The Estimation of a Cusp Model to Describe the Adoption of Word for Windows*

This article revisits earlier work in this journal by Paul Herbig (1991) that proposed a catastrophe model of industrial product adoption under certain conditions. Catastrophe models are useful for modeling situations where organizations can exhibit both smooth and abrupt adoption behavior. It extends Herbig's work by focusing on organizations' adoption of new products when network externalities are an important part of the decision process, and it presents an empirical estimation of the model. Network externalities occur when firms do not want to adopt a new innovation or product unless other firms do. The reason is that they do not want to end up with an innovation that ends up not being a standard of some sort. Mistakes of this nature can be costly as the firm must invest twice and loses time relative to competitors who have not made such a mistake. However, when such externalities exist, for example with regard to technological adoptions, then normal diffusion gives way to sudden discontinuous shifts as all firms seemingly act together an move to a new technology. Since, technology is an area where the authors expect network externalities to exist, that is the focus of this article. The specific application is developed from two sets of panel data on the organizational adoptions of Microsoft's (MS) Word for Windows software by organizations that previously were using either Word for DOS or Word for Macintosh (Mac). The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on work in the economics literature on network externalities. However, the organization and new product development catastrophe model comes primarily from Herbig (1991) . The article focuses on an area of organizational adoption where relatively little empirical research has been done, namely organizational adoption “for use.” Longitudinal data provided by Techtel Corporation is used to develop the estimations. Results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical framework suggested in Herbig's article and in those found in economics and catastrophe theory literatures. This lends clear support to the idea that organizations will adopt a bandwagon‐type behavior when network externalities are present. It further suggests that in such markets, the standard S‐shaped diffusion curve is not an appropriate model for examining organizational behavior. From a managerial perspective, it means that buyers and sellers may face nonstandard diffusion curves. Instead of S‐shaped curves, the actual curves have a break or rift where sales end, and there is a sudden shift to a new product that is relatively high very early on. Clearly, for new product development (NPD), it suggest that organizations' “for‐use” purchases may be similar to regular consumers and may change rapidly from one product to another almost instantly, as in the case of the switch from vinyl records to compact discs (CDs). From an old product seller's viewpoint, the market is here today and gone tomorrow, while for the new seller it is a sudden deluge of sales requests. To put it in more everyday terms, sudden changes in adoption behavior are a September 11‐type experience for the market. It is the day the world changes.     

Technology transactions: networks over markets

There is a widespread belief in the business community that firms can rely on the market for buying and selling technological opportunities. The argument is: with so much technology development going on in the world, ‘there must be somebody somewhere who has the technology we need.’ According to this belief, acquiring new technology just boils down to finding the supplier, possibly with the help of a specialized intermediary. Several large firms have indeed developed ambitious mechanisms for acquiring the needed technological know-how as they proceed to make and market a new product. We contend that this concept of the technology transfer process is erroneous, as it conflicts with actual practice. The very high transaction costs entailed leave considerable room for opportunistic behavior and are more likely to occur when the parties do not know each other. An effective way to reduce transaction costs, therefore, is to limit technology transfers to the firm's partners, i.e. organizations with which the firm has already interacted in the past. Our research provides evidence that successful technology transfers typically take place between suppliers and buyers who had business relationships before considering a technology agreement. In addition, we report findings that companies using intermediaries (technological opportunities catalogues, databases, fairs, etc.) have been disappointed in their attempts to find new technologies from unknown sources. Because of the high risk of opportunistic behavior, it is practically impossible to assess the value of a technology without knowing who sells it. Similarly, the technology transfer capabilities of a company are difficult to appraise without prior knowledge through business interaction. To a certain extent, it may be better to buy any technology from a partner that one knows well than to buy a supposedly good technology from a firm with which one has had no experience. To put it bluntly: the identity of the partner may actually matter more than the technology being traded! Consequently, the relevant framework for technology transfer is built on a ‘network concept’ rather than the ‘market concept’. Firms wishing to acquire new technology should turn first to their network of trusted business partners, looking for available technological opportunities instead of trying to buy technology from unrelated organizations.     

Incorporating Network Externalities into the Technology Acceptance Model*

Research on network externalities has identified a number of product categories in which the market performance of an innovation (e.g., unit sales and revenues) is an increasing function of that innovation's installed base and the availability of complementary products. Innovation scholars have attributed these findings to the positive impact of network externality variables on consumer perceptions of innovation attributes. This paper provides the first empirical examination of these perceptual linkages by extending the Technology Acceptance Model to include consumer perceptions of network externality variables. The authors hypothesize that, when direct and indirect network externalities exist, consumer purchase intentions and consumer perceptions of an innovation's usefulness and ease of use will positively reflect perceptions of installed base size and the availability of complementary products. To test this reasoning, the authors developed new measures of consumer perceptions of network externality variables. These measures were incorporated into a survey that explored the attitudes in Japan of potential adopters toward digital music (DM) players at an early stage in the product life cycle. Findings reveal a direct positive relationship between ease of use and the perceived availability of digital music. The authors also find positive and significant relationships between both purchase intention and perceived usefulness and (1) the perceived size of the DM player installed base and (2) the perceived availability of digital music. An application of the Baron‐Kenny test for mediating variables reveals that (1) ease of use partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and perceived usefulness and (2) perceived usefulness partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and purchase intention. The research has important implications for future research on new product adoption and for the management of innovations that involve network externalities. The conceptual model provides a framework for testing alternative explanations of observed variations in the impact of network externalities within and across product categories. The empirical analysis provides guidance for managers who wish to manage the impact of network externalities on adoption. In addition to stimulating the size of the installed base and the variety of complementary products, executives must also manage consumer awareness of network externality variables and consumer understanding of the relationship between those variables and innovation attributes. Finally, traditional adoption models link consumer adoption decisions to perceptions of innovation attributes. The findings provided here imply that predictive accuracy of these models can be improved by including consumer perceptions of network externality variables.     

Experimenting with purchase history based price discrimination

Many purchases of differentiated goods are repeated, giving sellers the opportunity to engage in price discrimination based upon the shopper's previous behavior by either offering loyalty discounts to repeat buyers or introductory rates to new customers. Recent theoretical work suggests that loyalty discounts can be profitable to sellers when customer preferences are not stationary and sellers can pre-commit to prices for repeat buyers, but otherwise returning customers can be expected to pay the same or more than new buyers. This paper reports behavior in controlled laboratory experiments designed to empirically test the impact of these factors on pricing strategies. The results generally support the comparative static predictions of the theoretical model. When customer preferences are fixed over time, sellers attempt to lure customers from their rival. Price pre-commitment for repeat shoppers when buyer preferences vary over time resulted in modest loyalty pricing, but the discounts are not as prevalent as predicted as sellers rarely price below cost. Behaviorally, price pre-commitment to loyal customers is found to reduce prices overall.     

On the duality of political and economic stakeholder influence on firm innovation performance: Theory and evidence from Chinese firms

Research Summary

In this study, we propose and test a multi‐stakeholder perspective to address variation in innovation performance across firms. Specifically, we analyze how a focal firm's innovation performance is shaped by its political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using a data set consisting of over 26,400 Chinese firms, we first find support for our predictions that a focal firm's innovation performance will be enhanced by both its government connections and the innovativeness of its economic stakeholders. We then analyze whether the interdependent effect of these political and economic stakeholders is more likely to be synergistic versus antagonistic, and find evidence consistent with the antagonistic view.

Managerial Summary

We show how a firm's innovativeness is influenced strongly by its relationships to external stakeholders. Specifically, we examine the potentially dual‐edged role of political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using extensive data on Chinese firms, we find: (a) that the higher the level of government connections, the greater a firm's innovativeness; (b) that firms located in proximity with more innovative economic stakeholders also tend to have higher innovation performance. We also look beyond these independent positive effects to examine the joint effect of these two forms of stakeholder influence, and here we see that more influence is not always better. Specifically, we find that the innovation benefit that typically accrues to firms in proximity to more innovative economic stakeholders is weakened when those firms also have higher‐level government connections.     

The impact of technology advancement strategies on consumers' patronage decisions

Among the many factors that encourage return patronage of incumbent technology, two that have received scholarly attention in other contexts are network externalities and switching costs. However, the roles of network externalities and switching costs in encouraging return patronage of technology have not yet been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. Furthermore, no examination has been conducted of the degree to which these factors play a role in the success or failure of corporate technology advancement strategies designed to encourage return patronage. In this context, we propose a systematic framework to explore the nature of the links between technology advancement strategies and consumer technology patronage via network externalities and switching costs. Based on consumer survey data from South Korea, we find empirical support for the link between technology advancement strategies and consumers' technology patronage. Specifically, both network externalities and switching costs are found to be positively associated with technology patronage. According to this study, consumers value compatibility because it gives them access to a larger network. Further, compatibility strategy is associated with the costs involved in switching away from incumbent technology because of an abundant or varied supply of complementary goods. The results also show that preannouncement is a key marketing strategy to achieve favorable expectations and to retain the patronage of current technology users. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.     

An optimization approach to business buyer choice sets: How many suppliers should be included?

In many new or repeat purchasing situations, business buyers must decide how many suppliers to consider (a “choice set”) in determining which supplier(s) to actually buy from or contract with. This paper develops an optimization approach to determining the size of the choice set, taking into consideration buyer utility and search and evaluation costs. A theoretical model is developed for both one-time and repeat purchase situations. The model is estimated using empirical data received from bids received for procurement auctions. In these auctions, suppliers provide bids for steel pipe based on two product attributes (price and delivery time). Model sensitivity to small changes in parameters is also tested.     

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES,COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE*

Consumers sometimes make choices that impose greater external costs on those who do not make the same choice. This paper examines how the selectivity of negative externalities in such situations affects the competitive equilibrium and the desirability of an externality‐reducing public policy. Selective negative externalities create network externalities, but outcomes may differ greatly from typical network effects. Price effects may cause the imposing product's sales to decline with the size of the negative externality. Consequently, a positive competitive effect may overwhelm the externality's negative direct effects on welfare, such that a policy that enlarges the externality may improve welfare.     

Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage

This article investigates the incentives of agents working with buyers (buying agents) under the fixed percentage commission system and the implications on housing market outcomes. Our model shows that the absence of a binding contract creates a risk of losing clients for buying agents, which helps mitigate the conflict of interest between buying agents and their clients. Both the buying agent's prediction accuracy regarding their client's reservation prices and the level of tolerance given by the buyer to the buying agent affect the binding force. Results from simulations and empirical analyses using house transactions in Canada support our model predictions.     

基于网络外部性的价值模块整合与兼容性选择

本文分析了价值模块的网络外部性特征，并基于网络外部性研究了价值模块整合过程中的兼容性选择和价格竞争行为。研究结果表明：当由进入厂商选择兼容度时，兼容性越高进入厂商的市场份额越大，并能够获得更高的市场价格；当由在位厂商选择兼容度时，兼容度增加将减少消费者的转移成本，使更多的模块需求商转向购买进入厂商的产品，减少了在位厂商的市场份额；当转移成本的兼容性敏感系数较低时，在位模块供应商能够获得更高的价格，而当转移成本对兼容性很敏感时，较高的兼容度将迫使在位模块供应商降低价格。价值模块的网络外部性加剧了模块供应商之间的竞争，进一步促进了价值模块整合和产业融合的过程。     

The Influence of Regulation and Disruptive Potential on Incumbents' Submarket Entry Decision and Success in the Context of a Network Industry

This paper uses the theoretical perspectives of disruptive innovation, network externalities, and regulation to study the submarket strategies of incumbent firms that operate in a regulated network industry. In this setting, the impact of potentially disruptive innovations might be different because of the tighter regulation of incumbent firms. By analyzing the entry and success patterns of incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in the public hotspot markets in 17 Western European countries, we focus on how regulation and network effects as well as disruption factors influence the incumbent firms' strategies. In doing so, this paper departs from prior research that has primarily focused on unregulated industries and combines contradicting explanations from disruptive innovation theory, the motivation/ability framework, regulation theory, as well as network effects to provide a comprehensive analysis on how incumbents behave in a regulated network industry that is being confronted with a potentially disruptive innovation. In particular, while disruptive innovation theory predicts that the incumbents' vast experience in an industry could cause them to avoid entering new submarkets created by potentially disruptive innovations, the desire to avoid regulation could encourage such submarket entry. Furthermore, in regulated network industries, incumbent firms might have a stronger motivation to enter new submarkets as the importance of single customers and high market shares could be substantially different. These contrasting insights are used to develop an integrative research model and to derive hypotheses on incumbents' submarket entry decision and success. Drawing on cross‐sectional, multicountry data of 62 MNOs that operate in 17 Western European countries, this study uses logit and tobit regressions to test the impact of disruption factors, regulation, and network externalities on the entry decision and success of incumbent firms. The results reveal that the incumbent MNOs are caught in an area of conflict between the regulated industry context and their international technology strategy. The findings suggest that the incumbent MNOs' motivation and ability to escape regulation positively influenced their submarket entry and success in the public hotspot market. Thus, the potentially disruptive scenario was successfully turned into a potentially sustaining one as the incumbent MNOs could enhance their presence in the mobile broadband market. The testing on a multicountry basis as well as the positive influence of ethnocentric technology strategies for public hotspots, which are devised in the headquarters' location and are then brought out internationally, shed new light on an industry that has typically been characterized by country‐by‐country decisions. These findings may also reveal challenges for future research on disruptive innovations in multinational industries and expose future challenges for regulative authorities and managers. This paper thereby adds to the theory of disruptive innovation as it includes the influence of regulation on incumbents in network industries. Additionally, this study expands on previous findings on the disruptive potential of wireless local area network technology by employing a multi‐country analysis in 17 Western European countries.     

Risk sharing in supplier relations: an agency model for the Italian air‐conditioning industry

This study of risk sharing in the Italian high precision air conditioning (AC) industry confirms agency theory predictions that buyers absorb risk to a non‐negligible degree, and that they absorb more risk (a) the greater the supplier's environmental uncertainty, (b) the more risk averse the supplier, and (c) the less severe the supplier's moral hazard. The analyzed buyers accommodate for unforeseen and uncontracted‐for cost fluctuations, which is consistent with relational contract theory. The study clarifies the relationship between risk sharing and the supplier's size, technological capability, financial stability, and cost fluctuation. It also suggests how buyers may adjust their risk‐sharing strategy as suppliers grow, develop technological capabilities, and change financial structure. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multi-sided platforms in B2B contexts: The role of affiliation costs and interdependencies in adoption decisions

Multi-sided platforms, enabling interactions between different user sides, hold an important place in the contemporary economy. Current literature, focusing on established and successful platforms, has neglected to study B2B multi-sided platform adoption mechanisms. In this article, we analyze these mechanisms by investigating the case of dematerialization platforms for B2B transactions between the multiple actors involved in public works contracts. Various qualitative materials, including 28 semi-structured interviews, were gathered over a thirty-month period. Adopting a business user perspective, this study contributes to the literature on multi-sided platforms in various ways. We show that platform adoption, in project-based B2B contexts, is mainly constrained by a high level of affiliation costs and the existence of tight-interdependencies between users' activities at project level. Thus, a consecutive adoption path would result in negative cross-group network externalities and undermine the platform's attractiveness. Conversely, a concurrent adoption path would activate positive network externalities and encourage platform adoption decisions.     

2009年纽伦堡玩具展：全球玩具业在纽伦堡的相聚已走过六十年

众所周知,德国纽伦堡玩具展览公司组织的纽伦堡国际玩具展是国际领先的玩具、兴趣爱好和休闲产品展会。纯粹的贸易博览会为2700个国家和国际制造商创建了一个全面沟通和订货平台。     

电信重组引发五大悬念

重组的具体过程依然会显得漫长而艰辛,并充满各种不确定性和悬念。在经过了几年的猜谜游戏之后,中国电信行业第三次重组方案终于尘埃落定。5月24日14:00,工业和信息化部、国家发改委以及财政部联合发布中国电信业重组公告:基于电信行业现状,为实现改革目标,鼓励中国电信收购中国联通CDMA网(包括资产和用户),中国联通与中     

The cost of integrating external technologies: Supply and demand drivers of value creation in the markets for technology

A classic question faced by technology suppliers and buyers is whether to compete in the product markets or to cooperate through licensing. We address this question by examining an important, demand‐side barrier to licensing—the buyers' cost of integrating a licensed technology. We argue that this cost can be affected by suppliers' knowledge transfer capabilities, buyers' absorptive capacity, and the cospecialization between R&D and downstream activities in the buyers' industries. Following this argument and a stylized bargaining model, we hypothesize that the supplier's knowledge transfer capability stimulates licensing. Moreover, the importance of this capability increases when licensing to industries where potential buyers have weak absorptive capacity or R&D and downstream activities are cospecialized. We find support for our hypotheses using a panel dataset of small ‘serial innovators.’ Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The certifier for the long run

We build a workhorse model to study the optimal and the equilibrium certifier from a long-run perspective. Firms enter the market, and invest in their capacity to provide quality, before the certification threshold is determined. With a certifier that cares about quality and externalities (such as an NGO), the threshold is demanding and the firms’ profits are small. Anticipating this, only a few firms enter the market, and they invest heavily. With a certifier mostly concerned with the firms’ profits (such as an industry association), the results are reversed. The relative importance of externalities, investments, and entry determines the socially optimal certifier identity as well as the type of certifier that is most likely to operate in equilibrium. The theory’s predictions are empirically testable and shed light on the variety of certifiers across markets and over time.     

Network effects in mobile telecommunications markets: A comparative analysis of consumers' preferences in five Latin American countries

It has been shown that the presence of demand-side externalities can induce the market to benefit the largest firms in terms of market share, usually named as network effect by the theoretical literature. On the one hand, macro-level approach in the empirical literature of network effects commonly use the assumption that a network's overall size matters more to consumers' decisions (global network effects). On the other hand, micro-level studies have suggested that social networks are more relevant to consumers' choices than the overall network size (local network effects). Based on microdata from five Latin American countries, we compare the choice of a particular operator over choosing the largest operator by individual consumers. Our research shows that country-level network size is one among a set factors that determine consumers' choices of mobile operators, once individual and operators' country presence heterogeneity are considered. We find that consumers' local network decisions are important for the choice of operator in the majority of cases considered, and that this result is conditional on the chosen operator's market share. Furthermore, network characteristics and consumer preferences, such as coverage, tariffs, and network importance also affect the choice of mobile network for the Latin American context.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

This paper develops a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNO's) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNO's. In the absence of international alliances, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, international alliances are endogenously formed since they serve as a commitment device to soften competition on the retail market, leading to excessively high roaming per‐call prices.