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1.
Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5 and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors may be good policy for many local governments.  相似文献   

2.
This study examines the effect of audit risks in the Korean initial public offering (IPO) market on the designated auditors’ decisions. The Korean External Audit Act requires firms to switch from incumbent to new auditors designated by the Securities and Futures Commission after the firm announces a future IPO. This study shows the effects of audit risks by examining if the quality of reported earnings and audit fees significantly differs between IPO‐eligible and IPO‐ineligible firms. Empirical tests first show that discretionary accruals are significantly lower for IPO‐ineligible firms than for IPO‐eligible firms in both the IPO designation period and the following review period. We interpret this result to mean that designated auditors evaluate the IPO‐ineligible (and eventually failed) firms’ listing possibility as low. Second, audit fees are higher for IPO‐ineligible firms in the auditor designation period. This reflects the fact that designated auditors are exposed to future audit risks associated with firms’ post‐IPO financial market troubles if IPO‐ineligible firms attempt to go public. Our study contributes to IPO‐related research by showing the effects of auditors’ risk evaluation on discretionary accruals and audit fees. This study also contributes to accounting policymaking regarding auditor independence.  相似文献   

3.
We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.  相似文献   

4.
This study examines the effect of the mandatory designation rule on audit fees charged and audit hours rendered by auditors for firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule in the Korean audit market. Under the mandatory auditor designation rule, which took effect in 1991, problematic firms are assigned new auditors by the Financial Supervisory Service. Previous studies suggest that this regulation positively affects the quality of audits by promoting auditor independence. Thus, this study hypothesises that firms that have been subjected to mandatory auditor designation improve the quality of their financial reporting, and that auditors hired after the mandatory designation period account for reduced audit risks when determining audit fees and audit hours. This study shows that audit fees and audit hours of firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule are lower than those of other initial audit engagements. Taken together, this study's findings reinforce the notion that auditors’ perceptions of changes in audit risk yield corresponding changes in the audit fees they charge and audit hours they render.  相似文献   

5.
The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.  相似文献   

6.
This study investigates the market for audit services in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The market has a number of interesting features, including the presence of the Audit Commission as a regulator, appointer and provider of audit services. Following a theoretical overview of audit pricing in the NHS, evidence is provided on the behaviour of private sector auditors in an environment where audit risk characteristics differ from the private sector. The research also investigates, for the first time in the public sector, the relationship between audit fees and non–audit (consultancy) fees. Comparisons are also drawn between audit fees in the public and private sectors in an analysis of audit fees by industry. Despite some key similarities, the study shows that a number of differences exist between private and public sector audit fee models. In particular, we find no evidence of Big 6 (or mid–tier) auditor premiums, but we do find a significant negative relationship between audit and consultancy fees providing support for the 'knowledge spill–over' hypothesis. In addition, the fees charged to trusts appear significantly lower than their private sector counterparts, despite trust auditors having additional duties to perform. Possible explanations for this finding are offered in the paper.  相似文献   

7.
The present study provides empirical evidence on the impact of government ownership on audit pricing behaviour based on data from Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2008. Our findings, having controlled for auditor choice, indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) incur significantly lower audit fees than non-SOEs. The results also reveal a significant interaction between the type of SOE (i.e., owned by central vs. local government) and audit firm size, which also affects audit fees. More specifically, large auditors tend to charge the central-SOEs lower audit fees than local-SOEs (province, city and county), while small auditors charge central-SOEs higher fees than local-SOEs. We explore a political economy rationale from a supply-side perspective in explaining the results.  相似文献   

8.
This paper reports the results of an analysis of the determinants of audit fees of both financial and non-financial companies in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi audit services market is unusual in that there is no direct involvement of international audit firms in it. The results of the regressions show that the size of the auditee has the greatest influence on audit fees. Whilst there was no international Big Six grouping, it was possible to construct a group of Bangladeshi audit firms which commanded a price premium, based on their size and whether they had a link with an international firm of auditors. Financial services companies were found to have higher audit fees relative to non-financial companies. Subsidiaries of multi-national holding companies also had higher audit fees. The surprising result was that auditees which employed at least one qualified accountant had higher audit fees.  相似文献   

9.
In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.  相似文献   

10.
Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.  相似文献   

11.
In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.  相似文献   

12.
This study investigates whether sudden and severe reductions in total CEO compensation affect auditor perceptions of risk. We argue that extreme CEO pay cuts can incentivize the CEO to manipulate the financial reports or make risky operational decisions in a desperate attempt to improve firm performance. This incentive, in turn, is likely to impact auditor assessments of audit risk and auditor business risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive and highly significant association between extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees. The results suggest that audit fees are 4.6% higher when there is an extreme CEO pay cut, which corresponds to an audit fee that is $111,458 higher for the average firm-year observation in our sample.  相似文献   

13.
This paper offers new findings about how audit fees vary around auditor dismissals and resignations. For dismissals, we find evidence of lower than normal fees before and after an auditor change, consistent with the view that both incumbent and successor auditors adjust fees downward to retain the client. Our evidence also shows that incumbent and successor auditors charge unusually high fees before and after a resignation. We interpret the higher than normal incumbent fees as an indication that resignation companies reflect unusual levels of audit effort or risk, which the incumbent auditor captures as additional fees. Eventually, however, the additional fees are insufficient, inducing the incumbent to resign. A fee premium by the successor auditor after resignation also supports this view.  相似文献   

14.
This study examines the effects of auditor market share and product differentiation on audit fees. Previous studies have attributed the price premium charged by the Big Eight (the Big Six in the present study) to Big Eight product differentiation. However, such a price premium could be partly due to monopoly pricing. In the present study, the Hong Kong audit market provides a unique setting in which a non-Big Six local auditor has a market share comparable to those of the third and fourth largest Big Six firms. This makes it feasible to control for the effects of market share via matching. Also, the wide disparity among the Big Six firms ‘market shares in Hong Kong makes it feasible to test for the effects of market power on audit fees. The results show that, consistent with prior studies, the Big Six audit firms charge higher audit fees than non-Big Six firms in the small auditee, but not the big auditee, market. This suggests that similar economic forces to those other audit markets are also at work in Hong Kong. Despite the Big Six firms’ widely different market shares, there was no price differentiation among them. Yet there was a Big Six price premium over the large local firm with a similar market share to those of two of the Big Six. Together, these results suggest that the Big Six price premium is a result of product differentiation rather than monopoly pricing.  相似文献   

15.
We find that firms with higher CSR performance are more likely to choose Big N auditors and less likely to switch to non-Big N auditors, consistent with socially responsible firms demanding higher audit quality. Furthermore, we provide robust evidence that firms with higher CSR performance pay lower audit fees using both levels and changes models, suggesting that higher CSR performance reduces auditor engagement risk. Our analysis based on the difference-in-differences approach indicates that it is higher CSR performance that leads to lower audit fees, not vice versa. Overall, the results highlight the important role of CSR performance in auditor-client contracting.  相似文献   

16.
In this study, we examine the effect of income smoothing on auditors' pricing decisions. Analyzing a sample of 12,823 firm-year observations from U.S. companies in non-regulated industries for the period 2000–2018, we find that income smoothing is negatively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors favorably view smoothed earnings. This result holds when we control for other variables that have been identified as determinants of audit fees in prior literature, including client-specific (e.g., client size, audit complexity, litigation risk, and corporate governance), auditor-specific (e.g., auditor quality, auditor tenure, and auditor expertise), and engagement-specific (e.g., audit opinion, busy season, reporting lag) factors. Our results also hold across (1) alternative smoothing measures (with and without considering the use of accruals to smooth earnings), (2) different sources of income smoothness (innate vs. discretionary components) and (3) various robustness tests. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that auditors perceive income smoothing as signaling rather than opportunistic behavior, and thus charge lower audit fees. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines income smoothing directly from the perspective of auditors.  相似文献   

17.
This study investigates whether auditor perceptions of risk are affected by accretive stock repurchases, which prior research has suggested is a form of earnings management. We argue that auditors are likely to view earnings management conducted through the use of accretive stock repurchases as a signal of increased risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive and significant association between the use of accretive stock repurchases as an earnings management technique and audit fees. The results suggest that audit fees are 6.0% higher when accretive stock repurchases are used to manage earnings, which corresponds to an audit fee that is approximately $107,000 higher for the average firm-year observation in our sample.  相似文献   

18.
An analytical model predicts that cross-sectionally (1) the marginal cost of auditor quality is inversely related to the strength of client companies' internal control. (2) In the short run, clients with stronger control, lower business risk, or less complex audits choose higher quality auditors; but whether they pay higher audit fees is indeterminate. (3) In the long run, client companies have both lower quality auditors and weaker controls as risk or complexity increase, so less precise financial reporting is expected from them. (4) The effects of risk and complexity on fees are indeterminate, because the price and quantity components of fees tend to vary inversely as risk or complexity change. The predictions are consistent with findings that have been viewed as empirical anomalies.  相似文献   

19.
The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.  相似文献   

20.
We apply game theory to model how alternative mandatory audit firm rotation regimes can affect the strategic interaction between auditee and auditor firms, and analyze potential consequences on detection risk and impairment of auditor scepticism. The major results suggest that: (1) relative to an initial state with no rotation requirement but high probability for impaired auditor scepticism, imposing either short-term or long-term mandatory audit firm rotation will remove the threat to auditor scepticism and lead to higher audit fees and lower detection risk; (2) relative to long-term mandatory audit firm rotation, imposing a short-term rotation will lead to lower audit fees and higher detection risk, resulting from greater informational frictions. We further find that imposing supplementary regulatory instruments, such as increased regulatory scrutiny of the auditee and/or auditor, can be used to lower the detection risk and increase audit quality. We discuss implications of these findings for empirical research.  相似文献   

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