Driven by the markets? ECB sovereign bond purchases and the securities markets programme

At the height of the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank decided to purchase distressed European government bonds. Even worse, and more importantly, the ECB is providing direct support of several hundred billions of euros to troubled banks via its normal monetary policy operations by granting them the opportunity to refinance at an interest rate of 1%. This article argues that these purchases will result in common monetary policy being dominated by national fiscal policies. The most worrisome aspect is that the euro area appears to have stumbled into unconventional monetary policies that, once started, will be difficult to exit. In the euro area, properly functioning financial markets are at risk.     

Neuausrichtung der Europapolitik

The economic power of the euro countries should be strengthened by growth incentives, in the form of an additional European growth fund, which should also be funded by financial transaction tax revenues. The current level of debt requires a strengthening of government revenues. Taxes must be collected more effectively, and tax harmonisation should eliminate imbalances in the EU. The banking union should be a central component of crisis management. Moreover, the lingering debt problem must be solved.     

宏观政策的协调机制与欧洲债务危机

通过政策调整损失函数的理论模型分析,认为负的需求冲击是构成欧洲债务危机的前提,而缺乏货币政策协调的持续性扩张财政政策是欧洲债务危机的本质原因。对2000Q1—2010Q1的"PIIGS"的季度数据进行实证分析后,发现5国独立财政政策和欧元区共同货币政策的协调机制是存在冲突的。希腊长期均衡和短期调整均存在主权债务危机风险,因而成为首个爆发危机的国家。西班牙、意大利的短期调整虽暂时缓解了主权债务危机出现的可能,但不能解决发生危机的根本问题。而爱尔兰、葡萄牙只是短期内实施了过度的积极财政计划而造成了主权债务危机假象。     

Can the Euro Survive?

One of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro. For much of 2011, the euro was a key reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. Now, however, the gravity of the crisis is finally dragging down the euro. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters its third uncertain year, the question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the euro can survive given policymakers still have in hand various tools. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.     

Wirtschaftspolitik für die Eurozone

At the root of the euro crisis was not only a sovereign debt crisis but also a balance-of-payments crisis. A multi-faceted approach is required to restore sustainable growth and prevent a vicious circle of public and private sector deleveraging leading to weaker economic activity, which in turn results in a further deterioration in banks’ asset quality. Both governments and the European Central Bank (ECB) face challenges. Governments must make progress in restoring the health and resilience of the banking sector and introduce microeconomic reforms in product, services and labour markets to reduce divergent trends in competitiveness and productivity. Budgetary discipline must be respected, and the ECB should avoid any deflationary bias while stabilising inflation at or around two per cent for the euro area as a whole.     

Das Securities Market Programme — viele Vorteile für den Euroraum

The Eurosystem’s Securities Market Programme (SMP,) the purchase of government bonds of euro area countries strongly affected by the crisis, started in 2010 and ended in 2012. The SMP benefited all parties concerned – the Eurosystem, all euro area countries and the crisis countries. The positive experience with the SMP can be replicated in the private sector with the creation of an exchangetraded fund (ETF), a Smart Beta ETF - SMP Fund. Like the SMP, the SMP Fund would buy government bonds, according to the ECB capital key. As an ETF, the SMP Fund would have low costs. Profits above the German Bund benchmark would be shared: 80% to investors, 10% to the SMP Fund and 10% to advisers who recommend the purchase. The related risks would be reduced by the diversification of the SMP Fund, the financing mechanisms of the euro area, especially the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the banking union. The SMP Fund could support the euro area fiscal capacity and the EU capital markets union. Past and future SMP profits create a fiscal capacity for the euro area with an initial amount of 50 billion Euro.     

Europäischer Zinslastenausgleich — eine sinnvolle Alternative zu EZB-Anleihekäufen

The eurozone’s public debt crisis is not over yet - as displayed in the still substantial yield spreads between “northern” and “southern” euro government bonds. Whereas the ECB tried to tackle this problem by announcing (in Sept. 2012) its willingness to conduct unlimited “outright monetary transactions” to the benefit of the southern countries, the German “Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)” offered a less risky option in its “Kiel policy brief” (Jan. 2013): it suggested narrowing this yield spread by establishing a “yield spread compensation fund”, which would balance out interest payments among euro countries. Though this may sound like the first concrete eurozone bailout mechanism, the idea really is a risk-free debt alleviation tool, matching windfall gains with windfall profits without too much of a bailout.     

Interaction in euro area sovereign bond markets during the financial crisis

Applying a t-DCC-GARCH model to daily spread data, four phases of interaction in euro area sovereign bond markets are identifi ed between January 2008 and June 2013. The initial period (January-October 2008) is followed by a general rise in pairwise correlation values between November 2008 and late 2009/early 2010. Interaction then declines on a piecemeal basis up to early 2012. In autumn 2012, coinciding with the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the European Central Bank, there is evidence of some reengagement of bond markets with one another. Policy then seems to have had an infl uence on euro area sovereign bond market behaviour. While it can act to calm markets, policy may also be unduly infl uencing market dynamics and raising moral hazard issues.     

Designing EU–US Atlantic Monetary Relations: Exchange Rate Variability and Labour Markets

The variability of the euro seems to have a statistically significant and economically small, but non‐negligible, impact on labour markets in Euroland. Unemployment tends to increase and employment growth tends to fall whenever the effective exchange rate of the euro or the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate becomes more variable. In the US a similar effect seems to be operating, but it is statistically less strong, especially concerning employment growth, which seems largely insulated from exchange rate variability. These results fit the general observation that US labour markets are more flexible and that the euro area is considerably more open than the US (exports of goods and services amount to close to 18 per cent of Euroland GDP versus only about 11 per cent for the US).     

Helicopter Money: Should Central Banks Rain Money from the Sky?

Ultra-low interest rates have become an endemic and potentially problematic characteristic of the global economy. Central banks in the euro area, the United States, Japan and Australia have bet on lowering interest rates to increase inflation, but despite their efforts, core inflation remains stubbornly below the desired two per cent. However, central banks have another tool at their disposal that has the potential to stimulate inflation: helicopter money.     

Deutschland haftet — aber warum umsonst?

State guarantees have been proven instruments of economic policy in Germany for decades. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, the sum of contractual, statutory and implied guarantees reached nearly 6 trillion euros. For the German government, the outstanding guarantees become ever riskier as the huge amounts of liability for banks and instable euro-states grows. Therefore it is suggested to require risk-based guarantee fees wherever possible. With the exception of Greece, most of the indebted countries and financial institutions certainly would be able to pay risk-orientated guarantee fees to avoid being cut off from capital markets. A European debt agency which earns money by giving guarantees would enhance the acceptance of the euro stabilization policy in the donor countries.     

Ramifications of debt restructuring on the euro area

The Greek government budget situation plays a central role in the debt crisis in the euro area. Strong consolidation measures need to be implemented, with potential adverse effects on the Greek economy and further credit requirements. Debt conversion might therefore become a reasonable alternative. The following paper provides some simulation-based calculations of the expected fiscal costs for the governments in the large European countries, Germany, France, Spain and Italy, arising from different policy options — among them a second Greek rescue package.     

Anmerkungen zu „Der Vorsorge-Albtraum“ von Carl Christian von Weizsäcker

Weizsäcker suggests that maintenance or even an increase in the current level of government debt is necessary to provide people with opportunities to save for the future. However, there are several politico-economic reasons for a reduction of public debt. Moreover, if people start to doubt the sustainability of an increasing percentage of public debt, a vicious circle can lead to a debt crisis, which would threaten the country’s political and economic stability. Public debt is not a burden for later generations when the rate of interest is below the rate of growth. Public debt may cause problems for the economy, but the absence of public debt also causes problems. Germany raised substantial implicit public debt by providing guarantees for the public debt of other euro countries, but if Germany had let the euro collapse, the “new Deutsche Mark” would have caused a severe defl ation, which also would have led to increased public debt. The new era of the “provision nightmare” requires a “new thinking” concerning public debt. Whenever the capital market adopts this new thinking, it will develop instruments to stabilise the economy even at high levels of public debt.     

Banking union with a sovereign virus

Despite the experience of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, European banks continue to hold large amounts of bonds from their home governments. This ties the fates of the sovereign and the banks together, leading to the disruptive self-reinforcing feedback loops that brought the euro area to the brink of collapse. This article addresses how banks can be weaned off of their massive investments in their home government’s bonds.     

On international integration of emerging sovereign bond markets

The paper investigates the international integration of EM sovereign dollar-denominated and local-currency bond markets. Factor analysis is used to examine movements in bond yields and common sources of variation. Results suggest that EM dollar-denominated debt markets are highly integrated; one common factor, highly correlated with US and EU interest rates, explains 80% of the total variability in yields. Local currency bond markets are not as internationally integrated, and three common factors explain 74% of total variability. But a global interest rates factor still explains 63% of the yield variation accounted for by common factors. Heterogeneity among EMs is explored.     

A more effective euro area monetary policy than OMTs — gold-backed sovereign debt

Given the shortcomings of the current responses to the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, the author proposes utilising national gold reserves as collateral for government debt. Gold backing would be quite attractive to bond investors and would significantly ease the burden of high sovereign debt yields, particularly in Portugal and Italy. Moreover, it would achieve this without adding further risky assets to the European Central Bank’s balance sheet and thereby transferring credit risk to Northern European countries.     

The near-death experience of the celtic tiger

This article narrates Ireland’s recent odyssey from the pride and envy of Europe to kneeling supplicant through the eyes of an econometric model of the government bond market. The exercise suggests that, in essence, two developments triggered and propelled Ireland’s drift towards sovereign default: first, the global financial crisis that drove Ireland into a severe recession with collapsing tax revenues and increasing unemployment; second, a gap between the post-2007 increase in sovereign default risk that can actually be linked to macroeconomic fundamentals and the much bigger increase in perceived risk reflected by high interest rates and communicated by the massive downgrades of Ireland’s sovereign debt rating.     

Gesundheitsfonds: Regelbindung für stabile GKV-Finanzen und sinnvollen Kassenwettbewerb

An unexpected surplus in the German statutory health insurance central fund has led to unwise discretionary decisions which should be avoided in the future. First, the setting of the contribution rate, which is currently politically determined, should be replaced by a rule-based procedure to adjust contribution revenues to expected expenditures. Furthermore, in view of the European Fiscal Compact’s debt criteria becoming effective in 2014, health care financing’s dependence on the state budget should be reduced. However, reorganising health care financing is only one area of reform. It should be accompanied by implementing workable solutions for increased competition among health insurers as well as providers.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

MONETARY POLICY RULES IN THE RUN‐UP TO THE EMU

We characterize central bank behavior in the euro area during the run‐up to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) era by estimating Taylor rule‐type reaction functions at both the individual and aggregate level. We focus on whether national monetary policies during the run‐up to the EMU were responding to economic developments according to their own policy rules or to a broader, euro area‐wide, policy rule. To consider the last possibility we examine whether national monetary policies were responding to German interest rates. Finally, we compare the performance of the estimated with imposed policy rules.