The Demise of the Mutual Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry

We investigate the role of organizational structure in financial services markets by examining the U.S. life insurance industry. Traditionally, stock and mutual life insurers were equally represented, but now the industry is mainly composed of stock firms. We find operational efficiency, access to capital, and tax savings are important determinants for this shift. The incentive to demutualize differs by the type of conversion: full demutualization is chosen for efficiency and access to capital reasons and partial conversion, using a mutual holding company, is chosen for tax savings. Firm operational efficiency improves after conversion. We also find the efficiency of the stock organizational form dominates that of the mutual structure during our sample period, 1995 to 2004.     

Cash holdings between public and private insurers ‒ a partial adjustment approach

Cash holdings of financial institutions, especially private firms, have been understudied in existing literature. This paper fills that gap by examining the cash holdings of US property-liability insurers in order to analyze the difference in cash holdings and cash adjustments between public and private stock insurers and between mutual and stock insurers within the private insurer category. We find that public insurers hold much less cash than private stock insurers, which differs from the findings for non-financial firms. Additionally, we find that mutual insurers hold less cash than private stock insurers. Public insurers adjust their cash holdings much faster toward their target cash levels than private stock insurers do when facing an extreme cash shortfall, but their adjustment speed is indifferent from that of private stock insurers when both having excess cash. Mutual insurers are able to adjust cash holdings slightly faster than private stock insurers when there is an extreme cash shortfall but are indifferent in adjustment speed from private stock insurers when having excess cash in hand. Overall, our results are more consistent with the financing frictions hypothesis of cash holdings and are inconsistent with the owner-manager agency problems of free cash flow.     

Capital Structure Decisions in the Insurance Industry: Stocks versus Mutuals

Mutual insurers generally face higher costs of raising new capital than stock insurers. Other things being equal, the higher costs of raising capital should cause mutual insurers to have higher ex ante target capital to liability ratios than stock insurers. Mutual insurers' capital ratios also should be more sensitive to income than capital ratios for stock insurers and therefore adjust more slowly toward their long-run targets. We provide evidence concerning these issues using aggregate time series data for stock and mutual insurers during 1984–1999 and a large panel data set during 1991–1998. Our regressions provide strong evidence that annual changes in capital to liability ratios are more sensitive to income for mutual insurers than for stock insurers. We also provide evidence that mutual insurers' capital ratios are on average higher than those for stock insurers after controlling for several factors that could influence capital ratios.     

Form Over Matter: Differences in the Incentives to Convert Using Full Versus Partial Demutualization in the U.S. Life Insurance Industry

We explore the recent wave of demutualizations in the U.S. life insurance industry and analyze if the motives were similar for mutual life insurers that fully demutualized versus those that converted to mutual holding company (MHC) form. We find that fully demutualizing insurers were primarily motivated by a desire to gain access to external capital markets while those that chose MHC were motivated by other incentives including a tax‐based incentive. We also document that after conversion, fully demutualizing insurers more aggressively increase their exposure to risks they have a comparative advantage to bear than do firms that convert to MHC.     

On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies

Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most stock companies don't offer participating contracts. This study explains why. We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stockholders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the fair‐return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legislation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn't because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.     

Prudent man or agency problem? On the performance of insurance mutual funds

Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.     

Changing organizational form in the stock exchange industry and risk-taking

Recent developments in the stock exchange industry have compelled some exchanges to demutualize and become for-profit entities. We examine the risk-taking behavior of demutualized exchanges and find that prior to the conversion, the exchanges exhibited higher risk than their mutual counterparts. Following demutualization, however, the exchanges experienced a significant decrease in risk, which is not attributable to industry-wide effects. Our results are consistent with the conjecture that higher risk induced the conversion to equity ownership. Interestingly, we find that publicly listed exchanges that have gone through the three organizational structures exhibit risk-taking behavior somewhat similar to that of the mutual, demutualized, and publicly listed exchanges. We also document significant increases in nontraditional income after demutualization and this increase in nontraditional income is significantly related to the reduction in risk. We therefore attribute the risk reduction experienced by the converted exchanges to diversification.     

Effizienz und Eigentümerstruktur: Eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Lebensversicherungsmarktes

We provide new insights into the effect of ownership on efficiency by analyzing the German life insurance market over the period 2002–2005. Previous research on alternative organizational forms in the life insurance industry has focused on stock and mutual ownership only. Due to the uniqueness of the German insurance market, where privately-owned companies face competition by public insurers, we add to the recent literature the well known debate on public versus private ownership, by investigating stock, mutual and public ownership forms. Using traditional DEA, we calculate technical efficiency and cost efficiency scores to test the efficient structure hypothesis as well as the expense preference hypothesis. Our results give strong support to the latter, while we find no evidence that public ownership is an efficient corporate structure for life insurers. The group of stock firms dominates both, mutual and public insurers, although differences between stock and mutual companies are smaller than differences between stock and public firms. Analyzing within-group results, our findings suggest that high efficiency scores can be associated with certain firm characteristics which are publicly available: high returns on assets, low cancellation rates and low costs.     

Efficiency in the UK life insurance industry: Mutual firms versus proprietary firms

The paper discusses the main tenets of stakeholder theory and agency theory and goes on to analyse the relative performance of a sample of 100 mutual and proprietary life insurance companies in the UK during the period 1992–1996. The paper concludes that there is weak evidence to support the contention that mutual life insurers are relatively more cost efficient than proprietary insurers. Mutual companies in the sample perform well relative to proprietary companies in terms of annual surpluses and expenses ratios. There is also evidence that fund managers in mutual companies perform at least as well on average as those in proprietary companies.     

On the application of finance theory to the insurance firm

The primary argument set forth in this article is that the theory of finance can and should be rigorously applied to the study of the insurance firm. In order to illustrate this point, we turn our attention to the insurance solvency literature, where the implications of default risk for insurance company decision-making and regulatory policy are widely discussed but not nearly as widely understood. Rather than treat the probability of ruin as an exogenous constraint that is arbitrarily imposed by regulators, the approach taken here is to endogenize the probability of ruin with respect to a complex contracting process undertaken by a variety of self-interested claim holders. This treatment enables us to evaluate regulatory constraints such as minimum capital requirements within a rigorous theoretical framework. Our analysis suggests that even in an unregulated market, insurers would voluntarily limit their premium-capital ratios in an effort to economize on contracting costs. Furthermore, mutual insurers are likely,ceteris paribus, to employ less leverage than insurers organized as stock corporations.     

Conversion and Efficiency Performance Changes: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry

This study investigates whether the conversion of U.S. property-liability insurers improves their efficiency performance before and after the conversion. We estimate relative efficiency of converting insurers and control insurers using data envelopment analysis. The Malmquist analysis is also used to measure changes in efficiency pre- and post-conversion. The evidence shows that converting insurers experience larger gains in cost efficiency and total productivity change than mutual control insurers before conversion. In addition, the empirical results indicate that converting insurers improve efficiency after conversion. These results are robust with respect to both the value-added and the financial intermediary approaches. The overall results support the efficiency hypothesis proposed by Mayers and Smith (1986).     

Dividend decisions in the property and liability insurance industry: mutual versus stock companies

This article examines the effect of organizational forms on corporate dividend decisions by exploring the differences in dividend payout ratios between mutual and stock property–liability (P–L) insurers in the US. Our large sample evidence suggests: (1) mutual insurers tend to have a lower dividend payout ratio than stock insurers and the observed difference is about 4% points, holding other factors constant; (2) mutual insurers tend to adjust dividend payout ratios toward their long-run target levels more slowly than stock firms. These results are consistent with the capital constraints and/or greater agency costs of equity in mutual insurers.

The Pricing of Insurer Demutualization Initial Public Offerings

This article examines the pricing of the initial public offerings (IPOs) that follow insurance company demutualizations. Insurers that convert from mutual to stock form typically cite the need for capital as a key motivation. Given that capital adequacy is a primary regulatory objective for insurers, one would expect that for a given number of shares to be sold, these firms would price their offerings to maximize proceeds. However, the vast literature on IPO pricing suggests various theories as to why it may be in the issuing firm's best interest to underprice its offering. By examining the initial and long‐run stock returns for these conversion IPOs, the existence and degree of underpricing, as characterized by large initial returns, can be determined. It is observed that on average demutualization insurer IPOs post significantly higher first‐day returns than nondemutualization insurer IPOs. These gains would accrue to the initial investors and to those policyholders who receive compensation in the form of shares in the newly created stock insurer. Attractive returns are sustained for both groups of insurers during the first few years after IPO.     

Efficiency and Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Life Insurance Industry in the 1980s and 1990s

This article examines the efficiency changes of U.S. life insurers before and after demutualization in the 1980s and 1990s. We use two frontier approaches (the value‐added approach and the financial intermediary approach) to measure the efficiency changes. In addition, we use Malmquist indices to investigate the efficiency and productivity change of converted life insurers over time. The results using the value‐added approach indicate that demutualized life insurers improve their efficiency before demutualization. On the other hand, the evidence using the financial intermediary approach shows the efficiency of the demutualized life insurers relative to mutual control insurers deteriorates before demutualization and improves after conversion. The difference in the results between the two approaches is due to the fact that the financial intermediary approach considers financial conditions. The results of both approaches suggest that there is no efficiency improvement after demutualization relative to stock control insurers. There is, however, efficiency improvement relative to mutual control insurers when the financial intermediary approach is used.     

CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors.     

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

Life insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.     

Determinants of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This article analyzes variations in line‐of‐business diversification status and extent among property–liability insurers. Our results show that the extent of diversification is not driven by risk pooling considerations; insurers operating in more volatile business lines do not diversify more. Diversification can rather be explained by the benefits of internal capital markets and barriers to business growth like market size and concentration. In our analysis, we distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. Using a measure of unrelated line‐of‐business diversification we find the first support for the diversification prediction of the managerial discretion hypothesis that mutual insurers should be less diversified than stock insurers. While mutual insurers tend to exhibit higher levels of total diversification, they engage in significantly less unrelated diversification than do stock insurers.     

Organizational Structure and Performance: Evidence From the Nonlife Insurance Industry in Japan

This study examines the impact of organizational structure on firm performance, incentive problems, and financial decisions in the Japanese nonlife (property‐casualty) insurance industry. Stock companies that belong to one of six horizontal keiretsu groups have lower expenses and lower levels of free cash flow than independent stock and mutual insurance companies. Keiretsu insurers also have higher profitability and higher loss ratios than independent insurers. With a limited sample size, there is some evidence that mutual insurers have higher levels of free cash flows, higher investment incomes, and lower financial leverage than their stock counterparts. Overall, empirical evidence suggests that each structure has its own comparative advantage.     

Organizational structure,risk-based capital requirements,and the sales of downgraded bonds

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

Eine neue Typologie real existierender deutscher Erstversicherer

The Criterions of insurance companies in Germany are changing as consequences of market competition and regulation. Trends of differentiation follow former trends of assimilation. A modern typology of direct insurers resp. groups of insurers is less oriented by legal form of companies, more by targets of activities and stakeholder situation. In case of mutual companies there are effects of demutualization.