Firms' investments in general training and the skilled labour market

An adverse selection model is analysed, where firms can train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium, the market wage is determined by supply and demand. The quality of the supplied skilled labour is negatively biased, because workers stem from firms that shut down and from firms that observed their trainee's bad quality during the training. If fewer firms were to shut down, then the supplied average quality deteriorates and the incentive to train increases. The incentive is inefficient, because firms must share the informational rent and they free-ride. Ex ante workers may wish to increase the firms' bargaining power.     

Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent differences in regulation

We study the effects of the more stringent employment protection legislation (EPL) that applies in Italy to firms with over 15 employees. We consider firms' propensity to grow when close to that threshold and changes in employment policies when they pass it. Using a comprehensive matched employer–employees dataset, we find that the probability of firms' growth is reduced by around 2 percentage points near the threshold. Using the stochastic transition matrix for firm size, we compute the long-run effects of EPL on the size distribution, finding that they are quantitatively modest. We also find that, contrary to the implications of more stringent firing restrictions, workers in firms just above the threshold have on average less stable employment relations than those just below it. We document that this might be because firms above the threshold make greater use of flexible employment contracts, arguably to circumvent the stricter regulation on open-end contracts.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

Preferences,Comparative Advantage,and Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Routinization*

I attempt to explain why there is not much evidence on compensating wage differentials for job disamenities. I focus on the match between workers’ preferences for routine jobs and the variability in tasks associated with the job. Using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, I find that mismatched workers earn lower wages and that both male and female workers in routinized jobs earn, on average, 5.5% and 7% less than their counterparts in non‐routinized jobs. However, once preferences and mismatch are accounted for, this difference decreases to 2% for men, and 4% for women, not statistically significant in both cases.     

连接外部性、横向联盟和市场竞争

分析了横向关系的双寡头企业具有连接外部性条件下的联盟决策,得出结论,横向企业的联盟降低了企业自身的成本,同时也降低了竞争对手的成本,具有正的连接外部性。企业先决定是否联盟,然后在市场上进行竞争;证实了市场竞争比较缓和时,横向企业联盟;市场竞争比较激烈时,横向企业不联盟。当存在产品差异化时,结论仍然不变;比较了企业联盟决策和社会计划者决策,论证得出市场竞争比较缓和时,企业和社会计划者联盟决策一致;市场竞争比较激烈时,企业联盟决策背离社会计划者的决策。     

Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training

Using worker and firm data from Dutch manufacturing, our paper investigates how product market competition and labor market imperfections affect firm-sponsored training. We find that product market competition does not affect the firms' training expenditures. Increasing competition, for instance due to increased international integration and globalization, is not a threat to investments in on-the-job training. Instead, labor market imperfections influence firm-sponsored training. An increase in labor market flexibility significantly reduces the incentives of firms to invest in training. The magnitude of this effect is nevertheless small.     

Performance Pay,Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*

Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.     

Multi-store competition: Market segmentation or interlacing?

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.     

The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition

We discuss two contrasting styles of vertical organization of complementary activities or components in an industry: systems competition versus component competition. When firms' competencies differ, systems competition is not a perfect substitute for component competition, even with Bertmnd behavior. Costs, prices, industry profits, and the distribution of those profits among firms all differ between the two styles of organization. Moreover, firms' profit incentives do not generally guide them towards the socially efficient form of vertical organization. In duopoly, there is a bias towards open organization (component competition), but with enough firms (three or more, in an exponential example) this bias is reversed.     

供应链管理下的企业纵向边界

在阐述交易成本理论对企业纵向边界的解释的基础上,指出供应链管理影响资产专用性、不确定性和交易频率,降低了供应链上企业的交易成本,使企业纵向边界趋于缩小。然后针对企业如何结合核心能力理论进行重组提出一些建议。     

负债来源、会计信息质量与企业投资

本文以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察了在高风险项目企业中会计信息质量对企业新增投资支出的影响,揭示了会计信息质量在债权人保护中的作用。实证结果表明:高质量的会计信息能够抑制高风险项目企业的新增投资支出,这样的抑制效果在高风险项目企业的主要负债来源为非商业银行时表现的更加显著。     

Wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker,firm, and match heterogeneity

We consider the problem of estimating and decomposing wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker, firm, and match heterogeneity. Controlling for these unobservables corrects omitted variable bias in previous studies. It also allows us to measure the contribution of unmeasured characteristics of workers, firms, and worker-firm matches to observed wage differentials. An application to linked employer-employee data shows that decompositions of inter-industry earnings differentials and the male-female differential are misleading when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.     

Acquisition of skills, labor subsidies, and agglomeration of firms

The paper develops an analytically solvable model of new economic geography in which agglomeration of firms is caused by workers' investment in the acquisition of skills. Skilled workers earn high wages and have a large demand for goods. Since firms are attracted towards the demand, they locate at proximity of skilled workers. More workers invest in the acquisition of skills when more firms ask for these skills. Consequently, partial or full agglomeration of firms may be the location equilibrium. We also show that a reduction in transport costs increases the regional governments' incentives to subsidize the acquisition of skills.     

The Economic Incentives and Consequences of Land Write-Ups

Firms in Taiwan are allowed to write up their assets when certain conditions are met. Tax benefits from higher depreciation expenses are granted to encourage corporate investment and capital maintenance. Land write-ups, unlike write-ups of depreciable assets, do not generate tax benefits. This paper investigates the economic incentives for firms in Taiwan to write up their land, and the security price reactions to land write-ups.
An analysis of annual financial data for the manufacturing firms listed in the Taiwan Exchange between 1982 and 1992 shows that firms write up their land by a larger amount when raising capital. Firms with relatively higher debt-asset ratios write up their land by a larger amount. Furthermore, the capital raised was invested in working capital or operational assets, but not in securities of other firms. The results suggest that land write-ups may reduce firms' difficulties in raising external capital, and may enhance corporate investments. The result from capital market analysis offers weak evidence that land write-ups are positively correlated with the market adjusted rate of returns of a firm's stock.     

资产质量分析——基于我国上市公司的数据

本文研究的是我国上市公司的资产质量。以K值作为衡量调整前后每股净资产的波动幅度的指标,以2000-2002年上市公司3年的样本为研究对象,分析了我国上市公司资产质量及其与盈利能力的相关问题。我们发现,K值越小,上市公司的资产质量就越好;上市公司资产质量越好,其当年的盈利能力就越好,而其未来的盈利能力却不一定好。     

审计意见与债务期限约束——来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据

中国上市家族企业存在债务期限过短的融资约束问题。标准(无保留)审计意见是否对企业债务期限融资约束产生影响呢?以2003年—2008年的上市家族企业为样本,对此问题展开实证研究发现,较之于被出具非标准审计意见的公司,被出具标准审计意见的公司所获得的银行借款期限较长;大型会计师事务所出具的标准审计意见更能缓解家族企业债务期限的约束。研究结论证实了信号传递理论。     

Some deadweight losses from the minimum wage: the cases of full and partial compliance

This paper highlights the social costs from non-price rationing of the labour force due to the minimum wage. By short-circuiting the ability of low reservation-wage workers to underbid high-reservation wage workers, the minimum wage interferes with the market's basic function of grouping the lowest cost workers with the highest productivity firms. The present paper models the deadweight loss that society bears when high reservation-cost workers displace low reservation-cost workers. When firms can evade part or all of the minimum wage, an extra deadweight loss arises. Firms with high evasive ability but low productivity may displace firms with low evasive ability but high productivity.     

A theory of minimum wage compliance (or voluntary recognition of unions)

An urn-ball matching model of the labor market is used to develop a theory of minimum wage compliance or voluntary recognition of unions. Workers can direct their search but, in the absence of wage commitment from the firms, they have no basis to do so. The default means of wage formation in one-on-one matches is Nash bargaining. When there are multiple applicants competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. By attracting more applicants, a binding wage floor provides a means for firms to increase matching rates and improve match quality. An otherwise poorly enforced minimum wage acts as a commitment device for the payment of more generous wages.