Endogenous NIC-formation in a North-South framework

In a model where initially the North specialises in manufactures and the South in primary products, international investment leads to a rising Northern growth rate. If this rate comes to exceed that of Northern labour growth, a full-employment barrier is reached, pushing up Northern wages. This may lead Northern capitalists to divert some manufacturing production to a favoured part of the South. Additional mechanisms are postulated that allow capitalists in the South to participate in, and possibly dominate manufacturing accumulation in that region.     

Endogenous trading bloc formation in a North-South global economy

Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.     

内生技术进步、南北贸易与干预政策

文章首先回顾了内生技术进步理论，然后试图在Li（2001）、Dinopoulos和Segerstrom（2003）模型的基础上扩展Grossman和Helpman的南北贸易与产品周期模型，将北方的激进式创新行为和南方的非激进式创新行为同时纳入Dinopoulos和Segerstrom的南北贸易模型，并在内生技术进步与南北贸易框架下分析北方创新和南方模仿之间的相互作用机理，阐述政府R＆D补贴、国际知识产权保护等干预政策对北方创新和南方模仿行为的经济效应。     

Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade

This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.     

On the North-South trade in the Americas and its ecological asymmetries

There has been a long and intensive debate within the scientific community about the role of international trade in the development of countries. During the last decades, the focus of attention has moved from the pure economic level to the environmental aspects of international trade. Establishing a simplified system of North-South trade for one reference period (2003), this paper attempts to test empirically the extent of potential asymmetries with regard to extracted material flows, and contrasts the results with the economic benefits from trade (in terms of value-added). The South is thereby represented by a selection of Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico), the North comprises one of their main commercial partners, the United States. At the methodological level, a multi-regional input-output analysis is used as the tool of investigation. Results generally support the hypothesis that the South was feeding the North's societal metabolism. South-North material exports were 1.6 times larger than North-South material exports, resulting in a net deficit for the South of 324 million tons. Moreover, material intensity of exported commodities from the South was twice as high as that from the North. It is worth highlighting, however, that part of the North-South hypothesis fails for the sample of countries since the larger part of the economic surplus has remained in the South, contrarily to what would have been expected.     

Endogenous trade policy: Political struggle in the growth process

This paper develops a dynamic theory that accounts for the evolution of trade policy, underlying internal class conflicts, and output growth performance. Analysis of political responses to the distributional effects of international trade reveals that economies with a comparative advantage in manufacturing may reach a developed stage through the ebb and flow of protectionism. This nonmonotonic evolution of trade policy is consistent with the historical experience of Western Europe over the last few centuries.     

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

A model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common-pool resource stock and welfare through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock. The model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a Markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare. Thus, opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines. Experimental results show that under certain conditions, subjects briefly follow a Markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects.     

Transfers in a North-South Growth Model

The possibility of immiserizing growth is explored in a non-Neoclassical North-South model having formal similarities to Goodwin's growth-cycle model. Because of the the 'engine-of-growth' property of the Northern economy, a redistribution in favour of the South is beneficial to that region only in the short run but will harm both regions in the long run.     

Endogenous factor market distortion, risk aversion, and international trade under input uncertainty

In the context of non-diversifiable and sector-specific risks in labour markets, we show that the resulting factor market distortion – attributable to an endogenous intersectoral wage differential – can provide a possible rationale that explains why larger wage dispersion prevails in developing nations. We also demonstrate how endogenous wage distortions spill over to capital markets, with capital-poor economies offering lower rates of returns. In addition, we show that inequality in the distribution of wealth further deviates factor allocation away from first-best and impairs intersectoral mobility of the poor.
Ce mémoire montre que la distorsion dans le marché des facteurs qui résulte de risques non diversifiables et spécifiques à certains secteurs (et qui se traduit par un différentiel de salaire endogène entre secteurs) peut expliquer pourquoi on observe une dispersion plus grande des salaires dans les pays en voie de développement.On montre aussi comment des distorsions endogènes de salaires débordent vers les marchés de capitaux,ce qui fait que les pays pauvres en capital ont des rendements plus faibles.De plus, on montre que l'inégalité dans la distribution de la richesse contribue à faire dévier l'allocation des ressources de son optimum de premier ordre et nuit à la mobilité inter-sectorielle des pauvres.     

North-South knowledge spillovers and competition: convergence versus divergence

Technology spillovers from high-productivity countries in the North allow low-productivity countries in the South to improve productivity in high-tech sectors relatively easy. However, the South's share in world goods markets for high-tech products is relatively low, which reduces opportunities for learning by doing. Our simple Ricardian endogenous growth model shows how the balance between toughness of competition in trade and the strength of North-South spillovers determines whether productivity levels diverge, partially converge or fully converge in the long run. If convergence prevails, the North is confronted with declining employment in high-tech sectors. Temporary (trade) policy measures can turn a diverging economy into a converging one.     

Endogenous Specialisation and Endogenous Principal-agent Relationship

The paper develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous principal-agent relationship within a framework of consumer-producer, economies of specialisation, and transaction costs. It is shown that if transaction efficiency is low, then autarky is chosen as the general equilibrium where no market and principal-agent relationship exists. As transaction efficiency is improved, the equilibrium level of division of labour increases, comparative advantage between ex ante identical individuals emerges from the division of labour, and the number of principal-agent relationships increases. The following features of the model distinguish it from other principal-agent models in the literature. The principal-agent relationships are not only endogenous, but also reciprocal between different specialists. In a general equilibrium environment, choice between pure pricing and contingent pricing is endogenised. In the paper, the implications of endogenous transaction costs caused by moral hazard for the equilibrium extent of the market and related degrees of market integration, production concentration, trade dependence, diversity of economic structure, and productivity are explored. The model predicts two interesting phenomena: a man might work harder for the market with moral hazard than working for himself in the absence of moral hazard; a market with moral hazard might be Pareto superior to autarky with no moral hazard.     

Structural economic dynamics: an alternative approach to North-South models

This paper isolates the mechanisms responsible for the difficultiesfacing poor regions in growing faster than rich ones. The analysisof uneven development is carried out in a framework where changesin demand composition are consistent with Engel's Law. The standpointof the analysis is the interaction between technical progress—whichproduces responses in per capita income—and changes ofper capita consumption. The paper focuses on one case in whichpreferences are homothetic and there is capital dependence,showing that the latter assumption is sufficient to explainthe inequalities between poor and rich regions. When dealingwith the case of non-homothetic tastes, adverse movements inthe terms of trade and the international demonstration effect,which are both due to the inelastic demand for goods producedby poor regions, are the mechanisms responsible for uneven development.     

强化知识产权保护与南北双赢

传统观点认为,强知识产权保护有利于北方国家而有损于南方国家。本文构建一个两期技术转移模型,说明在一定条件下,南方国家会自愿加强知识产权保护,并实现南北双赢。假设北方企业拥有两种技术,即传统技术和先进技术。若南方的知识产权保护太弱,北方企业可能会因为害怕被模仿而策略性延迟引入先进技术,导致南方国家受损。此时,南方政府将有积极性自愿加强知识产权保护以防止北方企业采用延迟策略,而模型分析表明,最优的知识产权保护力度是南方企业模仿能力的倒U型函数。进一步,如果是否拥有先进技术是北方企业的私人信息,南方政府将更不愿意采用严格的知识产权保护制度,因而消除信息不对称有利于南方国家自愿强化知识产权保护。     

Endogenous entry in contests

We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts that (a) contest entry and rent-seeking expenditures increase with the size of the prize and (b) earnings are equalized between the contest and the outside option. While the directional predictions offered in (a) are supported in the data, the level predictions are not. Prediction (b) is not supported in the data: when the prize is large, contest participants earn more than the outside option. When the prize is small, contest participants earn less. Previous studies of gender and contest competition suggest that females should (a) not perform as well in the contest; and (b) enter at a lower rate. We find some support for (a) but not for (b). Women participate in the contest at the same rate as men.     

Endogenous Categorization in Insurance

This paper analyzes the welfare properties of equilibrium when insurers use observable actions to classify consumers into different risk categories, and consumers' choice is influenced by the insurance market consequences of their actions. Specifically, we analyze this problem at the example of a car insurance market, in which individual preferences over car types are correlated with risk type and used by insurance firms for ratemaking. Equilibrium premiums for each car are determined by the losses that it generates. Consumers take insurance premiums into account when deciding which car to buy. This creates an incentive to buy the car that is preferred by more low risk individuals. From a utilitarian point of view, this incentive is excessive. Depending on parameters, it may even be possible to construct a tax‐subsidy scheme with balanced budget that Pareto improves on the market equilibrium.     

Paradoxical trade patterns and terms of trade

It is shown that, when a monopoly is present in a two-country, two-commodity world, the terms-of-trade do not necessarily fall in between the pre-trade relative prices of the two countries, and that these pre-trade prices do not unequivocally determine the pattern of trade.     

Endogenous Inequality

Does the market economy exacerbate inequality across households? In a capitalistic society, do the rich maintain a high level of wealth at the expense of the poor? Or would an accumulation of the wealth by the rich eventually trickle down to the poor and pull the latter out of poverty? This paper presents a theoretical framework, in which one can address these questions in a systematic way. The model focuses on the role of the credit market, which determines the joint evolution of the distribution of wealth and the interest rate. A complete characterization of the steady states is provided. Under some configurations of the parameter values, the model predicts an endogenous and permanent separation of the population into the rich and the poor, where the rich maintains a high level of wealth partially due to the presence of the poor. Under others, the model predicts the Kuznets curve, i.e. the wealth eventually trickles down from the rich to the poor, eliminating inequality in the long run.     

The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

The need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made, as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market, to analyze the North’s incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement. Technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement, but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus. The only impacts are distributional, technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments.     

Capital Flight, North-South Lending, and Stages of Economic Development

We present a two-country OLG economy in which international capital mobility exists in the presence of moral hazard in financial contracts. The difference in the extent of asymmetric information is a source of capital movement and capital flows from the South to the North. Even though there exists a unique steady state under autarky, multiple locally stable steady states may emerge in a world economy with an integrated capital market. However, the integration may drive the South down to further impoverishment. The South's government therefore should take into account seriously the timing of capital market liberalization as a conduit of economic development.     

Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity

In the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of GATT (1 January 1995) it was agreed to harmonise intellectual property rights (IPR) on an international level and to include the option for patent protection for all life forms such as plants and animals (Article 27 (3) b). Patenting, however, leads to considerable conflicts between international trade and protection of biological diversity, which can be illustrated by the example of seed production. We make use of a three-stage game to show the strategic incentives for implementation of two different property rights regimes (patents and farmers' rights) on competition and biodiversity. We show that the Southern government has no incentive to acknowledge international patents, even if farmers' rights do exist. The Northern producer will always dominate in the output market if patents are applied, but without farmers' rights biodiversity will not be maintained by the Southern government. Thus total payoff of the northern firm is maximized, if both IPR regimes are implemented. However, if only farmers' rights are valid, biodiversity will be maximal.