a significant difference in the distributions of ratings, and the shadow group has lower ratings. The results also indicate that banks that received shadow ratings are smaller and have weaker financial profiles than banks that have other ratings. This explains, in part, the lower ratings. In addition, we develop a model to explain bank ratings. The two‐step treatment effects model shows that bank size, profitability, asset quality, liquidity, and sovereign credit risk are important factors in determining bank ratings.     

International Propagation of the Credit Crisis: Lessons for Bank Regulation*

The authors use a large sample of non‐U.S. banks to examine the origins and spread of the 2007–2009 crisis. Using both stock market and structural variables, they test whether the effects of the crisis on individual banks are better explained by crisis models or by the VaR‐type analysis of the Basel system. The latter emphasizes risk weightings for individual assets while ignoring linkages that could leave banks exposed to systemic shocks. Consistent with crisis models, the authors find that a small set of pre‐crisis measures of a bank's international linkages, leverage, and the fragility of its liability structure does a good job of discriminating between banks that suffered a large impact and those that did not. (Indeed, these measures explain almost 50% of the differences among banks' stock returns during the crisis period, and almost 40% of the changes in the variability of those returns.) The authors also provide evidence of both a direct linkage among banks' stock returns and an indirect linkage that could reflect either linkages in the real economy or common demands by investors for liquidity. The authors run a “horse race” that demonstrates that simple measures of book leverage were better predictors of bank performance than the Basel capital ratios. They find that banks with lower Basel risk weightings prior to the crisis proved, on average, to be more exposed to the crisis. The authors' explanation is that banks with lower Basel risk measures tended to operate with higher leverage and more aggressive funding strategies, which in turn exposed them to greater crisis risk (even as they conformed to the letter of the Basel system in terms of asset risk measures). Finally, the authors find no evidence that substandard governance was a separate contributing factor to crisis exposure. Banks with substantial international business that were exposed to systemic shocks had high governance scores.     

Statement no.98 the new depositor preference legislation

Statement no.98 the new depositor preference legislationSeptember 20, 1993