我国劝诱性医疗的成因:管制、市场结构还是信息不对称?

本文使用一个价格管制背景下的医疗信号博弈模型讨论了我国劝诱性医疗现象的成因,以及管制、市场结构和信息不对称在导致资源配置扭曲中的作用机制和相互关系。研究表明,在无管制市场中,医生存在以价格承诺实现医疗资源最优配置的动机和可能。在政府对各项医疗收费实施全面价格管制的制度背景下,过低的诊断价格上限将使市场自发的事前价格承诺机制失灵,并诱发欺骗性的诊断结果,而药品和医疗器械使用的价格上限管制则诱使医生以增加药品和医疗器械使用量的数量决策来维持自身的垄断抽租能力。这两种机制的共同作用最终导致了双重劝诱性医疗均衡。在此均衡下,由于公立医院的垄断地位未受影响,故价格管制无法改善患者的福利状况,反而会导致社会的净福利损失。     

An Experimental Investigation of Hard and Soft Price Ceilings in Emissions Permit Markets

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.     

随机需求下考虑排污权交易的制造商最优生产与定价联合决策研究

在考虑排污权交易的情况下,研究了具有价格依赖需求特征的排污制造商如何进行单周期生产和定价联合决策的问题。研究表明:制造商的最优生产量和最优定价存在且唯一;制造商的最大期望利润既是排污权交易一级市场排污权交易价格的减函数,也是二级市场排污权交易价格的减函数(当最优生产量大于排污上限时)或增函数(当最优生产量小于排污上限时);与不考虑排污权交易的情况相比,排污权交易二级市场的存在可以促进制造商进行减排投资、提高排污生产效率;由制造商决策对排污权交易政策的反应函数可知,排污权交易中的各种政策因素和市场因素都会对制造商的生产经营决策产生显著影响。     

The optimal linear alternative to price and quantity controls in the multifirm case

Linear control schedules in output have been shown superior in the one-firm case to either of the extreme controls—price or quantity; they optimally trade off the desirable characteristics of both extremes. When many firms are regulated, however, that superiority fades. Then total output affects expected benefits and can display a larger (or smaller) variance than the sum of individual firms' output variances (upon which expected costs depend) if costs are positively (negatively) correlated. Output variation must be discouraged (encouraged), therefore, and the linear schedule rotates toward the quantity (price) extreme. The better extreme might thereby become the best choice among all three alternatives.     

Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty

This paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power. Under uncertainty, the unconstrained firm 'waits longer' before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary, enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry. In the certainty case, the imposition of an inter-temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution; by contrast, under uncertainty, it cannot. Even if the price cap is optimally chosen, under uncertainty, the monopoly firm will generally (a) under-invest and (b) impose quantity rationing on its customers.     

Economic determinants of global mobile telephony growth

This study examines the substitution effect between fixed-line and mobile telephony while controlling for the consumption externality associated with telephone networks. A dynamic demand model is estimated using a global telecommunications panel dataset comprised of 56 countries from 1995–2000. Estimation results show the presence of a substantial substitution effect. Additionally income and own-price elasticities are reported. Analysis of impulse responses for price, income and network size indicate substantial mobile telephone growth is yet to be realised. However, price ceilings imposed in the fixed-line network can retard the growth of the mobile network.     

存款人的市场约束对银行成本效率的影响

本文基于我国2008—2015年65家商业银行的面板数据,从银行效率的独特视角对银行存款人市场约束的有效性进行经验研究.研究结果表明﹕ 存款价格约束和个人定期存款数量约束能够促进银行成本效率的提高;公司存款没有发挥有效的市场约束效应;未保险存款对银行效率有一定影响,但没有发挥正向积极约束效应;隐性存款保险制度不利于存款人市场约束效应的发挥;信息披露有助于存款人市场约束作用的发挥;银行成本效率存在显著的规模经济效应.     

THE PARALLEL MARKET IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES

This paper presents some general-equilibrium models of the parallel market in centrally planned economies. The models are based on the hypotheses that private firms can operate more efficiently than bureaucratically-run state enterprises and that Soviet-type economies are characterized by price controls and quantitative allocations. The state's enforcement policy is explicitly modeled. Although the welfare implications of the parallel market for workers are ambiguous in general, under a variety of circumstances they turn out to be negative. For instance, responding to the shortage created by price controls, illegal firms divert resources from the official economy into the parallel market. The result is a higher price in the parallel market without any increase in the total supply of the good.     

Automobile quality choice under pollution control regulation

In this paper, we develop a modified quality choice model to study the effects of various mobile-source air pollution control regulations. We have a single producer that supplies a fixed number of car types (two) but faces a spectrum of consumers differing in their valuation of car quality. The car manufacturer chooses the quality levels of the two car types as well as the sales mix between the two types and the size of the market it wishes to supply. By endogenizing both the sales mix and the market size, while still allowing quality to be a choice variable, we are able to more completely analyze the impact of any car pollution control regulation. Existing studies of this impact either focus on the model line adjustment response (shifts in the quality array) or on the price adjustment response (changes in the sales mix and market size). In allowing for both the model line and the price adjustment options, we find that the corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standard is unambiguously welfare superior to the low-emission vehicle quantity constraint (LEV) and zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) programs. We also show that the effects of the CAFE standard are not equivalent to those of a fuel tax, as previously found, and that, for a given car pollution target, the former is preferred to the latter.      

The automobile industry and new trade theory: A classroom experiment

In this study, the author describes a classroom experiment on new trade theory appropriate for undergraduate international economics and trade courses. Students portray U.S. and Japanese automobile manufacturers with different average cost schedules. There are five rounds in the experiment, starting with autarky in the 1960s and ending with the Great Recession of 2008–9. In each round, the instructor announces a market price and quantity and then each producer calculates its market share, average cost and profit; and makes its shutdown decision. By varying the market price and size, the experiment illustrates the gains from intra-industry trade and also how efficiency gains and economic recession impact individual firm performance.     

英文摘要

LI Cheng, LI Ke-jun, MA Wen-tao （School of Economics and Finance, Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇an 710061, China） Abstract： This paper applies the simulation method on the basis of Dynamic Stochastic G...     

Modelling investment and disinvestment decisions under competition,uncertainty and different market interventions

A real options market model is developed, which derives the firms' optimal investment and disinvestment thresholds simultaneously in a competitive environment. It combines genetic algorithms and stochastic simulation, whereby vast modelling flexibility is gained. For example, different market interventions can be integrated and their effects on the firms' investment behaviour and the sectoral welfare can be assessed. The model is validated for its application to competitive markets by numerically replicating the optimality property of myopic planning. According to the results, production ceilings and investment subsidies are preferable to price floors because the welfare is less reduced for a given stimulation of the willingness to invest. Moreover, it is shown that not considering disinvestment options, which in reality often exist, can lead to incorrect valuations of investment strategies at firm level and incorrect policy impact analyses at macroeconomic level.     

Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy

We propose a game-theoretic model to study various effects of scale in an insurance market. After reviewing a simple static model of insurer solvency (in which all customers have inelastic demand), we present a one-period game in which both the buyers and sellers of insurance make strategic bids to determine market price and quantity. For the case in which both buyers and sellers are characterized by constant absolute risk aversion, we show that a unique market equilibrium exists under certain conditions. For the special case of risk-neutral insurers, we then consider how both the price and quantity of insurance, as well as other quantities of interest to public-policy decision makers, are affected by the number of insurance firms, the number of customers, and the total amount of capital provided by investors.     

Price controls in an open economy

Wage and price controls have been increasingly called for as Western economies have experienced periods of stagflation. Part of their attractiveness has been due to the belief that they are an appropriate instrument to deal with a country's unsatisfactory balance-of-payments position. This paper evaluates the appropriateness of an incomes policy in an open economy. An optimally structured incomes policy, derived for a simple inflation model, is examined under alternative exchange rate regimes. The model, in the tradition of models by Gordon, Hicks, and Okun, is characterized by two output markets-one a flexible price market and one characterized by markup pricing-and by a single labor (input) market. This model is then used as the constraint set in a dynamic optimization problem. Both analytical and simulation results are presented. The results suggest that a direct price control program is not appropriate in an open economy.     

The changing role of consumers and suppliers in a food safety event: the 2006 foodborne illness outbreak linked to spinach

This article provides a means for testing whether buyers or sellers are responsible for a drop in sales following a market shock. We show that suppliers’ responses dominated the market reaction to the 2006 US Food and Drug Administration warning to avoid fresh spinach contaminated with potentially deadly bacteria Escherichia coli O157:H7. A modified Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for temporary price endogeneity is developed and used in a leafy green vegetable demand model. Test results indicate the price of bagged spinach was exogenous before the announcement but endogenous for approximately 12 weeks afterward. We show these results are consistent with the notion that suppliers temporarily limited the availability of spinach to consumers. Instead of consumers choosing the quantity purchased given exogenous prices, it was suppliers who limited the quantity marketed and consumers’ choices established the market price.     

初始排污权定价的分散决策模型

提出利用分散决策模型进行排污权在一级市场的定价,并证明了其合理性。在明确排污权总量的条件下,利用"多对象、多轮次"的"试错法"得到排污权的价格,并给出具体的实施步骤。结果显示:该方法具有操作性强、成本低的优点,是一种可在完全竞争市场中进行排污权定价的合理方法。     

The theory of the labor-managed firm from the membership's perspective with implications for marshallian industry supply

The partial-equilibrium literature on labor-managed (L-M) firms argues that the property-rights structure inhibits economic efficiency and induces perverse responses to price parameters in the short run. But recent general-equilibrium literature demonstrates equivalence of equilibria between L-M and capitalist market economies with the relevant welfare results therefore applying to the L-M economy. Once the L-M firm's maximand is modified to incorporate members' property rights, the short-run industry supply curves of the two economics, under quasi-market conditions consistent with recent Yugoslav reforms, are seen to be equivalent. Hence, the property-rights structure in the L-M economy is compatible with efficiency and normal short-run price responses.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly With Network Compatibility Effects

We consider the efficiency of price and quantity competition in a network products market, where we observe product compatibility with network externalities (hereafter, network compatibility effects). In particular, if network compatibility effects between firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the Cournot equilibrium is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of larger consumer, producer and total surpluses. Then, we consider an endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity. If the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, then choosing prices (quantities) is a dominant strategy for the firm. Thus, if the network compatibility effects of both firms are larger (smaller), the Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium arises. Furthermore, if the network compatibility effects between the firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the firm with a larger (smaller) network compatibility effect than a certain level of product substitutability chooses quantities (prices). In this case, the Cournot–Bertrand equilibrium arises, which is less (more) efficient than the Cournot equilibrium in terms of consumer (producer) surplus.     

Pro‐Consumer Price Ceilings under Regulatory Uncertainty*

We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough, then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut‐off level of rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used.