Risk Aversion and Trade‐Union Membership*

If trade unions provide only their members with insurance against income variations, as a private good, this insurance will provide a stronger incentive for more risk‐averse employees to become union members. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and various direct measures of individual risk attitudes, we find robust evidence of a positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership for full‐time employees. This association is particularly strong for males and in West Germany.     

Union Wage Effects in the Presence of Enterprise Bargaining

Previous research on union wage effects has underestimated the potential for unions to raise member wages since the data used do not enable differences across bargaining units to be properly accounted for. This study addresses this deficiency by utilizing matched employer–employee data that permit workplace-specific union wage effects to be identified. Results from the estimation of wage equations indicate that, while there is only a very small intra-workplace union wage effect, differences across workplaces are considerable. This differential, however, only exists at workplaces where there is substantial coverage by collective agreements.     

A Theoretical Analysis of Trade Union Membership Fees, Bargaining Power, Wage Rate and Unemployment

The positive effect of membership fees on trade unions' cohesion and commitment and the adverse effect of these fees on trade unions' density imply that the effects of membership fees on trade unions' bargaining power, wage rate and unemployment can be depicted by inverted U-shaped curves whose upper bounds are reached when membership fees are set at half the ratio of the upper-bound on members' level of satisfaction from the trade union services to their disposable income rate. The implications of these effects for membership fees are analysed for a trade union that sets its membership fee so as to minimise the loss stemming from missing wage rate and unemployment targets.     

Monetary Union Enlargement,Fiscal Policy,and Strategic Wage Setting*

This contribution develops a framework for studying the effects of the enlargement of a monetary union on macroeconomic performances in the presence of strategic interactions between non‐atomistic labor unions, monetary, and fiscal authorities. We show that the integration of new identical member countries may have beneficial effects, depending on the fiscal policymaking structure. Qualifications to this result are provided under cross‐country asymmetries in the size of the economies, the structure of the labor markets, and the fiscal authorities' preferences.     

Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Apprenticeship Training*

The relatively small average wage effects of employer and occupation changes after apprenticeship training mask large differences between occupation groups and apprentices with different schooling backgrounds. People who change employer and occupation within industrial occupations enjoy large wage advantages, whereas apprentices in commerce and trading occupations, as well as in construction and crafts occupations, face wage losses from an occupation change. The differences between the firms that provide the apprenticeship training are found to be small or insignificant. In this paper, we reconcile the differences between previous findings by comparing and replicating the empirical estimation strategies used. This demonstrates that selectivity in occupations and changes, unobserved heterogeneity between occupations, and sample selection do matter.     

Union Wage Strategies and International Trade

We characterise a full set of possible international trade regimes for different combinations of wages in a two-country model of oligopoly with a homogeneous product. We show that the nature of any equilibrium trade will be either inter-industry (one-way) or intra-industry (two-way) depending on (endogenous) union choices between high and low-wage strategies. We show that intra-industry trade is the more likely the lower are trade costs, and that under intra-industry trade, falling trade costs lead monopoly unions to set higher wages, but the opposite obtains under inter-industry trade.     

Wage Inertia and Comparison Effects in Australian Award Wage Determination, 1964-74*

This paper attempts to explain the determination of average award wage changes without assuming that the outcome of certain strategic wage settlements is known. Models which allow for habit-inertia and comparison effects are constructed. It is argued that the main impact of these factors is on the specification and interpretation of lagged adjustment of wages to changes in its determinants. These models are empirically tested using the pre-indexation quarterly data. An analysis of 1973-74 wage experience is also provided.     

Taxation and Wage Bargaining*

The paper analyzes the effects of personal taxes on wage bargaining It concludes that an increase in tax progressivity will normally increase union wage-bargaining pressure and so raise the equilibrium wage This is the opposite result to that recently derived by Creedy and McDonald (1990).     

Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union‐Wide Ballot Requirements*

To avoid strikes and to curb labour militancy, some governments have introduced legislation stating that union leadership as well as wage offers should be decided through union‐wide ballots. This paper shows that members still have incentives to appoint militant union leaders, if these leaders have access to information critical for the members’ voting decisions. Furthermore, conflicts may arise in equilibrium even though the contract zone is never empty and there is an option to resolve any incomplete information. Ballot requirements hence preclude neither militant union bosses nor inefficient conflicts.     

Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation

This paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm may or maynot be able to sell out of its inventory of finished goods during astrike. Firms and the union are both risk neutral and have the same discountrate. It is shown that the wage equilibrium corresponds to the axiomaticNash bargaining solution where the threatpoints are the agents' payoffsshould bargaining continue indefinitely. We use the 1980 and 1982 EmploymentActs to test this theory, interpreting that legislation change as changingthe firm's threatpoint but not its bargaining power. This allows us toidentify the value of the firm's threatpoint post-1982. Formal testssupport the theory. Also consistent with the theory, it is found that unionwages decrease with inventories after 1982, but not before, and that theunion wage gap is smaller after 1982.     

Wage Determination In Australia*

This paper examines whether a stable expectations-augmented Phillips curve exists for Australia. High real wages in the face of continuing high unemployment over the past decade have led to suggestions that the level of unemployment has little effect on wage determination, with the bargaining process taking place between employers and those employees in ‘secure employment’. Results from aggregate data suggest that the level of unemployment is relevant to wage determination. In addition, the impact of overtime on the growth in money wages is consistent with the view that those in secure employment are influenced by labour market conditions.     

The Internationalization of the Us Wage Process*

This paper explains the wage-growth slowdown that occurred in the US in the 1980s. Using the vector auto regression method, it is shown that (I) a substantial portion of variations in the growth rate of average hourly earnings and other sectoral wages in the US can be attributed to exchange-rule changes; (2) during the 1983-1985 period the strong appreciation significantly reduced the growth rate of wages, but the subsequent depreciation had only modest effects; and (3) sectors like construction and services, traditionally assumed to be immune to foreign competition, have become sensitive to exchange-rate developments.     

Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality: A Theory of Domino Effects*

Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences. I demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy, maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages. Unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages, and still not sacrifice higher wages much, if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency-enhancing wage differences. If these “domino effects” are strong enough, then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage.     

On the Long-Run Growth Effects of a Minimum Wage for a Two-Sector Economy*

This paper investigates the effect of (nationally enforced) minimum wage regulation on economic growth using the standard two-sector model. The paper shows, inter alia. that the minimum wage regulation (if it is effective) always lowers the rate of growth by inducing over-capitalization in the economy, and that a minimum wage poor which is sufficiently high causes the economy to decay continually. A diagrammatical exposition of some of the results is also provided.     

Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union

This paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or at the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary union's countries; namely on the degree of openness of the monetary union, and the differentiation index between national goods.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level*

To what extent do firms insulate their workers' wages from fluctuations in product markets? Which firm and worker attributes are associated with wage flexibility at the micro level? We first rely on Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) to estimate dynamic models of sales and wages, finding that in Portugal, workers' wages respond to permanent shocks on firm performance, as opposed to transitory shocks. We then explore the factors associated with wage flexibility, finding that collective bargaining and minimum wages are associated with higher wage insurance by the firm, while the threat of firm bankruptcy reduces it. Managers receive less protection against permanent shocks than other workers.     

Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

Abstract. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict free‐riding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free‐rider problem.